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Kamil, A. C. (1998). On the Proper Definition of Cognitive Ethology. In Russell P. Balda, Irene M. Pepperberg, & Alan C. Kamil (Eds.), Animal Cognition in Nature (pp. 1–28). London: Academic Press.
Abstract: Summary The last 20-30 years have seen two `scientific revolutions' in the study of animal behavior: the cognitive revolution that originated in psychology, and the Darwinian, behavioral ecology revolution that originated in biology. Among psychologists, the cognitive revolution has had enormous impact. Similarly, among biologists, the Darwinian revolution has had enormous impact. The major theme of this chapter is that these two scientific research programs need to be combined into a single approach, simultaneously cognitive and Darwinian, and that this single approach is most appropriately called cognitive ethology.
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Müller-Wohlfahrt, H. W., Kübler, U., & Müller- Wohlfahrt, H. W. (1998). Hundert Prozent fit und gesund. Das Geheimnis des gesunden Menschen. München: Heyne.
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Shettleworth, S. J. (1998). Cognition, Evolution and Behaviour. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Abstract: Description
How do animals perceive the world, learn, remember, search for food or mates, and find their way around? Do any non-human animals count, imitate one another, use a language, or think as we do? What use is cognition in nature and how might it have evolved? Historically, research on such questions has been fragmented between psychology, where the emphasis has been on theoretical models and lab experiments, and biology, where studies focus on evolution and the adaptive use of perception, learning, and decision-making in the field. Cognition, Evolution and the Study of Behavior integrates research from psychology, behavioral ecology, and ethology in a wide-ranging synthesis of theory and research about animal cognition in the broadest sense, from species-specific adaptations in fish to cognitive mapping in rats and honeybees to theories of mind for chimpanzees. As a major contribution to the emerging discipline of comparative cognition, the book is an invaluable resource for all students and researchers in psychology, zoology, behavioral neuroscience. It will also interest general readers curious about the details of how and why animals--including humans--process, retain, and use information as they do. Reviews “This book is a very comprehensive review of animal cognition. It differs from other texts on this topic in a number of ways, as outlined by Shettleworth in her preface and in the opening chapter. Essentially, Shettleworth wants to advocate an 'adaptationist or ecological approach to cognition'. In doing so, she brings together a wealth of data on animal cognition, studied from quite different theoretical viewpoints, such as cognitive ethology, animal learning theory, neuroscience, behavioural ecology and cognitive psychology. . . . Each chapter ends with a clear and useful summary, and helpful suggestions for further reading. The book's numerous illustrations, which are mostly tables or figures redrawn by Margaret Nelson, greatly add to its appeal. . . . [T]his is a marvellously rich, well-written and stimulating book. . . . I greatly enjoyed reading [and] recommend it highly to anyone interested in animal cognition, evolution and behaviour.”--Animal Behaviour “Sara Shettleworth has probably written the most comprehensive study of the animal mind ever and therefore a fundamental textbook on 'comparative cognition'. She first gets consciousness out of the way: whether an animal is conscious or not is impossible to determine, since consciousness is a private, subjective phenomenon. We can study cognition, and certainly cognition lends credibility to the idea that at least some animals must be at least to some degree conscious, but experiments can only prove facts about cognition. She reviews the field of cognitive ethology from the beginning and then analyzes the main cognitive tasks from an information-processing perspective By the end of her review of cognitive faculties, it become apparent that, at least among vertebrates, there are no significant differences in learning, except for language. All vertebrates are capable of 'associative' learning What no other vertebrate seems to be capable of is 'syntax'.” -- Piero Scaruffi, Thymos.com |
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Yulk G. (1998). Leadership in organizations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Abstract: Yulk G. 1998. Leadership in organizations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall
Leadership in Organizations focuses on effective leadership in organizations through both theory and practice. This book explains and critiques the major theories and studies that are most relevant and informative and reviews what we know about leadership effectiveness. This combination of theory and practice makes this text a useful resource for practicing managers who are looking for something more than superficial answers to difficult questions about leadership. |
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Byrne, R. W., & Russon, A. E. (1998). Learning by imitation: a hierachical approach. Behav. Brain Sci., 21, 667–721.
