Abstract: 1. Several aspects of the behavioral ecology of feral horses (Equus caballus) were studied in Grand Canyon, Arizona, USA. Most bands contained three to five horses that included one stallion and his harem. Males that did not obtain a harem remained solitary. Throughout the study bands remained stable in composition.
2. Home ranges for all bands decreased in size in successive warm months, probably due to increased ambient temperature and drought. This resulted in greater utilization of spring areas that led to increased interband confrontation and agonistic display.
3. Territoriality was not observed in individual horses or bands, but bands hierarchial in both inter- and intraband structures. Interband stallion dominance was reinforced through posturing and fighting. Intraband hierarchies, as determined by dominance coefficients, were independent of individual size in three of four bands.
4. Indexes of nervousness (NER), calculated while horses were drinking, showed that stallions were less nervous than mares. A low NER was correlated with individuals leading toward drinking areas, whereas a high NER existed in individuals initiating flight although no single horse acted consistently as a leader.
5. Diurnal activity patterns were correlated with ambient temperatures.

Abstract: Although predator inspection behavior in fishes has become a model system for examining game theoretical strategies such as Tit for Tat, the direct costs of inspection behavior have not been quantified. To begin quantifying such costs, I conducted an experiment that examined mortality due to predation as a function of predator inspection in the guppy (Poecilia reticulata). Before being subjected to a “survivorship” experiment, guppies were assayed for their tendency to inspect a predator. Groups were then composed of six guppies that differed in their tendency to inspect. These groups were placed into a pool containing a predator, and survivorship of guppies with different inspection tendencies was noted 36 and 60 h later. Results indicate that individuals that display high degrees of inspection behavior suffer greater mortality than their noninspecting shoalmates.

Abstract: Group foragers may be able to assess patch quality more efficiently by paying attention to the sampling activities of conspecifics foraging in the same patch. In a previous field experiment, we showed that starlings foraging on patches of hidden food could use the successful foraging activities of others to help them assess patch quality. In order to determine whether a starling could also use another individual's lack of foraging success to assess and depart from empty patches more quickly, we carried out two experimental studies which compared the behaviour of captive starlings sampling artificial patches both when alone and when in pairs. Solitary starlings were first trained to assess patch quality in our experimental two-patch system, and were then tested on an empty patch both alone and with two types of partner bird. One partner sampled very few holes and thus provided a low amount of public information; the other sampled numerous holes and thus provided a high amount of public information. In experiment 1, we found no evidence of vicarious sampling. Subjects sampled a similar number of empty holes when alone as when with the low and high information partners; thus they continued to rely on their own personal information to make their patch departure decisions. In experiment 2, we modified the experimental patches, increasing the ease with which a bird could watch another's sampling activities, and increasing the difficulty of acquiring accurate personal sampling information. This time, subjects apparently did use public information, sampling fewer empty holes before departure when with the high-information partner than when with the low-information partner, and sampling fewer holes when with the low-information partner than when alone. We suggest that the degree to which personal and public information are used is likely to depend both on a forager's ability to remember where it has already sampled and on the type of environment in which foraging takes place.

Abstract: There are both benefits (e.g., social information) and costs (e.g., intraspecific competition) for individuals foraging in groups. To ascertain how group-foraging goats (Capra hircus) deal with these trade-offs, we asked 1) do goats use social information to make foraging decisions and 2) how do they adjust their intake rate in light of having attracted by other group members? To establish whether goats use social information, we recorded their initial choice of different quality food patches when they were ignorant of patch quality and when they could observe others foraging. After determining that goats use social information, we recorded intake rates while they fed alone and in the presence of potential competitors. Intake rate increased as the number of competitors increased. Interestingly, lone goats achieved an intake rate that was higher than when one competitor was present but similar to when two or more competitors were present. Faster intake rates may allow herbivores to ingest a larger portion of the available food before competing group members arrive at the patch. This however, does not explain the high intake rates achieved when the goats were alone. We provide 2 potential explanations: 1) faster intake rates are a response to greater risk incurred by lone individuals, the loss of social information, and the fear of being left behind by the group and 2) when foraging alone, intake rate is no longer a trade-off between reducing competition and acquiring social information. Thus, individuals are able to feed close to their maximum rate.

Abstract: Abstract   We present here an attempt to understand behaviors of dominant individuals and of subordinate individuals as behavior strategies in an asymmetric “hawk-dove” game. We assume that contestants have perfect information about relative fighting ability and the value of the resource. Any type of asymmetry, both relevant to and irrelevant to the fighting ability, can be considered. It is concluded that evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) depend on the resource value (V), the cost of injury (D), and the probability that the individual in one role will win (x). Different ESSs can exist even when values of V, D, and x are the same. The characteristics of dominance relations detected by observers may result from the ESSs that the individuals are adopting. The model explains some characteristics of dominance relations, for example, the consistent outcome of contests, the rare occurrence of escalated fights, and the discrepancy between resource holding potential (RHP) and dominance relations, from the viewpoint of individual selection.