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Hamilton, W. D. (1971). Geometry for the selfish herd. J. Theor. Biol., 31(2), 295–311.
Abstract: This paper presents an antithesis to the view that gregarious behaviour is evolved through benefits to the population or species. Following Galton (1871) and Williams (1964) gregarious behaviour is considered as a form of cover-seeking in which each animal tries to reduce its chance of being caught by a predator.
It is easy to see how pruning of marginal individuals can maintain centripetal instincts in already gregarious species; some evidence that marginal pruning actually occurs is summarized. Besides this, simply defined models are used to show that even in non-gregarious species selection is likely to favour individuals who stay close to others.
Although not universal or unipotent, cover-seeking is a widespread and important element in animal aggregation, as the literature shows. Neglect of the idea has probably followed from a general disbelief that evolution can be dysgenic for a species. Nevertheless, selection theory provides no support for such disbelief in the case of species with outbreeding or unsubdivided populations.
The model for two dimensions involves a complex problem in geometrical probability which has relevance also in metallurgy and communication science. Some empirical data on this, gathered from random number plots, is presented as of possible heuristic value.
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Seyfarth, R. M. (1977). A model of social grooming among adult female monkeys. J. Theor. Biol., 65(4), 671–698.
Abstract: Grooming networks among adult female monkeys exhibit two similar features across a number of different species. High-ranking animals receive more grooming than others, and the majority of grooming occurs between females of adjacent rank. A theoretical model which duplicates these features is presented, and the properties of the model are used to explain the possible causation and function of female grooming behaviour. The model illustrates how relatively simple principles governing the behaviour of individuals may be used to explain more complex aspects of the social structure of non-human primate groups.
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Kiltie, R. A., Fan, J., & Laine, A. F. (1995). A wavelet-based metric for visual texture discrimination with applications in evolutionary ecology. Math Biosci, 126(1), 21–39.
Abstract: Much work on natural and sexual selection is concerned with the conspicuousness of visual patterns (textures) on animal and plant surfaces. Previous attempts by evolutionary biologists to quantify apparency of such textures have involved subjective estimates of conspicuousness or statistical analyses based on transect samples. We present a method based on wavelet analysis that avoids subjectivity and that uses more of the information in image textures than transects do. Like the human visual system for texture discrimination, and probably like that of other vertebrates, this method is based on localized analysis of orientation and frequency components of the patterns composing visual textures. As examples of the metric's utility, we present analyses of crypsis for tigers, zebras, and peppered moth morphs.
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Scheffer, M., & van Nes, E. H. (2006). Self-organized similarity, the evolutionary emergence of groups of similar species. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 103(16), 6230–6235.
Abstract: Ecologists have long been puzzled by the fact that there are so many similar species in nature. Here we show that self-organized clusters of look-a-likes may emerge spontaneously from coevolution of competitors. The explanation is that there are two alternative ways to survive together: being sufficiently different or being sufficiently similar. Using a model based on classical competition theory, we demonstrate a tendency for evolutionary emergence of regularly spaced lumps of similar species along a niche axis. Indeed, such lumpy patterns are commonly observed in size distributions of organisms ranging from algae, zooplankton, and beetles to birds and mammals, and could not be well explained by earlier theory. Our results suggest that these patterns may represent self-constructed niches emerging from competitive interactions. A corollary of our findings is that, whereas in species-poor communities sympatric speciation and invasion of open niches is possible, species-saturated communities may be characterized by convergent evolution and invasion by look-a-likes.
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Mettke-Hofmann, C., & Gwinner, E. (2003). Long-term memory for a life on the move. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 100(10), 5863–5866.
Abstract: Evidence is accumulating that cognitive abilities are shaped by the specific ecological conditions to which animals are exposed. Long-distance migratory birds may provide a striking example of this. Field observations have shown that, at least in some species, a substantial proportion of individuals return to the same breeding, wintering, and stopover sites in successive years. This observation suggests that migrants have evolved special cognitive abilities that enable them to accomplish these feats. Here we show that memory of a particular feeding site persisted for at least 12 months in a long-distance migrant, whereas a closely related nonmigrant could remember such a site for only 2 weeks. Thus, it seems that the migratory lifestyle has influenced the learning and memorizing capacities of migratory birds. These results build a bridge between field observations suggesting special memorization feats of migratory birds and previous neuroanatomical results from the same two species indicating an increase in relative hippocampal size from the first to the second year of life in the migrant but not in the nonmigrant.
