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Genty, E., & Byrne, R. (2010). Why do gorillas make sequences of gestures? Anim. Cogn., 13(2), 287–301.
Abstract: Abstract Great ape gestures have attracted considerable research interest in recent years, prompted by their flexible and intentional pattern of use; but almost all studies have focused on single gestures. Here, we report the first quantitative analysis of sequential gesture use in western gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla), using data from three captive groups and one African study site. We found no evidence that gesture sequences were given for reasons of increased communicative efficiency over single gestures. Longer sequences of repeated gestures did not increase the likelihood of response, and using a sequence was seldom in reaction to communicative failure. Sequential combination of two gestures with similar meanings did not generally increase effectiveness, and sometimes reduced it. Gesture sequences were closely associated with play contexts. Markov transition analysis showed two networks of frequently co-occurring gestures, both consisting of gestures used to regulate play. One network comprised only tactile gestures, the other a mix of silent, audible and tactile gestures; apparently, these clusters resulted from gesture use in play with proximal or distal contact, respectively. No evidence was found for syntactic effects of sequential combination: meanings changed little or not at all. Semantically, many gestures overlapped massively with others in their core information (i.e. message), and gesture messages spanned relatively few functions. We suggest that the underlying semantics of gorilla gestures is highly simplified compared to that of human words. Gesture sequences allow continual adjustment of the tempo and nature of social interactions, rather than generally conveying semantically referential information or syntactic structures.
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Hirata, S., & Matsuzawa, T. (2001). Tactics to obtain a hidden food item in chimpanzee pairs (Pan troglodytes). Anim. Cogn., 4(3), 285–295.
Abstract: Five dyads of chimpanzees were tested in a competitive situation, as a pilot study to examine chimpanzees' understanding of conspecifics' knowledge. A human experimenter baited one of five containers in an outdoor enclosure. Chimpanzee A (witness) could see where the food was hidden, while chimpanzee B (witness-of-witness) could not see the baited place but could observe the chimpanzee A watching the food being hidden. Then the two were released into the enclosure. This procedure was repeated for a certain number of days along with a control condition in which neither could see the baited location. The witness-of-witness developed tactics to forestall the witness in two pairs. The witness misled the witness-of-witness by taking a route to an empty container in several cases. These episodes might represent examples of deception. Tactics and counter-tactics thus developed through the interaction between the witness and the witness-of-witness, illustrating the high social intelligence of chimpanzees. An examination of the changes in tactics suggests a possibility that the witness-of-witness understands the witness's knowledge of the location of hidden food.
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Kuroshima, H., Fujita, K., Adachi, I., Iwata, K., & Fuyuki, A. (2003). A Capuchin monkey (Cebus apella) recognizes when people do and do not know the location of food. Anim. Cogn., 6(4), 283–291.
Abstract: In a previous study, Kuroshima and colleagues demonstrated that capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) learned to discriminate between a “knower” who inspected a box for food, and a “guesser” who did not. The aim of the present study was to specify whether the subjects learned a simple conditional discrimination or a causal relationship that seeing leads to knowing. In experiment 1, we introduced five types of novel containers to two subjects. Each container was of different shape and color. The subjects gradually learned to reach toward the container the knower suggested. In experiment 2, we diversified the behavior of the knower and the guesser. In experiment 3, in order to eliminate the possibility of discrimination based on differences in the magnitude and the complexity of two trainers, we equated their behaviors. One subject adapted to the novel behaviors of the knower and the guesser, successfully discriminating the two trainers. Thus this monkey clearly learned to use the inspecting action of the knower and the non-inspecting action of the guesser as a discriminative cue to recognize the baited container. This result suggests that one capuchin monkey learned to recognize the relationship between seeing and knowing.
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Chiesa, A. D., Pecchia, T., Tommasi, L., & Vallortigara, G. (2006). Multiple landmarks, the encoding of environmental geometry and the spatial logics of a dual brain. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 281–293.
