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Conradt, L., & Roper, T. J. (2010). Deciding group movements: Where and when to go. Behav. Process., 84(3), 675–677.
Abstract: A group of animals can only move cohesively, if group members “somehow” reach a consensus about the timing (e.g., start) and the spatial direction/destination of the collective movement. Timing and spatial decisions usually differ with respect to the continuity of their cost/benefit distribution in such a way that, in principle, compromises are much more feasible in timing decision (e.g. median preferred time) than they are in spatial decisions. The consequence is that consensus costs connected to collective timing decisions are usually less skewed amongst group members than are consensus costs connected to spatial decisions. This, in turn, influences the evolution of decision sharing: sharing in timing decisions is most likely to evolve when conflicts are high relative to group cohesion benefits, while sharing in spatial decisions is most likely to evolve in the opposite situation. We discuss the implications of these differences for the study of collective movement decisions.
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Rands, S. A. (2010). Group-movement [`]initiation' and state-dependent decision-making. Behav. Process., 84(3), 668–670.
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Pillot, M. - H., & Deneubourg, J. - L. (2010). Collective movements, initiation and stops: Diversity of situations and law of parsimony. Behav. Process., 84(3), 657–661.
Abstract: The environment of animals is often heterogeneous, containing zones that may be dedicated specifically to resting, drinking or feeding. These functional zones may spread over a more or a less extensive area. Thus, mobile animals may have to move from one patch to another when resources are locally depleted or when they need to change activity. The mechanisms involved in collective movement appear simple at first glance, but a brief reflection shows the real difficulty of the problem in terms of the numerous environmental, physical, physiological and social parameters involved. This review is mainly concerned with collective movements, which are characterised by a directional and temporal coordination, where individuals mutually influence each other, meaning this coordination mainly depends on social interactions ([Huth and Wissel, 1992], [Warburton and Lazarus, 1991], [Couzin and Krause, 2003] and [Couzin et al., 2002]). In literature, two types of movement are discussed: large-scale movement and small-scale movement. First, we define these types of movement and then discuss the behavioural mechanisms involved. Secondly, we show that short and long movement but also moving and stopping may result from the outcome of parameters modulation underpinning collective decision-making.
Keywords: Collective movement; Decision-making; Sheep
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Petit, O., & Bon, R. (2010). Decision-making processes: The case of collective movements. Behav. Process., 84(3), 635–647.
Abstract: Besides focusing on the adaptive significance of collective movements, it is crucial to study the mechanisms and dynamics of decision-making processes at the individual level underlying the higher-scale collective movements. It is now commonly admitted that collective decisions emerge from interactions between individuals, but how individual decisions are taken, i.e. how far they are modulated by the behaviour of other group members, is an under-investigated question. Classically, collective movements are viewed as the outcome of one individual's initiation (the leader) for departure, by which all or some of the other group members abide. Individuals assuming leadership have often been considered to hold a specific social status. This hierarchical or centralized control model has been challenged by recent theoretical and experimental findings, suggesting that leadership can be more distributed. Moreover, self-organized processes can account for collective movements in many different species, even in those that are characterized by high cognitive complexity. In this review, we point out that decision-making for moving collectively can be reached by a combination of different rules, i.e. individualized (based on inter-individual differences in physiology, energetic state, social status, etc.) and self-organized (based on simple response) ones for any species, context and group size.
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Slater, C., & Dymond, S. (2011). Using differential reinforcement to improve equine welfare: Shaping appropriate truck loading and feet handling. Behav. Process., 86(3), 329–339.
Abstract: Inappropriate behavior during common handling procedures with horses is often subject to aversive treatment. The present study replicated and extended previous findings using differential reinforcement to shape appropriate equine handling behavior. In Study 1, a multiple baseline across subjects design was used with four horses to determine first the effects of shaping target-touch responses and then successive approximations of full truck loading under continuous and intermittent schedules of reinforcement. Full loading responses were shaped and maintained in all four horses and occurrences of inappropriate behaviors reduced to zero. Generalization of the loading response was also observed to both a novel trainer and trailer. In Study 2, a changing criterion design was used to increase the duration of feet handling with one horse. The horse's responding reached the terminal duration criterion of 1 min and showed consistent generalization and one-week maintenance. Overall, the results of both studies support the use of applied equine training systems based on positive reinforcement for increasing appropriate behavior during common handling procedures.
