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Moses, S. N., Villate, C., & Ryan, J. D. (2006). An investigation of learning strategy supporting transitive inference performance in humans compared to other species. Neuropsychologia, 44(8), 1370–1387.
Abstract: Generalizations about neural function are often drawn from non-human animal models to human cognition, however, the assumption of cross-species conservation may sometimes be invalid. Humans may use different strategies mediated by alternative structures, or similar structures may operate differently within the context of the human brain. The transitive inference problem, considered a hallmark of logical reasoning, can be solved by non-human species via associative learning rather than logic. We tested whether humans use similar strategies to other species for transitive inference. Results are crucial for evaluating the validity of widely accepted assumptions of similar neural substrates underlying performance in humans and other animals. Here we show that successful transitive inference in humans is unrelated to use of associative learning strategies and is associated with ability to report the hierarchical relationship among stimuli. Our work stipulates that cross-species generalizations must be interpreted cautiously, since performance on the same task may be mediated by different strategies and/or neural systems.
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Thor, D. H., & Holloway, W. R. (1982). Social memory of the male laboratory rat. J. Comp. Physiol. Psychol., 96(6), 1000–1006.
Abstract: Used duration of social-investigatory behavior by 36 mature male Long-Evans rats as a measure of individual recognition in 5 experiments to assess social memory. In Exp I, the duration of social investigation during a 2nd exposure to the same juvenile (n[en space]=[en space]12) was directly related to the length of the interexposure interval. In Exp II, Ss were exposed to the same or different juvenile 10 min after an initial 5-min exposure to a novel juvenile; reexposure to the same juvenile elicited significantly less social investigation than an exposure to a different juvenile. Exps III and IV demonstrated that following a 5-min introductory exposure, social memory of the juvenile was relatively brief in comparison with that of mature Ss. Exp V revealed a retroactive interference effect on recently acquired memory for an individual: 12 mature Ss exposed to interpolated social experience engaged in significantly longer investigation of a juvenile than those with no interpolated social experience. The combined results suggest that (1) the rat normally engages in spontaneous learning of individual identity and (2) social memory may be a significant aspect of complex social interactions. (16 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved)
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Rizzolatti, G., Fogassi, L., & Gallese, V. (2006). Mirrors of the mind. Sci Am, 295(5), 54–61.
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Lingle, S., Rendall, D., & Pellis, S. M. (2007). Altruism and recognition in the antipredator defence of deer: 1. Species and individual variation in fawn distress calls. Anim. Behav., 73(5), 897–905.
Abstract: Mule deer, Odocoileus hemionus, females actively defend fawns against predators, including nonoffspring conspecific fawns and heterospecific white-tailed deer, O. virginianus, fawns. We hypothesized that the defence of nonoffspring fawns was due to a recognition error. During a predator attack, females may have to decide whether to defend a fawn with imperfect information on its identity obtained from hearing only a few distress calls. We examined fawn distress calls to determine whether calls made by the two species and by different individuals within each species were acoustically distinctive. The mean and maximum fundamental frequencies of mule deer fawns were nearly double those of white-tailed deer fawns, with no overlap, enabling us to classify 100% of calls to the correct species using a single trait. A large proportion of calls was also assigned to the correct individual using a multivariate analysis (66% and 70% of mule deer and white-tailed deer fawns, respectively, chance = 6% and 10%); however, there was considerable statistical uncertainty in the probability of correct classification. We observed fawns approach conspecific females in an attempt to nurse; females probed most offspring fawns with their noses before accepting them, and always probed nonoffspring fawns before rejecting them, suggesting that close contact and olfactory information were needed to unequivocally distinguish nonoffspring from offspring fawns. Taken together, these results suggest that acoustic variation alone would probably be sufficient to permit rapid and reliable species discrimination, but it may not be sufficient for mothers to unequivocally distinguish their own fawn from conspecific fawns.
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Lingle, S., Rendall, D., Wilson, W. F., DeYoung, R. W., & Pellis, S. M. (2007). Altruism and recognition in the antipredator defence of deer: 2. Why mule deer help nonoffspring fawns. Anim. Behav., 73(5), 907–916.
Abstract: Both white-tailed deer, Odocoileus virginianus, and mule deer, O. hemionus, females defend fawns against coyotes, Canis latrans, but only mule deer defend nonoffspring conspecific and heterospecific fawns. During a predator attack, females may have to decide whether to defend a fawn while having imperfect information on its identity obtained from hearing a few distress calls. Although imperfect recognition can influence altruistic behaviour, few empirical studies have considered this point when testing functional explanations for altruism. We designed a series of playback experiments with fawn distress calls to test alternative hypotheses (by-product of parental care, kin selection, reciprocal altruism) for the mule deer's defence of nonoffspring, specifically allowing for the possibility that females mistake these fawns for their own. White-tailed deer females approached the speaker only when distress calls of white-tailed deer fawns were played and when their own fawn was hidden, suggesting that fawn defence was strictly a matter of parental care in this species. In contrast, mule deer females responded similarly and strongly, regardless of the caller's identity, the female's reproductive state (mother or nonmother) or the presence of their own offspring. The failure of mule deer females to adjust their responses to these conditions suggests that they do not defend nonoffspring because they mistake them for their own fawns. The lack of behavioural discrimination also suggests that kin selection, reciprocal altruism and defence of the offspring's area are unlikely to explain the mule deer's defence of nonoffspring. We identify causal and functional questions that still need to be addressed to understand why mule deer defend fawns so indiscriminately.