Abstract: A series of place learning experiments was carried out in young chicks (Gallus gallus) in order to investigate how the geometry of a landmark array and that of a walled enclosure compete when disoriented animals could rely on both of them to re-orient towards the centre of the enclosure. A square-shaped array (four wooden sticks) was placed in the middle of a square-shaped enclosure, the two structures being concentric. Chicks were trained to ground-scratch to search for food hidden in the centre of the enclosure (and the array). To check for effects of array degradation, one, two, three or all landmarks were removed during test trials. Chicks concentrated their searching activity in the central area of the enclosure, but their accuracy was inversely contingent on the number of landmarks removed; moreover, the landmarks still present within the enclosure appeared to influence the shape of the searching patterns. The reduction in the number of landmarks affected the searching strategy of chicks, suggesting that they had focussed mainly on local cues when landmarks were present within the enclosure. When all the landmarks were removed, chicks searched over a larger area, suggesting an absolute encoding of distances from the local cues and less reliance on the relationships provided by the geometry of the enclosure. Under conditions of monocular vision, chicks tended to rely on different strategies to localize the centre on the basis of the eye (and thus the hemisphere) in use, the left hemisphere attending to details of the environment and the right hemisphere attending to the global shape.
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Martin, T. I., & Zentall, T. R. (2005). Post-choice information processing by pigeons. Anim. Cogn., 8(4), 273–278.
Abstract: In a conditional discrimination (matching-to-sample), a sample is followed by two comparison stimuli, one of which is correct, depending on the sample. Evidence from previous research suggests that if the stimulus display is maintained following an incorrect response (the so-called penalty-time procedure), acquisition by pigeons is facilitated. The present research tested the hypothesis that the penalty-time procedure allows the pigeons to review and learn from the maintained stimulus display following an incorrect choice. It did so by including a penalty-time group for which, following an incorrect choice, the sample changed to match the incorrect comparison, thus providing the pigeons with post-choice 'misinformation.' This misinformation group acquired the matching task significantly slower than the standard penalty-time group (that had no change in the sample following an error). Furthermore, acquisition of matching by a control group that received no penalty time fell midway between the other two groups, suggesting that the pigeons did not merely take more care in making choices because of the aversiveness of penalty-time. Thus, it appears that in the acquisition of matching-to-sample, when the stimulus display is maintained following an incorrect choice, the pigeons can review or acquire information from the display. This is the first time that such an effect has been reported for a nonhuman species.
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Watanabe, S., & Troje, N. F. (2006). Towards a “virtual pigeon”: a new technique for investigating avian social perception. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 271–279.
Abstract: The purpose of the present study is to examine the applicability of a computer-generated, virtual animal to study animal cognition. Pigeons were trained to discriminate between movies of a real pigeon and a rat. Then, they were tested with movies of the computer-generated (CG) pigeon. Subjects showed generalization to the CG pigeon, however, they also responded to modified versions in which the CG pigeon was showing impossible movement, namely hopping and walking without its head bobbing. Hence, the pigeons did not attend to these particular details of the display. When they were trained to discriminate between the normal and the modified version of the CG pigeon, they were able to learn the discrimination. The results of an additional partial occlusion test suggest that the subjects used head movement as a cue for the usual vs. unusual CG pigeon discrimination.
Keywords: Animals; Behavioral Research/instrumentation/methods; Columbidae/*physiology; Computer Graphics; *Computer Simulation; Discrimination Learning/*physiology; Generalization (Psychology)/*physiology; Pattern Recognition, Visual/*physiology; Perceptual Masking/physiology; Rats; Recognition (Psychology)/physiology; *Social Behavior; User-Computer Interface
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Santos, L. R., Miller, C. T., & Hauser, M. D. (2003). Representing tools: how two non-human primate species distinguish between the functionally relevant and irrelevant features of a tool. Anim. Cogn., 6(4), 269–281.
