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de Jong, T. R., & Neumann, I. D. (2018). Oxytocin and Aggression. In R. Hurlemann, & V. Grinevich (Eds.), Behavioral Pharmacology of Neuropeptides: Oxytocin (pp. 175–192). Cham: Springer International Publishing.
Abstract: The neuropeptide oxytocin (OT) has a solid reputation as a facilitator of social interactions such as parental and pair bonding, trust, and empathy. The many results supporting a pro-social role of OT have generated the hypothesis that impairments in the endogenous OT system may lead to antisocial behavior, most notably social withdrawal or pathological aggression. If this is indeed the case, administration of exogenous OT could be the “serenic” treatment that psychiatrists have for decades been searching for.
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Krueger, K. (2017). Perissodactyla Cognition. In J. Vonk, & T. Shackelford (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Animal Cognition and Behavior (pp. 1–10). Cham: Springer International Publishing.
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Krueger, K., Marr, I., & Farmer, K. (2017). Equine Cognition. In J. Vonk, & T. Shackelford (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Animal Cognition and Behavior (pp. 1–11). Cham: Springer International Publishing.
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Irving-Pease, E. K., Ryan, H., Jamieson, A., Dimopoulos, E. A., Larson, G., & Frantz, L. A. F. (2019). Paleogenomics of Animal Domestication. In C. Lindqvist, & O. P. Rajora (Eds.), Paleogenomics: Genome-Scale Analysis of Ancient DNA (pp. 225–272). Cham: Springer International Publishing.
Abstract: Starting with dogs, over 15,000 years ago, the domestication of animals has been central in the development of modern societies. Because of its importance for a range of disciplines – including archaeology, biology and the humanities – domestication has been studied extensively. This chapter reviews how the field of paleogenomics has revolutionised, and will continue to revolutionise, our understanding of animal domestication. We discuss how the recovery of ancient DNA from archaeological remains is allowing researchers to overcome inherent shortcomings arising from the analysis of modern DNA alone. In particular, we show how DNA, extracted from ancient substrates, has proven to be a crucial source of information to reconstruct the geographic and temporal origin of domestic species. We also discuss how ancient DNA is being used by geneticists and archaeologists to directly observe evolutionary changes linked to artificial and natural selection to generate a richer understanding of this fascinating process.
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Ruid, D. B., Paul, W. J., Roell, B. J., Wydeven, A. P., Willging, R. C., Jurewicz, R. L., et al. (2009). Wolf-Human Conflicts and Management in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Michigan. In A. P. Wydeven, T. R. Van Deelen, & E. J. Heske (Eds.), Recovery of Gray Wolves in the Great Lakes Region of the United States: An Endangered Species Success Story (pp. 279–295). New York, NY: Springer New York.
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Marinsek, N. L., Gazzaniga, M. S., & Miller, M. B. (2016). Chapter 17 – Split-Brain, Split-Mind. In S. Laureys, O. Gosseries, & G. Tononi (Eds.), The Neurology of Conciousness (Second Edition) (pp. 271–279). San Diego: Academic Press.
Abstract: The corpus callosum anatomically and functionally connects the two cerebral hemispheres. Despite its important role in interhemispheric communication however, severing the corpus callosum produces few--if any--noticeable cognitive or behavioral abnormalities. Incredibly, split-brain patients do not report any drastic changes in their conscious experience even though nearly all interhemispheric communication ceases after surgery. Extensive research has shown that both hemispheres remain conscious following disconnection and the conscious experience of each hemisphere is private and independent of the other. Additionally, the conscious experiences of the hemispheres appear to be qualitatively different, such that the consciousness of the left hemisphere is more enriched than the right. In this chapter, we offer explanations as to why split-brain patients feel unified despite possessing dual conscious experiences and discuss how the divided consciousness of split-brain patients can inform current theories of consciousness.
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Gadhöfer, R., Krüger, K., & Zanger, M. (2021). Der Bockhuf – Entstehung, Verlauf und Therapie. Wald: Xenophon Verlag.
