| Home | << 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 >> |
|
Heinrich, B., & Bugnyar, T. (2007). Just how smart are ravens? Sci Am, 296(4), 64–71.
|
|
Cattell, R. B., & Korth, B. (1973). The isolation of temperament dimensions in dogs. Behav Biol, 9(1), 15–30.
|
|
Beckers, T., Miller, R. R., De Houwer, J., & Urushihara, K. (2006). Reasoning rats: forward blocking in Pavlovian animal conditioning is sensitive to constraints of causal inference. J Exp Psychol Gen, 135(1), 92–102.
Abstract: Forward blocking is one of the best-documented phenomena in Pavlovian animal conditioning. According to contemporary associative learning theories, forward blocking arises directly from the hardwired basic learning rules that govern the acquisition or expression of associations. Contrary to this view, here the authors demonstrate that blocking in rats is flexible and sensitive to constraints of causal inference, such as violation of additivity and ceiling considerations. This suggests that complex cognitive processes akin to causal inferential reasoning are involved in a well-established Pavlovian animal conditioning phenomenon commonly attributed to the operation of basic associative processes.
|
|
Zentall, T. R., & Sherburne, L. M. (1994). Transfer of value from S+ to S- in a simultaneous discrimination. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 20(2), 176–183.
Abstract: Value transfer theory has been proposed to account for transitive inference effects (L. V. Fersen, C. D. L. Wynne, J. D. Delius, & J. E. R. Staddon, 1991), in which following training on 4 simultaneous discriminations (A+B-, B+C-, C+D-, D+E-) pigeons show a preference for B over D. According to this theory, some of the value of reinforcement acquired by each S+ transfers to the S-. In the transitive inference experiment, C (associated with both reward and nonreward) can transfer less value to D than A (associated only with reward) can transfer to B. Support for value transfer theory was demonstrated in 2 experiments in which an S- presented in the context of a stimulus to which responses were always reinforced (S+) was preferred over an S- presented in the context of a stimulus to which responses were sometimes reinforced (S +/-).
|
|
Urcuioli, P. J., & Zentall, T. R. (1992). Transfer across delayed discriminations: evidence regarding the nature of prospective working memory. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 18(2), 154–173.
Abstract: Pigeons were trained successively either on 2 delayed simple discriminations or on a delayed simple discrimination followed by delayed matching-to-sample. During subsequent transfer tests, the initial stimuli from the 1st task were substituted for those in the 2nd. Performances transferred immediately if both sets of initial stimuli had been associated with the presence versus absence of food on their respective retention tests, and the direction of transfer (positive or negative) depended on whether the substitution involved stimuli with identical or different outcome associates. No transfer was found, however, when the initial stimuli were associated with different patterns of responding but food occurred at the end of every trial. These results are consistent with outcome expectancy mediation but are incompatible with response intention and retrospective coding accounts.
|
|
Brodbeck, D. R. (1997). Picture fragment completion: priming in the pigeon. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 23(4), 461–468.
Abstract: It has been suggested that the system behind implicit memory in humans is evolutionarily old and that animals should readily show priming. In Experiment 1, a picture fragment completion test was used to test priming in pigeons. After pecking a warning stimulus, pigeons were shown 2 partially obscured pictures from different categories and were always reinforced for choosing a picture from one of the categories. On control trials, the warning stimulus was a picture of some object (not from the S+ or S- category), on study trials the warning stimulus was a picture to be categorized on the next trial, and on test trials the warning stimulus was a randomly chosen picture and the S+ picture was the warning stimulus seen on the previous trial. Categorization was better on study and test trials than on control trials. Experiment 2 ruled out the possibility that the priming effect was caused by the pigeons' responding to familiarity by using warning stimuli from both S+ and S- categories. Experiment 3 investigated the time course of the priming effect.
|
|
Epstein, R. (1985). Animal cognition as the praxist views it. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 9(4), 623–630.