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Blackmore, T. L., Foster, T. M., Sumpter, C. E., & Temple, W. (2008). An investigation of colour discrimination with horses (Equus caballus). Behav. Process., 78(3), 387–396.
Abstract: The ability of four horses (Equus caballus) to discriminate coloured (three shades of blue, green, red, and yellow) from grey (neutral density) stimuli, produced by back projected lighting filters, was investigated in a two response forced-choice procedure. Pushes of the lever in front of a coloured screen were occasionally reinforced, pushes of the lever in front of a grey screen were never reinforced. Each colour shade was randomly paired with a grey that was brighter, one that was dimmer, and one that approximately matched the colour in terms of brightness. Each horse experienced the colours in a different order, a new colour was started after 85% correct responses over five consecutive sessions or if accuracy showed no trend over sessions. All horses reached the 85% correct with blue versus grey, three horses did so with both yellow and green versus grey. All were above chance with red versus grey but none reached criterion. Further analysis showed the wavelengths of the green stimuli used overlapped with the yellow. The results are consistent with histological and behavioural studies that suggest that horses are dichromatic. They differ from some earlier data in that they indicate horses can discriminate yellow and blue, but that they may have deficiencies in discriminating red and green.
Keywords: Chromatic discrimination; Colour vision; Horse; Operant
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Zentall, T. R. (2006). Timing, memory for intervals, and memory for untimed stimuli: The role of instructional ambiguity. Behav. Process., 71(2-3), 88–97.
Abstract: Theories of animal timing have had to account for findings that the memory for the duration of a timed interval appears to be dramatically shorted within a short time of its termination. This finding has led to the subjective shortening hypothesis and it has been proposed to account for the poor memory that animals appear to have for the initial portion of a timed interval when a gap is inserted in the to-be-timed signal. It has also been proposed to account for the poor memory for a relatively long interval that has been discriminated from a shorter interval. I suggest here a simpler account in which ambiguity between the gap or retention interval and the intertrial interval results in resetting the clock, rather than forgetting the interval. The ambiguity hypothesis, together with a signal salience mechanism that determines how quickly the clock is reset at the start of the intertrial interval can account for the results of the reported timing experiments that have used the peak procedure. Furthermore, instructional ambiguity rather than memory loss may account for the results of many animal memory experiments that do not involve memory for time.
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Le Pendu, Y., Guilhem, C., Briedermann, L., Maublanc, M. - L., & Gerard, J. - F. (2000). Interactions and associations between age and sex classes in mouflon sheep (Ovis gmelini) during winter. Behav. Process., 52(2-3), 97–107.
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Zentall, T. R. (2007). Temporal discrimination learning by pigeons. Behav. Process., 74(2), 286–292.
Abstract: Memory for time by animals appears to undergo a systematic shortening. This so-called choose-short effect can be seen in a conditional temporal discrimination when a delay is inserted between the sample and comparison stimuli. We have proposed that this temporal shortening may result from a procedural artifact in which the delay appears similar to the intertrial interval and thus, produces an inadvertent ambiguity or 'instructional failure'. When this ambiguity is avoided by distinguishing the intertrial interval from the delay, as well as the samples from the delay, the temporal shortening effect and other asymmetries often disappear. By avoiding artifacts that can lead to a misinterpretation of results, we may understand better how animals represent time. An alternative procedure for studying temporal discriminations is with the psychophysical bisection procedure in which following conditional discrimination training, intermediate durations are presented and the point of subjective equality is determined. Research using the bisection procedure has shown that pigeons represent temporal durations not only as their absolute value but also relative to durations from which they must be discriminated. Using this procedure, we have also found that time passes subjectively slower when animals are required to respond to the to-be-timed stimulus.
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Zentall, T. R. (2006). Mental time travel in animals: a challenging question. Behav. Process., 72(2), 173–183.
Abstract: Humans have the ability to mentally recreate past events (using episodic memory) and imagine future events (by planning). The best evidence for such mental time travel is personal and thus subjective. For this reason, it is particularly difficult to study such behavior in animals. There is some indirect evidence, however, that animals have both episodic memory and the ability to plan for the future. When unexpectedly asked to do so, animals can report about their recent past experiences (episodic memory) and they also appear to be able to use the anticipation of a future event as the basis for a present action (planning). Thus, the ability to imagine past and future events may not be uniquely human.
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