Abstract: Few studies have examined whether non-human tool-users understand the properties that are relevant for a tool's function. We tested cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) and rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) on an expectancy violation procedure designed to assess whether these species make distinctions between the functionally relevant and irrelevant features of a tool. Subjects watched an experimenter use a tool to push a grape down a ramp, and then were presented with different displays in which the features of the original tool (shape, color, orientation) were selectively varied. Results indicated that both species looked longer when a newly shaped stick acted on the grape than when a newly colored stick performed the same action, suggesting that both species perceive shape as a more salient transformation than color. In contrast, tamarins, but not rhesus, attended to changes in the tool's orientation. We propose that some non-human primates begin with a predisposition to attend to a tool's shape and, with sufficient experience, develop a more sophisticated understanding of the features that are functionally relevant to tools.
Keywords: Animals; *Discrimination Learning; Female; Form Perception/*physiology; Habituation, Psychophysiologic/*physiology; Imitative Behavior; Macaca mulatta/*growth & development/*psychology; Male; Motor Skills; Practice (Psychology); Saguinus/*growth & development/*psychology; Species Specificity
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Hare, B. (2001). Can competitive paradigms increase the validity of experiments on primate social cognition? Anim. Cogn., 4(3), 269–280.
Abstract: Experiments vary in their ability to distinguish between competing hypotheses. In tests on primate cognition the majority of this variation is due to an experimenter's ability to test primates in valid settings while providing the adequate amount of experimental control. While experimenters studying primate cognition can use methods of control perfected in captivity, it is still very unclear how to design and then objectively evaluate the external validity of new experimental paradigms. I recommend that more effort be allocated to specify how to create relevant test settings for primates. Primate social life is highly competitive. This means that all aspects of primates themselves, including their cognitive abilities, have likely been shaped by the need to out-compete conspecifics. Based on this hypothesis, sophisticated cognitive abilities of primates might best be demonstrated in competitive contexts. Thus, it is suggested that one possible measure of validity is whether investigators integrate a competitive component into their experimental designs. To evaluate this methodological prediction I review the literature on chimpanzee perspective-taking as a case study including several recent studies that include a competitive component in their experimental designs.
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Anderson, J. R., Kuwahata, H., & Fujita, K. (2007). Gaze alternation during “pointing” by squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus)? Anim. Cogn., 10(2), 267–271.
Abstract: Gaze alternation (GA) is considered a hallmark of pointing in human infants, a sign of intentionality underlying the gesture. GA has occasionally been observed in great apes, and reported only anecdotally in a few monkeys. Three squirrel monkeys that had previously learned to reach toward out-of-reach food in the presence of a human partner were videotaped while the latter visually attended to the food, a distractor object, or the ceiling. Frame-by-frame video analysis revealed that, especially when reaching toward the food, the monkeys rapidly and repeatedly switched between looking at the partner's face and the food. This type of GA suggests that the monkeys were communicating with the partner. However, the monkeys' behavior was not influenced by changes in the partner's focus of attention.
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Russell, J. L., Braccini, S., Buehler, N., Kachin, M. J., Schapiro, S. J., & Hopkins, W. D. (2005). Chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) intentional communication is not contingent upon food. Anim. Cogn., 8(4), 263–272.
Abstract: Studies of great apes have revealed that they use manual gestures and other signals to communicate about distal objects. There is also evidence that chimpanzees modify the types of communicative signals they use depending on the attentional state of a human communicative partner. The majority of previous studies have involved chimpanzees requesting food items from a human experimenter. Here, these same communicative behaviors are reported in chimpanzees requesting a tool from a human observer. In this study, captive chimpanzees were found to gesture, vocalize, and display more often when the experimenter had a tool than when she did not. It was also found that chimpanzees responded differentially based on the attentional state of a human experimenter, and when given the wrong tool persisted in their communicative efforts. Implications for the referential and intentional nature of chimpanzee communicative signaling are discussed.
Keywords: *Animal Communication; Animals; *Feeding Behavior; Female; Humans; Male; Pan troglodytes/*psychology
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