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Meehan, C. L., & Mench, J. A. (2007). The challenge of challenge: Can problem solving opportunities enhance animal welfare? Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 102(3-4), 246–261.
Abstract: Cognitive mechanisms are an important part of the organization of the behavior systems of animals. In the wild, animals regularly face problems that they must overcome in order to survive and thrive. Solving such problems often requires animals to process, store, retrieve, and act upon information from the environment--in other words, to use their cognitive skills. For example, animals may have to use navigational, tool-making or cooperative social skills in order to procure their food. However, many enrichment programs for captive animals do not include the integration of these types of cognitive challenges. Thus, foraging enrichments typically are designed to facilitate the physical expression of feeding behaviors such as food-searching and food consumption, but not to facilitate complex problem solving behaviors related to food acquisition. Challenging animals by presenting them with problems is almost certainly a source of frustration and stress. However, we suggest here that this is an important, and even necessary, feature of an enrichment program, as long as animals also possess the skills and resources to effectively solve the problems with which they are presented. We discuss this with reference to theories about the emotional consequences of coping with challenge, the association between lack of challenge and the development of abnormal behavior, and the benefits of stress (arousal) in facilitating learning and memory of relevant skills. Much remains to be done to provide empirical support for these theories. However, they do point the way to a practical approach to improving animal welfare--to design enrichments to facilitate the cognitive mechanisms which underlie the performance of complex behaviors that cannot be performed due to the restrictions inherent to the captive environment.
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Quesada, J., Kintsch, W., & Gomez, E. (2005). Complex problem-solving: a field in search of a definition? Theor Issues Ergon Sci, 6(1), 5–33.
Abstract: Complex problem-solving (CPS) is as an area of cognitive science that has received a good amount of attention, but theories in the field have not progressed accordingly. The reasons could be the lack of good definitions and classifications of the tasks (taxonomies). Although complexity is a term used pervasively in psychology and is operationalized in different ways, there are no psychological theories of complexity. The definition of problem-solving has been changed in the past to reflect the varied interests of the researchers and has lost its initial concreteness. These two facts together make it difficult to define CPS or make clear if CPS should reuse the theory and methods of classical problem-solving or on the contrary should build a theoretical structure starting from scratch. A taxonomy is offered of tasks using both formal features and psychological features that are theory-independent that could help compare the CPS tasks used in the literature. The adequateness is also reviewed of the most extended definitions of CPS and conclude that they are in serious need of review, since they cover tasks that are not considered problem-solving by their own authors or are not complex, but ignore others that should clearly be included.
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Levin, L. E. (1996). Passage order through different pathways in groups of schooling fish, and the diversified leadership hypothesis. Behav. Process., 37(1), 1–8.
Abstract: The diversified leadership hypothesis proposes that different individuals within a school of fish act as leaders in different circumstances. This `circumstantial leadership' results from inter-individual behavioral variability and a `cohesion-dispersion' tendency modulated by `failure-success' contingencies. The hypothesis predicts that when offered different pathways to escape the restriction of their swimming space, individuals within a group of fish will show 1. (a) consistent passage orders in each pathway, but2. (b) different passage orders in different pathways. Using an avoidance paddle and three different groups of fish (Aphyocharax erithrurus) the results confirmed prediction 1. (a) while prediction2. (b) was verified only in one group.
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Neuringer, A. (2004). Reinforced variability in animals and people: implications for adaptive action. Am Psychol, 59(9), 891–906.
Abstract: Although reinforcement often leads to repetitive, even stereotyped responding, that is not a necessary outcome. When it depends on variations, reinforcement results in responding that is diverse, novel, indeed unpredictable, with distributions sometimes approaching those of a random process. This article reviews evidence for the powerful and precise control by reinforcement over behavioral variability, evidence obtained from human and animal-model studies, and implications of such control. For example, reinforcement of variability facilitates learning of complex new responses, aids problem solving, and may contribute to creativity. Depression and autism are characterized by abnormally repetitive behaviors, but individuals afflicted with such psychopathologies can learn to vary their behaviors when reinforced for so doing. And reinforced variability may help to solve a basic puzzle concerning the nature of voluntary action.