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Krueger, K. (2014). “Pferdehaltung und Ethologie der Pferde” im Bachelorstudiengang Pferdewirtschaft. In : S. Lepp und C. Niederdrenk-Felgner (Ed.), Forschendes Lernen initiieren, umsetzen und reflektieren (pp. 54–81). Bielefeld: UniversitätsVerlag Webler.
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Zentall, T. R. (2006). Imitation: definitions, evidence, and mechanisms. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 335–353.
Abstract: Imitation can be defined as the copying of behavior. To a biologist, interest in imitation is focused on its adaptive value for the survival of the organism, but to a psychologist, the mechanisms responsible for imitation are the most interesting. For psychologists, the most important cases of imitation are those that involve demonstrated behavior that the imitator cannot see when it performs the behavior (e.g., scratching one's head). Such examples of imitation are sometimes referred to as opaque imitation because they are difficult to account for without positing cognitive mechanisms, such as perspective taking, that most animals have not been acknowledged to have. The present review first identifies various forms of social influence and social learning that do not qualify as opaque imitation, including species-typical mechanisms (e.g., mimicry and contagion), motivational mechanisms (e.g., social facilitation, incentive motivation, transfer of fear), attentional mechanisms (e.g., local enhancement, stimulus enhancement), imprinting, following, observational conditioning, and learning how the environment works (affordance learning). It then presents evidence for different forms of opaque imitation in animals, and identifies characteristics of human imitation that have been proposed to distinguish it from animal imitation. Finally, it examines the role played in opaque imitation by demonstrator reinforcement and observer motivation. Although accounts of imitation have been proposed that vary in their level of analysis from neural to cognitive, at present no theory of imitation appears to be adequate to account for the varied results that have been found.
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Heyes, C. M. (1994). Social learning in animals: categories and mechanisms. Biol. Rev., 69(2), 207–231.
Abstract: There has been relatively little research on the psychological mechanisms of social learning. This may be due, in part, to the practice of distinguishing categories of social learning in relation to ill-defined mechanisms (Davis, 1973; Galef, 1988). This practice both makes it difficult to identify empirically examples of different types of social learning, and gives the false impression that the mechanisms responsible for social learning are clearly understood. It has been proposed that social learning phenomena be subsumed within the categorization scheme currently used by investigators of asocial learning. This scheme distinguishes categories of learning according to observable conditions, namely, the type of experience that gives rise to a change in an animal (single stimulus vs. stimulus-stimulus relationship vs. response-reinforcer relationship), and the type of behaviour in which this change is detected (response evocation vs. learnability) (Rescorla, 1988). Specifically, three alignments have been proposed: (i) stimulus enhancement with single stimulus learning, (ii) observational conditioning with stimulus-stimulus learning, or Pavlovian conditioning, and (iii) observational learning with response-reinforcer learning, or instrumental conditioning. If, as the proposed alignments suggest, the conditions of social and asocial learning are the same, there is some reason to believe that the mechanisms underlying the two sets of phenomena are also the same. This is so if one makes the relatively uncontroversial assumption that phenomena which occur under similar conditions tend to be controlled by similar mechanisms. However, the proposed alignments are intended to be a set of hypotheses, rather than conclusions, about the mechanisms of social learning; as a basis for further research in which animal learning theory is applied to social learning. A concerted attempt to apply animal learning theory to social learning, to find out whether the same mechanisms are responsible for social and asocial learning, could lead both to refinements of the general theory, and to a better understanding of the mechanisms of social learning. There are precedents for these positive developments in research applying animal learning theory to food aversion learning (e.g. Domjan, 1983; Rozin & Schull, 1988) and imprinting (e.g. Bolhuis, de Vox & Kruit, 1990; Hollis, ten Cate & Bateson, 1991). Like social learning, these phenomena almost certainly play distinctive roles in the antogeny of adaptive behaviour, and they are customarily regarded as 'special kinds' of learning (Shettleworth, 1993).(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)
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