| Records |
| Author |
Seyfarth, R.M. |
| Title |
A model of social grooming among adult female monkeys |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
1977 |
Publication |
Journal of Theoretical Biology |
Abbreviated Journal |
J. Theor. Biol. |
| Volume |
65 |
Issue  |
4 |
Pages |
671-698 |
| Keywords |
Animals; Behavior, Animal; Female; *Grooming; Haplorhini/*physiology; *Models, Biological; Reproduction; Social Dominance; Time Factors |
| Abstract |
Grooming networks among adult female monkeys exhibit two similar features across a number of different species. High-ranking animals receive more grooming than others, and the majority of grooming occurs between females of adjacent rank. A theoretical model which duplicates these features is presented, and the properties of the model are used to explain the possible causation and function of female grooming behaviour. The model illustrates how relatively simple principles governing the behaviour of individuals may be used to explain more complex aspects of the social structure of non-human primate groups. |
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| Language |
English |
Summary Language |
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Edition |
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| ISSN |
0022-5193 |
ISBN |
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Conference |
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| Notes |
PMID:406485 |
Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
5259 |
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| Author |
Dubois, F.; Giraldeau, L.-A. |
| Title |
The forager's dilemma: food sharing and food defense as risk-sensitive foraging options |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2003 |
Publication |
The American Naturalist |
Abbreviated Journal |
Am Nat |
| Volume |
162 |
Issue |
6 |
Pages |
768-779 |
| Keywords |
Animals; Competitive Behavior/*physiology; *Environment; Feeding Behavior/*physiology; *Game Theory; *Models, Biological; Population Density; Population Dynamics |
| Abstract |
Although many variants of the hawk-dove game predict the frequency at which group foraging animals should compete aggressively, none of them can explain why a large number of group foraging animals share food clumps without any overt aggression. One reason for this shortcoming is that hawk-dove games typically consider only a single contest, while most group foraging situations involve opponents that interact repeatedly over discovered food clumps. The present iterated hawk-dove game predicts that in situations that are analogous to a prisoner's dilemma, animals should share the resources without aggression, provided that the number of simultaneously available food clumps is sufficiently large and the number of competitors is relatively small. However, given that the expected gain of an aggressive animal is more variable than the gain expected by nonaggressive individuals, the predicted effect of the number of food items in a clump-clump richness-depends on whether only the mean or both the mean and variability associated with payoffs are considered. More precisely, the deterministic game predicts that aggression should increase with clump richness, whereas the stochastic risk-sensitive game predicts that the frequency of encounters resulting in aggression should peak at intermediate clump richnesses or decrease with increasing clump richness if animals show sensitivity to the variance or coefficient of variation, respectively. |
| Address |
Departement des Sciences Biologiques, Universite du Quebec a Montreal, Case postale 8888, Succursale Centre-Ville, Montreal, Quebec H3C 3P8, Canada. fdubois@u-bourgogne.fr |
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English |
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0003-0147 |
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| Notes |
PMID:14737714 |
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no |
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Serial |
2132 |
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| Author |
Conradt, L.; Roper, T.J. |
| Title |
Group decision-making in animals |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2003 |
Publication |
Nature |
Abbreviated Journal |
Nature |
| Volume |
421 |
Issue |
6919 |
Pages |
155-158 |
| Keywords |
Animals; Behavior, Animal/*physiology; *Decision Making; Democracy; Group Processes; *Models, Biological; Population Density; Social Behavior |
| Abstract |
Groups of animals often need to make communal decisions, for example about which activities to perform, when to perform them and which direction to travel in; however, little is known about how they do so. Here, we model the fitness consequences of two possible decision-making mechanisms: 'despotism' and 'democracy'. We show that under most conditions, the costs to subordinate group members, and to the group as a whole, are considerably higher for despotic than for democratic decisions. Even when the despot is the most experienced group member, it only pays other members to accept its decision when group size is small and the difference in information is large. Democratic decisions are more beneficial primarily because they tend to produce less extreme decisions, rather than because each individual has an influence on the decision per se. Our model suggests that democracy should be widespread and makes quantitative, testable predictions about group decision-making in non-humans. |
| Address |
School of Biological Sciences, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9QG, UK. l.conradt@sussex.ac.uk |
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English |
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| ISSN |
0028-0836 |
ISBN |
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Conference |
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| Notes |
PMID:12520299 |
Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
5136 |
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| Author |
Johnson, D.D.P.; Stopka, P.; Knights, S. |
| Title |
Sociology: The puzzle of human cooperation |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2003 |
Publication |
Nature |
Abbreviated Journal |
Nature |
| Volume |
421 |
Issue |
6926 |
Pages |
911-2; discussion 912 |
| Keywords |
Altruism; *Cooperative Behavior; Evolution; Humans; *Models, Biological; Punishment; Reward; Risk |
| Abstract |
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| Address |
Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA. dominic@post.harvard.edu |
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English |
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Edition |
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0028-0836 |
ISBN |
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| Notes |
PMID:12606989 |
Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
refbase @ user @ |
Serial |
467 |
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| Author |
Rands, S.A.; Cowlishaw, G.; Pettifor, R.A.; Rowcliffe, J.M.; Johnstone, R.A. |
| Title |
Spontaneous emergence of leaders and followers in foraging pairs |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2003 |
Publication |
Nature |
Abbreviated Journal |
Nature |
| Volume |
423 |
Issue |
6938 |
Pages |
432-434 |
| Keywords |
Animals; *Energy Metabolism; Food; *Food Chain; *Models, Biological; Motor Activity; *Social Behavior; Time Factors |
| Abstract |
Animals that forage socially often stand to gain from coordination of their behaviour. Yet it is not known how group members reach a consensus on the timing of foraging bouts. Here we demonstrate a simple process by which this may occur. We develop a state-dependent, dynamic game model of foraging by a pair of animals, in which each individual chooses between resting or foraging during a series of consecutive periods, so as to maximize its own individual chances of survival. We find that, if there is an advantage to foraging together, the equilibrium behaviour of both individuals becomes highly synchronized. As a result of this synchronization, differences in the energetic reserves of the two players spontaneously develop, leading them to adopt different behavioural roles. The individual with lower reserves emerges as the 'pace-maker' who determines when the pair should forage, providing a straightforward resolution to the problem of group coordination. Moreover, the strategy that gives rise to this behaviour can be implemented by a simple 'rule of thumb' that requires no detailed knowledge of the state of other individuals. |
| Address |
Department of Zoology, University of Cambridge, Downing Street, Cambridge CB2 3EJ, UK. s.rands@zoo.cam.ac.uk |
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English |
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0028-0836 |
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| Notes |
PMID:12761547 |
Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
5138 |
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| Author |
Bell, A.M. |
| Title |
Evolutionary biology: animal personalities |
Type |
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| Year |
2007 |
Publication |
Nature |
Abbreviated Journal |
Nature |
| Volume |
447 |
Issue |
7144 |
Pages |
539-540 |
| Keywords |
Aggression/physiology/psychology; Animals; Behavior, Animal/*physiology; *Evolution; Humans; *Models, Biological; Personality/genetics/*physiology; Reproduction/genetics/physiology; Risk-Taking; Selection (Genetics) |
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English |
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Series Issue |
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Edition |
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| ISSN |
1476-4687 |
ISBN |
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| Notes |
PMID:17538607 |
Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
4099 |
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