Abstract: Marten and Psarakos have presented some evidence which suggests that objective self-awareness and possibly representations of self may characterize the dolphins' experience of self. Their research demonstrates the possibility of similarities in the sense of self between primate species and dolphins, although whether dolphins have subjective self-awareness, personal memories, and theories of self--all important facets of the sense of self in humans--was not examined. Clearly, even this limited evidence was difficult to achieve; the difficulties in adapting methods and coding behavior are quite apparent in their report. Future progress, however, may depend upon clarification of what are the necessary components for a sense of self and an explication of how these might be reflected in dolphin behavior. We are mindful of the authors' point (pp. 219 and 220) that the dolphin lives more in an acoustic than a visual environment. Thus, while tasks relying upon vision may reveal the presence or absence of the sense of self in primates, it might well be the case that in dolphins self-related experiences might be better revealed in auditory tasks. But then, what is the nature of human self-awareness in terms of audition? While both conceptual and methodological hurdles remain, Marten and Psarakos have demonstrated that important questions can be asked about the minds and phenomenal worlds of nonanthropoid species.

Abstract: In mirror mark tests dolphins twist, posture, and engage in open-mouth and head movements, often repetitive. Because postures and an open mouth are also dolphin social behaviors, we used self-view television as a manipulatable mirror to distinguish between self-examination and social behavior. Two dolphins were exposed to alternating real-time self-view (“mirror mode”) and playback of the same to determine if they distinguished between them. The adult male engaged in elaborate open-mouth behaviors in mirror mode, but usually just watched when played back the same material. Mirror mode behavior was also compared to interacting with real dolphins (controls). Mark tests were conducted, as well as switches from front to side self-views to see if the dolphins turned. They presented marked areas to the self-view television and turned. The results suggest self-examination over social behavior.

Abstract: During feeding behaviour, dogs were suddenly presented with 2D stimuli depicting the silhouette of a dog, a cat or a snake simultaneously into the left and right visual hemifields. A bias to turn the head towards the left rather than the right side was observed with the cat and snake stimulus but not with the dog stimulus. Latencies to react following stimulus presentation were lower for left than for right head turning, whereas times needed to resume feeding behaviour were higher after left rather than after right head turning. When stimuli were presented only to the left or right visual hemifields, dogs proved to be more responsive to left side presentation, irrespective of the type of stimulus. However, cat and snake stimuli produced shorter latencies to react and longer times to resume feeding following left rather than right monocular visual hemifield presentation. Results demonstrate striking lateralization in dogs, with the right side of the brain more responsive to threatening and alarming stimuli. Possible implications for animal welfare are discussed.

Abstract: From the viewpoint of experimental psychology, there are two problems with our current knowledge of equine perception. The first is that the behavioral and neurophysiological research in this area has enormous gaps, reflecting that this animal is not a convenient laboratory subject. The second is that the horse, having been a close companion to humans for many millennia, entrenched anecdotal wisdom is often hard to separate from scientific fact. Therefore, any summary at present of equine perception has to be provisional. The horse appears to have developed a visual system particularly sensitive to dim light and movement, it may or may not have a weak form of color vision in part of the retina, it has little binocular overlap, and its best acuity is limited to a restricted horizontal band which is aimed primarily by head/neck movements. However, the total field of view is very large. Overall, as would be expected for a prey animal, horse vision appears to have evolved more for detection of predator approach from any angle than for accurate visual identification of stationary objects, especially those seen at a distance. It is likely that, as for most mammals except the primates, horses rely more heavily on their other senses for forming a view of their world. Equine high-frequency hearing extends far above that of humans, but horses may be less able to localize the point of origin of brief sounds. The horse's capacity for chemoreception and its reliance on chemical information for identification may more closely resemble that of the dog than of the human. Its tactile sensitivity is high, and the ability of its brain and body to regulate pain perception appears to be similar to that found in other mammals. There is room for a great deal of future research in both the area of equine perception and sensory-based cognition, but for the present time persons interacting with this animal should be made aware of the importance of the sounds they make, the movements of their bodies, the way they touch the animal, and the odors they emit or carry on their clothing.

Abstract: Domestic chicks are capable of perceiving as a whole objects partly concealed by occluders (“amodal completion”). In previous studies chicks were imprinted on a certain configuration and at test they were required to choose between two alternative versions of it. Using the same paradigm we now investigated the presence of hemispheric differences in amodal completion by testing newborn chicks with one eye temporarily patched. Separate groups of newly hatched chicks were imprinted binocularly: (1) on a square partly occluded by a superimposed bar, (2) on a whole or (3) on an amputated version of the square. At test, in monocular conditions, each chick was presented with a free choice between a complete and an amputated square. In the crucial condition 1, chicks tested with only their left eye in use chose the complete square (like binocular chicks would do); right-eyed chicks, in contrast, tended to choose the amputated square. Similar results were obtained in another group of chicks imprinted binocularly onto a cross (either occluded or amputated in its central part) and required to choose between a complete or an amputated cross. Left-eyed and binocular chicks chose the complete cross, whereas right-eyed chicks did not choose the amputated cross significantly more often. These findings suggest that neural structures fed by the left eye (mainly located in the right hemisphere) are, in the chick, more inclined to a “global” analysis of visual scenes, whereas those fed by the right eye seem to be more inclined to a “featural” analysis of visual scenes.