Abstract: The distinction between psychology and praxics provides a clear answer to the question of animal cognition. As Griffin and others have noted, the kinds of behavioral phenomena that lead psychologists to speak of cognition in humans are also observed in nonhuman animals, and therefore those who are convinced of the legitimacy of psychology should not hesitate to speak of and to attempt to study animal cognition. The behavior of organisms is also a legitimate subject matter, and praxics, the study of behavior, has led to significant advances in our understanding of the kinds of behaviors that lead psychologists to speak of cognition. Praxics is a biological science; the attempt by students of behavior to appropriate psychology has been misguided. Generativity theory is an example of a formal theory of behavior that has proved useful both in the engineering of intelligent performances in nonhuman animals and in the prediction of intelligent performances in humans.
|
|
Heyes, C. M., & Dawson, G. R. (1990). A demonstration of observational learning in rats using a bidirectional control. Q J Exp Psychol B, 42(1), 59–71.
Abstract: Hungry rats observed a conspecific demonstrator pushing a single manipulandum, a joystick, to the right or to the left for food reward and were then allowed access to the joystick from a different orientation. The effects of right-pushing vs left-pushing observation experience on (1) response acquisition, (2) reversal of a left-right discrimination, and (3) responding in extinction, were examined. Rats that had observed left-pushing made more left responses during acquisition than rats that had observed right-pushing, and rats that had observed demonstrators pushing in the direction that had previously been reinforced took longer to reach criterion reversal and made more responses in extinction than rats that had observed demonstrators pushing in the opposite direction to that previously reinforced. These results provide evidence that rats are capable of learning a response, or a response-reinforcer contingency, through conspecific observation.
|
|
Dunbar, R. I. M., McAdam, M. R., & O'connell, S. (2005). Mental rehearsal in great apes (Pan troglodytes and Pongo pygmaeus) and children. Behav. Process., 69(3), 323–330.
Abstract: The ability to rehearse possible future courses of action in the mind is an important feature of advanced social cognition in humans, and the “social brain” hypothesis implies that it might also be a feature of primate social cognition. We tested two chimpanzees, six orangutans and 63 children aged 3-7 years on a set of four puzzle boxes, half of which were presented with an opportunity to observe the box before being allowed to open it (“prior view”), the others being given without an opportunity to examine the boxes before handling them (“no prior view”). When learning effects are partialled out, puzzle boxes in the “prior view” condition were opened significantly faster than boxes given in the “no prior view” condition by the children, but not by either of the great apes. The three species differ significantly in the speed with which they opened boxes in the “no prior view” condition. The three species' performance on this task was a function of relative frontal lobe volume, suggesting that it may be possible to identify quantitative neuropsychological differences between species.
|
|
Griffin, A. S., & Guez, D. (2014). Innovation and problem solving: A review of common mechanisms. Behav. Process., 109, 121–134.
Abstract: Behavioural innovations have become central to our thinking about how animals adjust to changing environments. It is now well established that animals vary in their ability to innovate, but understanding why remains a challenge. This is because innovations are rare, so studying innovation requires alternative experimental assays that create opportunities for animals to express their ability to invent new behaviours, or use pre-existing ones in new contexts. Problem solving of extractive foraging tasks has been put forward as a suitable experimental assay. We review the rapidly expanding literature on problem solving of extractive foraging tasks in order to better understand to what extent the processes underpinning problem solving, and the factors influencing problem solving, are in line with those predicted, and found, to underpin and influence innovation in the wild. Our aim is to determine whether problem solving can be used as an experimental proxy of innovation. We find that in most respects, problem solving is determined by the same underpinning mechanisms, and is influenced by the same factors, as those predicted to underpin, and to influence, innovation. We conclude that problem solving is a valid experimental assay for studying innovation, propose a conceptual model of problem solving in which motor diversity plays a more central role than has been considered to date, and provide recommendations for future research using problem solving to investigate innovation. This article is part of a Special Issue entitled: Cognition in the wild.
Keywords: Behavioural flexibility; Cognition; Innovation; Problem solving
|