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Kirkwood, J. K. (2000). Animal minds and animal welfare. Vet. Rec., 146(11), 327.
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Morton, D. B. (2000). Self-consciousness and animal suffering. Biologist (London), 47(2), 77–80.
Abstract: Animals with relatively highly developed brains are likely to experience some degree of self-awareness and the ability to think. As well as being interesting in its own right, self-consciousness matters from an ethical point of view, since it can give rise to forms of suffering above and beyond the immediate physical sensations of pain or distress. This article surveys the evidence for animal self-consciousness and its implications for animal welfare.
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Helton, W. S. (2005). Animal expertise, conscious or not. Anim. Cogn., 8(2), 67–74.
Abstract: Rossano (Cognition 89:207, 2003) proposes expertise as an indicator of consciousness in humans and other animals. Since there is strong evidence that the development of expertise requires deliberate practice (Ericsson in The road to excellence: the acquisition of expert performance in the arts and sciences, sports and games 1996), and deliberate practice appears to be outside of the bounds of unconscious processing, then any signs of expertise development in an animal are indicators of consciousness. Rossano's argument may lead to an unsolvable debate about animal consciousness while causing researchers to overlook the underlying reality of animal expertise. This article provides evidence indicative of animals meeting each of the three definitions of expertise established in the scientific literature: expertise as a social construction, expertise as exceptional performance, and expertise as knowledge. In addition, cases of deliberate practice by non-human animals are offered. Acknowledging some animals as experts, regardless of consciousness, is warranted by the research findings and would prove useful in solving many issues remaining in the human expertise literature.
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Kozarovitskii, L. B. (1988). [Further comment on the distinction between humans and animals]. Nauchnye Doki Vyss Shkoly Biol Nauki, (3), 42–45.
Abstract: The problem of mind is considered in the aspect of natural scientific and philosophical problem of distinction between human and animal. The widespread confusion of the terms “rudiments”, “elements” of specifically human properties in animals and “biological prerequisites” of these properties are critically analysed. The idea is formulated according to which only in the process of anthropogenesis the rudiments of new social property--mind, conscience--could appear in the developing human beings.
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Doherty, T. J., & Frazier, D. L. (1998). Effect of intravenous lidocaine on halothane minimum alveolar concentration in ponies. Equine Vet J, 30(4), 300–303.
Abstract: This study investigated the effect of lidocaine i.v. on halothane minimum alveolar concentration (MAC) in ponies. Six ponies were anaesthetised with thiopentone and succinylcholine, intubated and anaesthesia maintained with halothane. Ventilation was controlled and blood pressure maintained within clinically acceptable limits. Following a 2 h equilibration period, baseline halothane MAC was determined. The ponies were then given a loading dose of lidocaine (2.5 or 5 mg/kg bwt) or saline over 5 min, followed by a constant infusion of lidocaine (50 or 100 microg/kg/min, or saline, respectively). The halothane MAC was redetermined after a 60 min infusion of lidocaine or saline. The baseline halothane MAC for the control group was mean +/- s.d. 0.94 +/- 0.03%, and no significant decrease occurred following saline infusion. Lidocaine decreased halothane MAC in a dose-dependent fashion (r = 0.86; P < 0.0003). The results indicate that i.v. lidocaine may have a role in equine anaesthesia.
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Forster, H. V., Pan, L. G., Bisgard, G. E., Flynn, C., & Hoffer, R. E. (1985). Changes in breathing when switching from nares to tracheostomy breathing in awake ponies. J Appl Physiol, 59(4), 1214–1221.