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Benson-Amram, S., Weldele, M. L., & Holekamp, K. E. (2013). A comparison of innovative problem-solving abilities between wild and captive spotted hyaenas, Crocuta crocuta. Animal Behaviour, 85(2), 349–356.
Abstract: Innovative problem solving enables individuals to deal with novel social and ecological challenges. However, our understanding of the importance of innovation for animals in their natural habitat is limited because experimental investigations of innovation have historically focused on captive animals. To determine how captivity affects innovation, and whether captive studies of animal innovation suffer from low external validity, we need experimental investigations of innovation in both wild and captive populations of the same species in diverse taxa. Here we inquired whether wild and captive spotted hyaenas differ in their ability to solve the same novel technical problem, and in the diversity of exploratory behaviours they exhibit when first interacting with the problem. Our results suggest that wild and captive populations show important differences in their innovative problem-solving abilities. Captive hyaenas were significantly more successful at solving the novel problem, and significantly more diverse in their initial exploratory behaviour, than were wild hyaenas. We were able to rule out hypotheses suggesting that these differences result from excess energy or time available to captive animals. We conclude that captive hyaenas were more successful because captive individuals were less neophobic and more exploratory than their wild counterparts. These results have important implications for our interpretation of studies on innovative problem solving in captive animals and aid our attempts to gain a broader understanding of the importance of innovation for animals in their natural habitat.
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Sterling, E. J., & Povinelli, D. J. (1999). Tool use, aye-ayes, and sensorimotor intelligence. Folia Primatol (Basel), 70(1), 8–16.
Abstract: Humans, chimpanzees, capuchins and aye-ayes all display an unusually high degree of encephalization and diverse omnivorous extractive foraging. It has been suggested that the high degree of encephalization in aye-ayes may be the result of their diverse, omnivorous extractive foraging behaviors. In combination with certain forms of tool use, omnivorous extractive foraging has been hypothesized to be linked to higher levels of sensorimotor intelligence (stages 5 or 6). Although free-ranging aye-ayes have not been observed to use tools directly in the context of their extractive foraging activities, they have recently been reported to use lianas as tools in a manner that independently suggests that they may possess stage 5 or 6 sensorimotor intelligence. Although other primate species which display diverse, omnivorous extractive foraging have been tested for sensorimotor intelligence, aye-ayes have not. We report a test of captive aye-ayes' comprehension of tool use in a situation designed to simulate natural conditions. The results support the view that aye-ayes do not achieve stage 6 comprehension of tool use, but rather may use trial-and-error learning to develop tool-use behaviors. Other theories for aye-aye encephalization are considered.
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Rumbaugh, D. M., Riesen, A. H., & Wright, S. C. (1972). Creative responsiveness to objects: a report of a pilot study with young apes. Folia Primatol (Basel), 17(5), 397–403.
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Menzel, E. W. J. (1971). Communication about the environment in a group of young chimpanzees. Folia Primatol (Basel), 15(3), 220–232.
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Birch, H. G. (1945). The relation of previous experience to insightful problem-solving. J Comp Psychol, 38, 367–383.
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Rilling, M. E., & Neiworth, J. J. (1991). How animals use images. Sci Prog, 75(298 Pt 3-4), 439–452.
Abstract: Animal cognition is a field within experimental psychology in which cognitive processes formerly studied exclusively with people have been demonstrated in animals. Evidence for imagery in the pigeon emerges from the experiments described here. The pigeon's task was to discriminate, by pecking the appropriate choice key, between a clock hand presented on a video screen that rotated clockwise with constant velocity from a clock hand that violated constant velocity. Imagery was defined by trials on which the line rotated from 12.00 o'clock to 3.00 o'clock, then disappeared during a delay, and reappeared at a final stop location beyond 3.00 o'clock. After acquisition of a discrimination with final stop locations at 3.00 o'clock and 6.00 o'clock, the evidence for imagery was the accurate responding of the pigeons to novel locations at 4.00 o'clock and 7.00 o'clock. Pigeons display evidence of imagery by transforming a representation of movement that includes a series of intermediate steps which accurately represent the location of a moving stimulus after it disappears.
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