Rands, S. A., Cowlishaw, G., Pettifor, R. A., Rowcliffe, J. M., & Johnstone, R. A. (2003). Spontaneous emergence of leaders and followers in foraging pairs. Nature, 423(6938), 432–434.
Abstract: Animals that forage socially often stand to gain from coordination of their behaviour. Yet it is not known how group members reach a consensus on the timing of foraging bouts. Here we demonstrate a simple process by which this may occur. We develop a state-dependent, dynamic game model of foraging by a pair of animals, in which each individual chooses between resting or foraging during a series of consecutive periods, so as to maximize its own individual chances of survival. We find that, if there is an advantage to foraging together, the equilibrium behaviour of both individuals becomes highly synchronized. As a result of this synchronization, differences in the energetic reserves of the two players spontaneously develop, leading them to adopt different behavioural roles. The individual with lower reserves emerges as the 'pace-maker' who determines when the pair should forage, providing a straightforward resolution to the problem of group coordination. Moreover, the strategy that gives rise to this behaviour can be implemented by a simple 'rule of thumb' that requires no detailed knowledge of the state of other individuals.
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Conradt, L., & Roper, T. J. (2003). Group decision-making in animals. Nature, 421(6919), 155–158.
Abstract: Groups of animals often need to make communal decisions, for example about which activities to perform, when to perform them and which direction to travel in; however, little is known about how they do so. Here, we model the fitness consequences of two possible decision-making mechanisms: 'despotism' and 'democracy'. We show that under most conditions, the costs to subordinate group members, and to the group as a whole, are considerably higher for despotic than for democratic decisions. Even when the despot is the most experienced group member, it only pays other members to accept its decision when group size is small and the difference in information is large. Democratic decisions are more beneficial primarily because they tend to produce less extreme decisions, rather than because each individual has an influence on the decision per se. Our model suggests that democracy should be widespread and makes quantitative, testable predictions about group decision-making in non-humans.
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Seyfarth, R. M., Cheney, D. L., & Bergman, T. J. (2005). Primate social cognition and the origins of language. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 9(6), 264–266.
Abstract: Are the cognitive mechanisms underlying language unique, or can similar mechanisms be found in other domains? Recent field experiments demonstrate that baboons' knowledge of their companions' social relationships is based on discrete-valued traits (identity, rank, kinship) that are combined to create a representation of social relations that is hierarchically structured, open-ended, rule-governed, and independent of sensory modality. The mechanisms underlying language might have evolved from the social knowledge of our pre-linguistic primate ancestors.
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Emery, N. J. (2000). The eyes have it: the neuroethology, function and evolution of social gaze. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 24(6), 581–604.
Abstract: Gaze is an important component of social interaction. The function, evolution and neurobiology of gaze processing are therefore of interest to a number of researchers. This review discusses the evolutionary role of social gaze in vertebrates (focusing on primates), and a hypothesis that this role has changed substantially for primates compared to other animals. This change may have been driven by morphological changes to the face and eyes of primates, limitations in the facial anatomy of other vertebrates, changes in the ecology of the environment in which primates live, and a necessity to communicate information about the environment, emotional and mental states. The eyes represent different levels of signal value depending on the status, disposition and emotional state of the sender and receiver of such signals. There are regions in the monkey and human brain which contain neurons that respond selectively to faces, bodies and eye gaze. The ability to follow another individual's gaze direction is affected in individuals with autism and other psychopathological disorders, and after particular localized brain lesions. The hypothesis that gaze following is “hard-wired” in the brain, and may be localized within a circuit linking the superior temporal sulcus, amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex is discussed.
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Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (1984). Grooming, alliances and reciprocal altruism in vervet monkeys. Nature, 308(5959), 541–543.
Abstract: Reciprocal altruism refers to the exchange of beneficial acts between individuals, in which the benefits to the recipient exceed the cost to the altruist. Theory predicts that cooperation among unrelated animals can occur whenever individuals encounter each other regularly and are capable of adjusting their cooperative behaviour according to experience. Although the potential for reciprocal altruism exists in many animal societies, most interactions occur between closely related individuals, and examples of reciprocity among non-kin are rare. The field experiments on vervet monkeys which we present here demonstrate that grooming between unrelated individuals increases the probability that they will subsequently attend to each others' solicitations for aid. Vervets appear to be more willing to aid unrelated individuals if those individuals have behaved affinitively toward them in the recent past. In contrast, recent grooming between close genetic relatives appears to have no effect on their willingness to respond to each other's solicitations for aid.
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Cohen, J. (2007). Animal behavior. The world through a chimp's eyes (Vol. 316).
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Miller, G. (2006). Animal behavior. Signs of empathy seen in mice. Science, 312(5782), 1860–1861.
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Pennisi, E. (2006). Animal cognition. Man's best friend(s) reveal the possible roots of social intelligence (Vol. 312).
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Pennisi, E. (2006). Animal cognition. Social animals prove their smarts (Vol. 312).
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Dunbar, R. (2003). Evolution of the social brain. Science, 302(5648), 1160–1161.
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