Dugatkin, L. A., Mesterton-Gibbons, M., & Houston, A. I. (1992). Beyond the prisoner's dilemma: Toward models to discriminate among mechanisms of cooperation in nature. Trends Evol. Ecol., 7, 202–205.
Abstract: The iterated prisoner's dilemma game, or IPD, has now established itself as the orthodox paradigm for theoretical investigations of the evolution of cooperation; but its scope is restricted to reciprocity, which is only one of three categories of cooperation among unrelated individuals. Even within that category, a cooperative encounter has in general three phases, and the IPD has nothing to say about two of them. To distinguish among mechanisms of cooperation in nature, future theoretical work on the evolution of cooperation must distance itself from economics and develop games as a refinement of ethology's comparative approach.
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de Waal, F. B. M. (1992). Coalitions as part of reciprocal relations in the Arnhem chimpanzee colony. In A. H. Harcourt, & F. B. M. de Waal (Eds.), Coalitions and Alliances in Humans and Other Animals (pp. 233–257). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Manson, J. H. (1992). Measuring female mate choice in Cayo Santiago rhesus macaques. Anim. Behav., 44, 405–416.
Abstract: Few studies of female mate choice have been carried out among free-ranging non-human primates. To qualify as female mate choice, behaviour by oestrous females must predict the occurrence or rate of potentially fertile copulations, in comparisons between heterosexual dyads. In this paper, data are presented to show three behaviour patterns that meet this criterion in free-ranging rhesus macaques, Macaca mulatta, at the island colony of Cayo Santiago: (1) selective cooperation with male sexual solicitations (hip-grasps), (2) restoration of proximity following attacks on females by intruding males, and (3) proximity maintenance (in one of two study groups). Oestrous females maintained proximity preferentially to lower ranking males, but this appeared to reflect differences in the tactics necessary to achieve copulations with males of different dominance ranks, rather than preference for lower ranking mates. Male-oestrous female dyads showed consistency over two consecutive mating seasons in which partner was responsible for proximity maintenance. Male dominance rank was positively correlated with copulatory rate with fertile females. However, in one study group, males to whom oestrous females maintained proximity more actively had higher copulatory rates with fertile females, independent of the effects of male dominance rank.
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Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1992). Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups. Ethol. Sociobiol., 13, 171–195.
Abstract: Existing models suggest that reciprocity is unlikely to evolve in large groups as a result of natural selection. In these models, reciprocators punish noncooperation by with-holding future cooperation, and thus also penalize other cooperators in the group. Here, we analyze a model in which the response is some form of punishment that is directed solely at noncooperators. We refer to such alternative forms of punishment as retribution. We show that cooperation enforced by retribution can lead to the evolution of cooperation in two qualitatively different ways. (1) If benefits of cooperation to an individual are greater than the costs to a single individual of coercing the other n − 1 individuals to cooperate, then strategies which cooperate and punish noncooperators, strategies which cooperate only if punished, and, sometimes, strategies which cooperate but do not punish will coexist in the long run. (2) If the costs of being punished are large enough, moralistic strategies which cooperate, punish noncooperators, and punish those who do not punish noncooperators can be evolutionarily stable. We also show, however, that moralistic strategies can cause any individually costly behavior to be evolutionarily stable, whether or not it creates a group benefit.
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Reeve, H. K. (1992). Queen activation of lazy workers in colonies of the eusocial naked mole-rat. Nature, 358, 147–149.
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Ehardt, C. L., & Bernstein, I. S. (1992). Conflict intervention behaviour by adult male macaques: structural and functional aspects. In A. H. Harcourt, & F. B. M. de Waal (Eds.), Coalitions and Alliances in Humans and Other Animals (pp. 83–111). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Schneider, K. (1992). Emotionen. In Spada Hans (Ed.), Allgemeine Psychologie. Bern: Verlag Hans Huber.
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Zabel, C. J., Glickman, S. E., Frank, L. G., Woodmansee, K. B., & Keppel, G. (1992). Coalition formation in a colony of prepubertal spotted hyaenas. In A. H. Harcourt, & F. B. M. de Waal (Eds.), Coalitions and Alliances in Humans and Other Animals (pp. 113–135). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Silk, J. B. (1992). Patterns of intervention in agonistic contests among male bonnet macaques. In F.B.M. and de Waal A. H. Harcourt (Ed.), Coalitions and Alliances in Humans and Other Animals (pp. 215–232). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Connor, R. C., Smokler, R. A., & Richards, A. F. (1992). Dolphin alliances and coalitions. In A. H. Harcourt, & F. B. M. de Waal (Eds.), Coalitions and Alliances in Humans and Other Animals (pp. 415–443). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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