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Dreier, S., van Zweden, J. S., & D'Ettorre, P. (2007). Long-term memory of individual identity in ant queens. Biol Lett, 3(5), 459–462.
Abstract: Remembering individual identities is part of our own everyday social life. Surprisingly, this ability has recently been shown in two social insects. While paper wasps recognize each other individually through their facial markings, the ant, Pachycondyla villosa, uses chemical cues. In both species, individual recognition is adaptive since it facilitates the maintenance of stable dominance hierarchies among individuals, and thus reduces the cost of conflict within these small societies. Here, we investigated individual recognition in Pachycondyla ants by quantifying the level of aggression between pairs of familiar or unfamiliar queens over time. We show that unrelated founding queens of P. villosa and Pachycondyla inversa store information on the individual identity of other queens and can retrieve it from memory after 24h of separation. Thus, we have documented for the first time that long-term memory of individual identity is present and functional in ants. This novel finding represents an advance in our understanding of the mechanism determining the evolution of cooperation among unrelated individuals.
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Watanabe, S., & Troje, N. F. (2006). Towards a “virtual pigeon”: a new technique for investigating avian social perception. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 271–279.
Abstract: The purpose of the present study is to examine the applicability of a computer-generated, virtual animal to study animal cognition. Pigeons were trained to discriminate between movies of a real pigeon and a rat. Then, they were tested with movies of the computer-generated (CG) pigeon. Subjects showed generalization to the CG pigeon, however, they also responded to modified versions in which the CG pigeon was showing impossible movement, namely hopping and walking without its head bobbing. Hence, the pigeons did not attend to these particular details of the display. When they were trained to discriminate between the normal and the modified version of the CG pigeon, they were able to learn the discrimination. The results of an additional partial occlusion test suggest that the subjects used head movement as a cue for the usual vs. unusual CG pigeon discrimination.
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Benard, J., Stach, S., & Giurfa, M. (2006). Categorization of visual stimuli in the honeybee Apis mellifera. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 257–270.
Abstract: Categorization refers to the classification of perceptual input into defined functional groups. We present and discuss evidence suggesting that stimulus categorization can also be found in an invertebrate, the honeybee Apis mellifera, thus underlining the generality across species of this cognitive process. Honeybees show positive transfer of appropriate responding from a trained to a novel set of visual stimuli. Such a transfer was demonstrated for specific isolated features such as symmetry or orientation, but also for assemblies (layouts) of features. Although transfer from training to novel stimuli can be achieved by stimulus generalization of the training stimuli, most of these transfer tests involved clearly distinguishable stimuli for which generalization would be reduced. Though in most cases specific experimental controls such as stimulus balance and discriminability are still required, it seems appropriate to characterize the performance of honeybees as reflecting categorization. Further experiments should address the issue of which categorization theory accounts better for the visual performances of honeybees.
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Lea, S. E. G., Goto, K., Osthaus, B., & Ryan, C. M. E. (2006). The logic of the stimulus. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 247–256.
Abstract: This paper examines the contribution of stimulus processing to animal logics. In the classic functionalist S-O-R view of learning (and cognition), stimuli provide the raw material to which the organism applies its cognitive processes-its logic, which may be taxon-specific. Stimuli may contribute to the logic of the organism's response, and may do so in taxon-specific ways. Firstly, any non-trivial stimulus has an internal organization that may constrain or bias the way that the organism addresses it; since stimuli can only be defined relative to the organism's perceptual apparatus, and this apparatus is taxon-specific, such constraints or biases will often be taxon-specific. Secondly, the representation of a stimulus that the perceptual system builds, and the analysis it makes of this representation, may provide a model for the synthesis and analysis done at a more cognitive level. Such a model is plausible for evolutionary reasons: perceptual analysis was probably perfected before cognitive analysis in the evolutionary history of the vertebrates. Like stimulus-driven analysis, such perceptually modelled cognition may be taxon-specific because of the taxon-specificity of the perceptual apparatus. However, it may also be the case that different taxa are able to free themselves from the stimulus logic, and therefore apply a more abstract logic, to different extents. This thesis is defended with reference to two examples of cases where animals' cognitive logic seems to be isomorphic with perceptual logic, specifically in the case of pigeons' attention to global and local information in visual stimuli, and dogs' failure to comprehend means-end relationships in string-pulling tasks.
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Santos, L. R., Barnes, J. L., & Mahajan, N. (2005). Expectations about numerical events in four lemur species (Eulemur fulvus, Eulemur mongoz, Lemur catta and Varecia rubra). Anim. Cogn., 8(4), 253–262.
Abstract: Although much is known about how some primates--in particular, monkeys and apes--represent and enumerate different numbers of objects, very little is known about the numerical abilities of prosimian primates. Here, we explore how four lemur species (Eulemur fulvus, E. mongoz, Lemur catta, and Varecia rubra) represent small numbers of objects. Specifically, we presented lemurs with three expectancy violation looking time experiments aimed at exploring their expectations about a simple 1+1 addition event. In these experiments, we presented subjects with displays in which two lemons were sequentially added behind an occluder and then measured subjects' duration of looking to expected and unexpected outcomes. In experiment 1, subjects looked reliably longer at an unexpected outcome of only one object than at an expected outcome of two objects. Similarly, subjects in experiment 2 looked reliably longer at an unexpected outcome of three objects than at an expected outcome of two objects. In experiment 3, subjects looked reliably longer at an unexpected outcome of one object twice the size of the original than at an expected outcome of two objects of the original size. These results suggest that some prosimian primates understand the outcome of simple arithmetic operations. These results are discussed in light of similar findings in human infants and other adult primates.
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