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Bergstrom, C. T., & Lachmann, M. (1998). Signaling among relatives. III. Talk is cheap. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 95(9), 5100–5105.
Abstract: The Sir Philip Sidney game has been used by numerous authors to show how signal cost can facilitate honest signaling among relatives. Here, we demonstrate that, in this game, honest cost-free signals are possible as well, under very general conditions. Moreover, these cost-free signals are better for all participants than the previously explored alternatives. Recent empirical evidence suggests that begging is energetically inexpensive for nestling birds; this finding led some researchers to question the applicability of the costly signaling framework to nestling begging. Our results show that cost-free or inexpensive signals, as observed empirically, fall within the framework of signaling theory.
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Johnson, D. D. P., Stopka, P., & Knights, S. (2003). Sociology: The puzzle of human cooperation. Nature, 421(6926), 911–2; discussion 912.
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Wilson, A. M., McGuigan, M. P., Su, A., & van Den Bogert, A. J. (2001). Horses damp the spring in their step. Nature, 414(6866), 895–899.
Abstract: The muscular work of galloping in horses is halved by storing and returning elastic strain energy in spring-like muscle-tendon units.These make the legs act like a child's pogo stick that is tuned to stretch and recoil at 2.5 strides per second. This mechanism is optimized by unique musculoskeletal adaptations: the digital flexor muscles have extremely short fibres and significant passive properties, whereas the tendons are very long and span several joints. Length change occurs by a stretching of the spring-like digital flexor tendons rather than through energetically expensive length changes in the muscle. Despite being apparently redundant for such a mechanism, the muscle fibres in the digital flexors are well developed. Here we show that the mechanical arrangement of the elastic leg permits it to vibrate at a higher frequency of 30-40 Hz that could cause fatigue damage to tendon and bone. Furthermore, we show that the digital flexor muscles have minimal ability to contribute to or regulate significantly the 2.5-Hz cycle of movement, but are ideally arranged to damp these high-frequency oscillations in the limb.
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Conradt, L., & Roper, T. J. (2003). Group decision-making in animals. Nature, 421(6919), 155–158.
Abstract: Groups of animals often need to make communal decisions, for example about which activities to perform, when to perform them and which direction to travel in; however, little is known about how they do so. Here, we model the fitness consequences of two possible decision-making mechanisms: 'despotism' and 'democracy'. We show that under most conditions, the costs to subordinate group members, and to the group as a whole, are considerably higher for despotic than for democratic decisions. Even when the despot is the most experienced group member, it only pays other members to accept its decision when group size is small and the difference in information is large. Democratic decisions are more beneficial primarily because they tend to produce less extreme decisions, rather than because each individual has an influence on the decision per se. Our model suggests that democracy should be widespread and makes quantitative, testable predictions about group decision-making in non-humans.
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Rands, S. A., Cowlishaw, G., Pettifor, R. A., Rowcliffe, J. M., & Johnstone, R. A. (2003). Spontaneous emergence of leaders and followers in foraging pairs. Nature, 423(6938), 432–434.
Abstract: Animals that forage socially often stand to gain from coordination of their behaviour. Yet it is not known how group members reach a consensus on the timing of foraging bouts. Here we demonstrate a simple process by which this may occur. We develop a state-dependent, dynamic game model of foraging by a pair of animals, in which each individual chooses between resting or foraging during a series of consecutive periods, so as to maximize its own individual chances of survival. We find that, if there is an advantage to foraging together, the equilibrium behaviour of both individuals becomes highly synchronized. As a result of this synchronization, differences in the energetic reserves of the two players spontaneously develop, leading them to adopt different behavioural roles. The individual with lower reserves emerges as the 'pace-maker' who determines when the pair should forage, providing a straightforward resolution to the problem of group coordination. Moreover, the strategy that gives rise to this behaviour can be implemented by a simple 'rule of thumb' that requires no detailed knowledge of the state of other individuals.
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