Abstract: We assessed the consequences of respiratory unloading associated with tracheostomy breathing (TBr). Three normal and three carotid body-denervated (CBD) ponies were prepared with chronic tracheostomies that at rest reduced physiological dead space (VD) from 483 +/- 60 to 255 +/- 30 ml and lung resistance from 1.5 +/- 0.14 to 0.5 +/- 0.07 cmH2O . l-1 . s. At rest and during steady-state mild-to-heavy exercise arterial PCO2 (PaCO2) was approximately 1 Torr higher during nares breathing (NBr) than during TBr. Pulmonary ventilation and tidal volume (VT) were greater and alveolar ventilation was less during NBr than TBr. Breathing frequency (f) did not differ between NBr and TBr at rest, but f during exercise was greater during TBr than during NBr. These responses did not differ between normal and CBD ponies. We also assessed the consequences of increasing external VD (300 ml) and resistance (R, 0.3 cmH2O . l-1 . s) by breathing through a tube. At rest and during mild exercise tube breathing caused PaCO2 to transiently increase 2-3 Torr, but 3-5 min later PaCO2 usually was within 1 Torr of control. Tube breathing did not cause f to change. When external R was increased 1 cmH2O . l-1 . s by breathing through a conventional air collection system, f did not change at rest, but during exercise f was lower than during unencumbered breathing. These responses did not differ between normal, CBD, and hilar nerve-denervated ponies, and they did not differ when external VD or R were added at either the nares or tracheostomy.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)
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Gallup, G. G. J. (1985). Do minds exist in species other than our own? Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 9(4), 631–641.
Abstract: An answer to the question of animal awareness depends on evidence, not intuition, anecdote, or debate. This paper examines some of the problems inherent in an analysis of animal awareness, and whether animals might be aware of being aware is offered as a more meaningful distinction. A framework is presented which can be used to make a determination about the extent to which other species have experiences similar to ours based on their ability to make inferences and attributions about mental states in others. The evidence from both humans and animals is consistent with the idea that the capacity to use experience to infer the experience of others is a byproduct of self-awareness.
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Pennisi, E. (1999). Are out primate cousins 'conscious'? (Vol. 284).
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Crook, J. H. (1983). On attributing consciousness to animals. Nature, 303(5912), 11–14.
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Spadavecchia, C., Arendt-Nielsen, L., Andersen, O. K., Spadavecchia, L., Doherr, M., & Schatzmann, U. (2003). Comparison of nociceptive withdrawal reflexes and recruitment curves between the forelimbs and hind limbs in conscious horses. Am J Vet Res, 64(6), 700–707.
Abstract: OBJECTIVE: To compare nociceptive withdrawal reflexes (NWRs) evoked from the distal aspect of the left forelimb and hind limb in conscious standing horses and to investigate NWR recruitment for graded electrical stimulation intensities. ANIMALS: 20 adult horses. PROCEDURE: Surface electromyographic (EMG) activity evoked by transcutaneous electrical stimulation of the digital palmar (or plantar) nerve was recorded from the common digital extensor and cranial tibial muscles. Stimuli consisted of 25-millisecond train-of-5 constant current pulses. Current intensity was gradually increased until NWR threshold intensity was reached. The EMG signal was analyzed for quantification of the NWR. Behavioral responses accompanying the reflex were scored (scale, 0 to 5). The NWR recruitment curves were determined at 0.9, 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 times the NWR threshold intensity. RESULTS: The NWR threshold was significantly higher for the hind limb (median value, 6.6 mA; range, 3 to 10 mA) than the forelimb (median, 3 mA; range, 1.7 to 5.5 mA). The NWR of the hind limb had a significantly longer latency (median, 122.8 milliseconds; range, 106 to 172 milliseconds), compared with the forelimb (median, 98 milliseconds; range, 86 to 137 milliseconds), and it was associated with significantly stronger behavioral reactions. Gradual increase of NWR amplitude was evident at increasing stimulation intensities and supported by the behavioral observations. CONCLUSIONS AND CLINICAL RELEVANCE: We documented NWRs evoked from the forelimb and hind limb and their recruitment with stimuli of increasing intensity in horses. These results provide a basis for use of NWRs in studies on nociceptive modulation in horses.
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