|
Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (2001). Cognitive strategies and the representation of social relations by monkeys. Nebr Symp Motiv, 47, 145–177.
|
Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (2003). Meaning and emotion in animal vocalizations. Ann N Y Acad Sci, 1000, 32–55.
Abstract: Historically, a dichotomy has been drawn between the semantic communication of human language and the apparently emotional calls of animals. Current research paints a more complicated picture. Just as scientists have identified elements of human speech that reflect a speaker's emotions, field experiments have shown that the calls of many animals provide listeners with information about objects and events in the environment. Like human speech, therefore, animal vocalizations simultaneously provide others with information that is both semantic and emotional. In support of this conclusion, we review the results of field experiments on the natural vocalizations of African vervet monkeys, diana monkeys, baboons, and suricates (a South African mongoose). Vervet and diana monkeys give acoustically distinct alarm calls in response to the presence of leopards, eagles, and snakes. Each alarm call type elicits a different, adaptive response from others nearby. Field experiments demonstrate that listeners compare these vocalizations not just according to their acoustic properties but also according to the information they convey. Like monkeys, suricates give acoustically distinct alarm calls in response to different predators. Within each predator class, the calls also differ acoustically according to the signaler's perception of urgency. Like speech, therefore, suricate alarm calls convey both semantic and emotional information. The vocalizations of baboons, like those of many birds and mammals, are individually distinctive. As a result, when one baboon hears a sequence of calls exchanged between two or more individuals, the listener acquires information about social events in its group. Baboons, moreover, are skilled “eavesdroppers:” their response to different call sequences provides evidence of the sophisticated information they acquire from other individuals' vocalizations. Baboon males give loud “wahoo” calls during competitive displays. Like other vocalizations, these highly emotional calls provide listeners with information about the caller's dominance rank, age, and competitive ability. Although animal vocalizations, like human speech, simultaneously encode both semantic and emotional information, they differ from language in at least one fundamental respect. Although listeners acquire rich information from a caller's vocalization, callers do not, in the human sense, intend to provide it. Listeners acquire information as an inadvertent consequence of signaler behavior.
|
Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (2003). Signalers and receivers in animal communication. Annu Rev Psychol, 54, 145–173.
Abstract: In animal communication natural selection favors callers who vocalize to affect the behavior of listeners and listeners who acquire information from vocalizations, using this information to represent their environment. The acquisition of information in the wild is similar to the learning that occurs in laboratory conditioning experiments. It also has some parallels with language. The dichotomous view that animal signals must be either referential or emotional is false, because they can easily be both: The mechanisms that cause a signaler to vocalize do not limit a listener's ability to extract information from the call. The inability of most animals to recognize the mental states of others distinguishes animal communication most clearly from human language. Whereas signalers may vocalize to change a listener's behavior, they do not call to inform others. Listeners acquire information from signalers who do not, in the human sense, intend to provide it.
|
|
Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1990). How Monkeys See the World.
|
|
Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (2003). The Structure of Social Knowledge in Monkeys. In F. B. M. de Waal, & P. L. Tyack (Eds.), Animal Social Complexity: Intelligence, Culture, and Individualized Societies. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
|
|
Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1988). Social and non.social knowledge in vervet monkeys. In Machiavellian Intelligence (pp. 255–270). Oxford: Oxford Univ Press.
|
|
Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1986). The recognition of social alliances among vervet monkeys. Anim. Behav., 34, 1722–1731.
|
|
Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1989). Reconciliation and redirected aggression in vervet monkeys, Behaviour. Behaviour, 110, 258–275.
|
Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (2015). Social cognition. Animal Behaviour, 103, 191–202.
Abstract: The social intelligence hypothesis argues that competition and cooperation among individuals have shaped the evolution of cognition in animals. What do we mean by social cognition? Here we suggest that the building blocks of social cognition are a suite of skills, ordered roughly according to the cognitive demands they place upon individuals. These skills allow an animal to recognize others by various means; to recognize and remember other animals' relationships; and, perhaps, to attribute mental states to them. Some skills are elementary and virtually ubiquitous in the animal kingdom; others are more limited in their taxonomic distribution. We treat these skills as the targets of selection, and assume that more complex levels of social cognition evolve only when simpler methods are inadequate. As a result, more complex levels of social cognition indicate greater selective pressures in the past. The presence of each skill can be tested directly through field observations and experiments. In addition, the same methods that have been used to compare social cognition across species can also be used to measure individual differences within species and to test the hypothesis that individual differences in social cognition are linked to differences in reproductive success.
|
Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1999). Recognition of other individuals' social relationships by female baboons. Anim. Behav., 58(1), 67–75.
Abstract: We describe a series of playback experiments designed to test whether free-ranging baboons, Papio cynocephalus ursinus, recognize the calls of other group members and also associate signallers with their close genetic relatives. Pairs of unrelated females were played sequences of calls that mimicked a fight between their relatives. As controls, the same females heard sequences that involved either (1) only the more dominant female's relative or (2) neither of the females' relatives. When call sequences involved their relatives, subjects looked towards the speaker for a longer duration than when the sequences involved nonkin. When the sequences involved the other female's relative, they also looked towards that female. Subjects did not look towards one another when call sequences involved nonkin. Dominant subjects were more likely to supplant their subordinate partners following playbacks of sequences that mimicked a dispute between their relatives than following the two control trials. In contrast, both subjects were more likely to approach one another and to interact in a friendly manner following the two control trials than following the test trial. Results indicate that female baboons recognize the screams and threat grunts not only of their own close relatives but also of unrelated individuals. They also replicate previous studies in suggesting that female monkeys recognize the close associates of other individuals and adjust their interactions with others according to recent events involving individuals other than themselves. Copyright 1999 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.
|