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Mench, J. A., Morrow-Tesch, J., & Chu, L. - R. (1998). Environmental enrichment for farm animals. Lab Anim., 27, 32–36.
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Nissen, J. (1998). Enzyklopädie der Pferderassen. Stuttgart: Kosmos.
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Urcuioli, P. J., DeMarse, T. B., & Zentall, T. R. (1998). Transfer across delayed discriminations: II. Differences in the substitutability of initial versus test stimuli. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 24(1), 47–59.
Abstract: In 2 experiments, pigeons were trained on, and then transferred to, delayed simple discriminations in which the initial stimuli signalled reinforcement versus extinction following a retention interval. Experiment 1 showed that discriminative responding on the retention test transferred to novel test stimuli that had appeared in another delayed simple discrimination but not to stimuli having the same reinforcement history off-baseline. By contrast, Experiment 2 showed that performances transferred to novel initial stimuli whether they had been trained on-baseline or off-baseline. These results suggest that the test stimuli in delayed simple discriminations acquire control over responding only in the memory task itself. On the other hand, control by the initial stimuli, if coded as outcome expectancies, does not require such task-specific training.
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Templeton, J. J. (1998). Learning from others' mistakes: a paradox revisited. Anim. Behav., 55(1), 79–85.
Abstract: Some researchers have reported the paradoxical finding of enhanced social learning when naive observers learn from unskilled rather than skilled demonstrators, particularly in discrimination tasks. In two experiments with starlings,Sturnus vulgaris, I considered whether this enhanced learning is because the observer (1) sees incorrect responses only, (2) sees both correct and incorrect responses or (3) sees an increase in the proportion of correct responses over trials. In experiment 1, individual starlings observed a demonstrator bird perform multiple simultaneous discrimination tasks. In one group, the demonstrator always picked the correct stimulus; in another group, the demonstrator always picked the incorrect stimulus; in a third group, the demonstrator consistently picked the correct stimulus 50% of the time. Those subjects that observed only incorrect choices performed significantly better than the other two groups, but none of the birds achieved the 90% correct performance criterion. Experiment 2 involved a single discrimination task; thus, a fourth group was added to control for individual learning. Again, subjects that observed only incorrect responses learned the discrimination significantly more quickly than the other three groups. Subjects that observed the demonstrator make both correct and incorrect responses were equally likely to select the same (correct) or opposite (incorrect) stimulus when the demonstrator picked the correct stimulus. When the demonstrator picked the incorrect stimulus, however, these subjects were significantly more likely to pick the opposite (correct) stimulus. These findings suggest that when learning a discrimination problem, observing a foraging companion's lack of success is more informative than observing its success.
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Allen, C. (1998). Assessing animal cognition: ethological and philosophical perspectives. J. Anim Sci., 76(1), 42–47.
Abstract: Developments in the scientific and philosophical study of animal cognition and mentality are of great importance to animal scientists who face continued public scrutiny of the treatment of animals in research and agriculture. Because beliefs about animal minds, animal cognition, and animal consciousness underlie many people's views about the ethical treatment of nonhuman animals, it has become increasingly difficult for animal scientists to avoid these issues. Animal scientists may learn from ethologists who study animal cognition and mentality from an evolutionary and comparative perspective and who are at the forefront of the development of naturalistic and laboratory techniques of observation and experimentation that are capable of revealing the cognitive and mental properties of nonhuman animals. Despite growing acceptance of the ethological study of animal cognition, there are critics who dispute the scientific validity of the field, especially when the topic is animal consciousness. Here, a proper understanding of developments in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of science can help to place cognitive studies on a firm methodological and philosophical foundation. Ultimately, this is an interdisciplinary task, involving scientists and philosophers. Animal scientists are well-positioned to contribute to the study of animal cognition because they typically have access to a large pool of potential research subjects whose habitats are more controlled than in most field studies while being more natural than most laboratory psychology experiments. Despite some formidable questions remaining for analysis, the prospects for progress in assessing animal cognition are bright.
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