Abstract: Cooperation in organisms, whether bacteria or primates, has been a difficulty for evolutionary theory since Darwin. On the assumption that interactions between pairs of individuals occur on a probabilistic basis, a model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Deductions from the model, and the results of a computer tournament show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established. Potential applications include specific aspects of territoriality, mating, and disease.

Abstract: The effects of ACTH 4-10 on rats' imitation learning was examined during the acquisition and extinction of a bar-press response for water reinforcement. Rats were exposed to either a bar-pressing conspecific (OB), an experimentally naive conspecific (ON), or an empty box (OE) during bar-press acquisition. In a factorial design, each rat was then exposed to one of the same three conditions during extinction. An 80 mcg dose of ACTH 4-10 was administered to half of the rats in each group prior to observation. Performance differences during acquisition were generally small, but significant performance differences during extinction were found. Social facilitation was indicated by the finding that rats extinguished in the presence of a conspecific exhibited significantly greater resistance to extinction than rats extinguished in the presence of an empty box. An imitation effect was also found. Rats that observed a bar-pressing conspecific during both acquisition and extinction (group OB-OB) showed significantly greater resistance top extinction than did groups OB-ON, CB-OE, or OE-OE. There were no significant effects of the hormone, however, relative to saline controls.

Abstract: It was formerly argued that alternative evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) are possible for animal contests characterized by some asymmetry that can be perceived with perfect accuracy. Where roles A and B refer to the asymmetry between opponents, ESSs are: [`]fight when A, retreat when B', and vice versa. Either can be an ESS, but only if the [`]reserve strategy' (=what an animal does when it fights) is sufficiently damaging. We examine the [`]war of attrition' (winner = opponent that persists longer). In a population at either ESS, reserve strategy is never normally shown; it is therefore subject to drift unless the selective action of rare individuals which break the convention is considered. These could arise either by mutation or by mistakes in role assessment. When mutations and mistakes simply specify that occasionally an animal fights when it [`]should' retreat, selection adjusts reserve strategy to a level where only one ESS (the [`]commonsense' ESS) is possible, if the asymmetry is relevant to payoff. Thus for asymmetries in fighting ability or resource value, the individual with the lower score will retreat. However, we are particularly concerned with cases where both payoff-relevant aspects (fighting ability and resource value) are asymmetric. If opponents sustain contest costs at rates KA and KB, and their resource values are VA and VB, an [`]optimal assessor' strategy defined by the interaction between the two asymmetries, is a unique ESS. It obeys the rule [`]fight on estimating role A, where VA/KA>VB/KB; retreat in B'. If mistakes can occur in both roles, but are very rate, the ESS is not fundamentally altered though there will be infinitesimal tendencies for persisting in role B. Selection to improve assessment abilities intensifies as abilities improve, but is weak if roles A and B are rather similar. Over a range of similarity between roles, an [`]owner wins' convention may be adopted if ownership correlates positively with role A and an individual cannot tell when it would otherwise pay him to break the convention. We also examine a contest in which information about roles can be acquired only during a contest itself, and at a cost. Much depends on the rate at which information is acquired relative to the rate at which costs are expended, and on whether contests normally escalate in intensity, remain at the same level, or de-escalate. Selection favours short contests when costs are high relative to resource value, where the outcome of a round contains much information about fighting ability, and where the actual disparity in fighting ability is large.

Abstract: Equilibria and kinetics of alkaline isomerization of seven ferricytochromes c from vertebrates were studied by pH-titration and pH-jump methods in the pH region of 7-12. In the equilibrium behavior, no significant difference was detected among the cytochromes c, whereas marked differences in the kinetic behavior were observed. According to the kinetic behavior of the isomerization, the cytochromes c examined fall into three classes: Group I (horse, sheep, dog and pigeon cytochromes c), Group II (tuna and bonito cytochromes c) and Group III (rhesus monkey cytochrome c). The kinetic results are interpreted in terms of the sequential scheme: Neutral form in equilibrium with fast Transient form in equilibrium with slow Alkaline form where the neutral and alkaline forms are the species stable at neutral and alkaline pH, respectively, and the transient form is a kinetic intermediate. From comparison of the primary sequences of the seven cytochromes c and the classification of these cytochromes c, it is concluded that the amino acid substitution Phe/Tyr at the 46-th position has a major influence on the kinetic behavior. In Group II and III cytochromes c, the ionization of Tyr-46 is suggested to bring about loosening of the heme crevice and thus facilitate the ligand replacement involved in the isomerization.