Abstract: Drawing on studies of humans, rodents, birds and arthropods, I show that 'cognitive maps' have been used to describe a wide variety of spatial concepts. There are, however, two main definitions. One, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, is that a cognitive map is a powerful memory of landmarks which allows novel short-cutting to occur. The other, sensu Gallistel, is that a cognitive map is any representation of space held by an animal. Other definitions with quite different meanings are also summarised. I argue that no animal has been conclusively shown to have a cognitive map, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, because simpler explanations of the crucial novel short-cutting results are invariably possible. Owing to the repeated inability of experimenters to eliminate these simpler explanations over at least 15 years, and the confusion caused by the numerous contradictory definitions of a cognitive map, I argue that the cognitive map is no longer a useful hypothesis for elucidating the spatial behaviour of animals and that use of the term should be avoided.

Abstract: For an animal from any species to exhibit intelligent perception it must be capable of being consciously aware of what it perceives and capable of learning from this experience. Although many organisms, and for that matter machines, are capable of rapid adaptive learning in response to perception of environmental changes, such adaptations can occur without them being consciously aware either of external stimuli or their response to them. While behavioural and neurophysiological evidence suggests that, apart from ourselves, other higher primates must also be capable of such awareness, an important central question is whether such awareness is a characteristic of primate evolution or if it also occurs in sub-primate mammals as well. In this review I will examine our behavioural and neurophysiological evidence from visual and olfactory recognition studies in the sheep to support the argument that they are likely to be aware of and learn about both social and non-social objects and that they are therefore capable of intelligent perception. However, the impact of motivational changes on these perceptual processes suggests that they may be limited in terms of both prospection and retrospection and dealing with symbolic associations.

Abstract: Recently, (Collier-Baker E, Davis JM, Suddendorf T (2004) J Comp Psychol 118:421-433) suggested that domestic dogs do not understand invisible displacements. In the present study, we further investigated the hypothesis that the search behavior of domestic dogs in invisible displacements is guided by various visual cues inherent to the task rather than by mental representation of an object's past trajectory. Specifically, we examined the role of the experimenter as a function of the final position of the displacement device in the search behavior of domestic dogs. Visible and invisible displacement problems were administered to dogs (N = 11) under two conditions. In the Visible-experimenter condition, the experimenter was visible whereas in the Concealed-experimenter condition, the experimenter was visibly occluded behind a large rigid barrier. Our data supported the conclusion that dogs do not understand invisible displacements but primarily search as a function of the final position of the displacement device and, to a lesser extent, the position of the experimenter.

Abstract: The capacity to construct a cognitive map is hypothesized to rest on two foundations: (1) dead reckoning (path integration); (2) the perception of the direction and distance of terrain features relative to the animal. A map may be constructed by combining these two sources of positional information, with the result that the positions of all terrain features are represented in the coordinate framework used for dead reckoning. When animals need to become reoriented in a mapped space, results from rats and human toddlers indicate that they focus exclusively on the shape of the perceived environment, ignoring non-geometric features such as surface colors. As a result, in a rectangular space, they are misoriented half the time even when the two ends of the space differ strikingly in their appearance. In searching for a hidden object after becoming reoriented, both kinds of subjects search on the basis of the object's mapped position in the space rather than on the basis of its relationship to a goal sign (e.g. a distinctive container or nearby marker), even though they have demonstrably noted the relationship between the goal and the goal sign. When choosing a multidestination foraging route, vervet monkeys look at least three destinations ahead, even though they are only capable of keeping a maximum of six destinations in mind at once.

Abstract: From the viewpoint of experimental psychology, there are two problems with our current knowledge of equine perception. The first is that the behavioral and neurophysiological research in this area has enormous gaps, reflecting that this animal is not a convenient laboratory subject. The second is that the horse, having been a close companion to humans for many millennia, entrenched anecdotal wisdom is often hard to separate from scientific fact. Therefore, any summary at present of equine perception has to be provisional. The horse appears to have developed a visual system particularly sensitive to dim light and movement, it may or may not have a weak form of color vision in part of the retina, it has little binocular overlap, and its best acuity is limited to a restricted horizontal band which is aimed primarily by head/neck movements. However, the total field of view is very large. Overall, as would be expected for a prey animal, horse vision appears to have evolved more for detection of predator approach from any angle than for accurate visual identification of stationary objects, especially those seen at a distance. It is likely that, as for most mammals except the primates, horses rely more heavily on their other senses for forming a view of their world. Equine high-frequency hearing extends far above that of humans, but horses may be less able to localize the point of origin of brief sounds. The horse's capacity for chemoreception and its reliance on chemical information for identification may more closely resemble that of the dog than of the human. Its tactile sensitivity is high, and the ability of its brain and body to regulate pain perception appears to be similar to that found in other mammals. There is room for a great deal of future research in both the area of equine perception and sensory-based cognition, but for the present time persons interacting with this animal should be made aware of the importance of the sounds they make, the movements of their bodies, the way they touch the animal, and the odors they emit or carry on their clothing.