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Takaoka, A., Maeda, T., Hori, Y., & Fujita, K. (2015). Do dogs follow behavioral cues from an unreliable human? Anim.Cogn., 18(2), 475–483.
Abstract: Dogs are known to consistently follow human pointing gestures. In this study, we asked whether dogs “automatically” do this or whether they flexibly adjust their behavior depending upon the reliability of the pointer, demonstrated in an immediately preceding event. We tested pet dogs in a version of the object choice task in which a piece of food was hidden in one of the two containers. In Experiment 1, Phase 1, an experimenter pointed at the baited container; the second container was empty. In Phase 2, after showing the contents of both containers to the dogs, the experimenter pointed at the empty container. In Phase 3, the procedure was exactly as in Phase 1. We compared the dogs’ responses to the experimenter’s pointing gestures in Phases 1 and 3. Most dogs followed pointing in Phase 1, but many fewer did so in Phase 3. In Experiment 2, dogs followed a new experimenter’s pointing in Phase 3 following replication of procedures of Phases 1 and 2 in Experiment 1. This ruled out the possibility that dogs simply lost motivation to participate in the task in later phases. These results suggest that not only dogs are highly skilled at understanding human pointing gestures, but also they make inferences about the reliability of a human who presents cues and consequently modify their behavior flexibly depending on the inference.
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Miyata, H., Gajdon, G. K., Huber, L., & Fujita, K. (2011). How do keas (Nestor notabilis) solve artificial-fruit problems with multiple locks? Anim. Cogn., 14(1), 45–58.
Abstract: Keas, a species of parrots from New Zealand, are an interesting species for comparative studies of problem solving and cognition because they are known not only for efficient capacities for object manipulation but also for explorative and playful behaviors. To what extent are they efficient or explorative, and what cognitive abilities do they use? We examined how keas would solve several versions of artificial-fruit box problems having multiple locks. After training keas to remove a metal rod from over a Plexiglas lid that had to be opened, we exposed the birds to a variety of tasks having two or more locks. We also introduced a preview phase during which the keas had extended opportunity to look at the tasks before the experimenter allowed the birds to solve them, to examine whether the preview phase would facilitate the birds' performance on the tasks. In a large number of tests, the keas showed a strong trend to solve the tasks with no positive effect of previewing the tasks. When the tasks became complex, however, the keas corrected inappropriate responses more quickly when they had had chance to preview the problems than when they had not. The results suggest that the keas primarily used explorative strategies in solving the lock problems but might have obtained some information about the tasks before starting to solve them. This may reflect a good compromise of keas' trial-and-error tendency and their good cognitive ability that result from a selection pressure they have faced in their natural habitat.
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Anderson, J. R., Kuwahata, H., & Fujita, K. (2007). Gaze alternation during “pointing” by squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus)? Anim. Cogn., 10(2), 267–271.
Abstract: Gaze alternation (GA) is considered a hallmark of pointing in human infants, a sign of intentionality underlying the gesture. GA has occasionally been observed in great apes, and reported only anecdotally in a few monkeys. Three squirrel monkeys that had previously learned to reach toward out-of-reach food in the presence of a human partner were videotaped while the latter visually attended to the food, a distractor object, or the ceiling. Frame-by-frame video analysis revealed that, especially when reaching toward the food, the monkeys rapidly and repeatedly switched between looking at the partner's face and the food. This type of GA suggests that the monkeys were communicating with the partner. However, the monkeys' behavior was not influenced by changes in the partner's focus of attention.
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Kuroshima, H., Fujita, K., Adachi, I., Iwata, K., & Fuyuki, A. (2003). A Capuchin monkey (Cebus apella) recognizes when people do and do not know the location of food. Anim. Cogn., 6(4), 283–291.
Abstract: In a previous study, Kuroshima and colleagues demonstrated that capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) learned to discriminate between a “knower” who inspected a box for food, and a “guesser” who did not. The aim of the present study was to specify whether the subjects learned a simple conditional discrimination or a causal relationship that seeing leads to knowing. In experiment 1, we introduced five types of novel containers to two subjects. Each container was of different shape and color. The subjects gradually learned to reach toward the container the knower suggested. In experiment 2, we diversified the behavior of the knower and the guesser. In experiment 3, in order to eliminate the possibility of discrimination based on differences in the magnitude and the complexity of two trainers, we equated their behaviors. One subject adapted to the novel behaviors of the knower and the guesser, successfully discriminating the two trainers. Thus this monkey clearly learned to use the inspecting action of the knower and the non-inspecting action of the guesser as a discriminative cue to recognize the baited container. This result suggests that one capuchin monkey learned to recognize the relationship between seeing and knowing.
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Ushitani, T., Fujita, K., & Yamanaka, R. (2001). Do pigeons (Columba livia) perceive object unity? Anim. Cogn., 4(3), 153–161.
Abstract: Human infants perceive two rods moving in concert behind an occluder as one unitary rod. In four experiments we tested whether pigeons also perceive unity of objects. Pigeons were trained on a matching-to-sample task to discriminate between one unitary rod moving at a constant speed and two aligned rods moving together at the same speed. The latter stimulus was identical to the former except for a gap in the center. In experiment 1, we tested pigeons in probe trials in which a rectangle occluded the center of the sample rods, to see which comparison stimulus, the unitary rod or the aligned two rods, the subjects would match to the sample. Two of the three subjects pecked at the two rods significantly more often than at the unitary rod. In experiment 2, we trained the same pigeons to match the sample rods moving “in front of” the occluder. Pigeons persisted in matching two separate rods to the unitary rod moving in front of the occluder. In experiments 3 and 4, we used a parallelogram and an undulating shape as the occluder to alter the shape and the size of the portions above and below the occluder by the motion of the sample rods. Both subjects chose the two rods significantly more often than chance in experiment 3 and one of them did so in experiment 4. The results suggest that pigeons do not complete occluded portions even though the two elements move in concert. These negative results suggest that some alternative way of identifying objects may have evolved in pigeons.
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