Abstract: To determine whether pen size affected the behaviour and welfare of farmed red deer confined temporarily in yards, four groups of ten 2-year-old stags were confined for 40 min or 2 days in each of spring and summer, in either large (5 m × 4 m ) or small (2.5 m × 4) pens. In the small pens, wall pacing and vertical/horizontal head movements at the walls were more frequently observed (P < 0.05) and were carried out by a greater percentage of the deer (P < 0.001), and distances between individuals were smaller (P < 0.01), than observations in the large pens. Aggressive activities varied seasonally, with head-butting and chasing being seen most frequently in the spring (P < 0.05) and biting and kicking being seen most frequently in the summer (P < 0.05), and the overall frequency of aggressive activities was low in summer. In spring, in small pens there were fewer threats to head-butt, head butts by moving animals, and less stepping activity than in large pens (P < 0.05). In summer, in small pens there were more threats to butt and more stepping activity than in the large pens (P < 0.05). In both seasons, aggressive activities were correlated with wall pacing (r = 0.58 and 0.55, respectively). It was concluded that the effect of pen size on the frequency and nature of aggressive and other activities varied seasonally. In order minimise aggression and stepping activity, small pens were favoured in spring and large pens were favoured in summer. However, in both seasons there were greater inter-individual distances and reduced pacing and head movements at the walls in large pens. This latter finding may indicate that the large pens were less aversive to the deer, regardless of season.

Abstract: This study examines the role of observation during the formation of triads in female domestic hens. Results indicate that during hierarchy formation, a hen observing agonistic interactions and conflict settlement between its former dominant and a stranger uses this information when in turn confronted by the latter. Under a first condition (E, N = 15 triads), bystanders witnessed their prior dominant being defeated by a stranger before being introduced to them. In a second condition (C1, N = 16 triads), bystanders witnessed the victory of their prior dominant over a stranger. In a third condition (C2, N = 15 triads), bystanders witnessed two strangers establishing a dominance relationship before being introduced to their prior dominant and to a stranger the former had just defeated. The behavioural strategies of bystanders depended on the issue of the conflict they had witnessed. Bystanders of the E condition behaved as having no chance of defeating the stranger. They never initiated an attack against it, and upon being attacked, readily submitted in turn to the stranger. On the contrary, bystanders of the C1 condition behaved as having some chances against the stranger. They initiated attacks in 50% of cases, and won 50% of conflicts against the stranger. Under condition C2, bystanders first initiated contact with the strangers in only 27% of cases, which approximates the average of their chances for defeating the stranger. However, bystanders finally defeated the strangers in 40% of cases. These results suggest that bystanders of conditions E and C1 gained some information on the relationship existing between their prior dominant and the stranger and that they used it coherently, perhaps through transitive inference, thus contributing to the existence of transitive relationships within the triads. Alternate explanations are examined.

Abstract: Drawing on studies of humans, rodents, birds and arthropods, I show that 'cognitive maps' have been used to describe a wide variety of spatial concepts. There are, however, two main definitions. One, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, is that a cognitive map is a powerful memory of landmarks which allows novel short-cutting to occur. The other, sensu Gallistel, is that a cognitive map is any representation of space held by an animal. Other definitions with quite different meanings are also summarised. I argue that no animal has been conclusively shown to have a cognitive map, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, because simpler explanations of the crucial novel short-cutting results are invariably possible. Owing to the repeated inability of experimenters to eliminate these simpler explanations over at least 15 years, and the confusion caused by the numerous contradictory definitions of a cognitive map, I argue that the cognitive map is no longer a useful hypothesis for elucidating the spatial behaviour of animals and that use of the term should be avoided.

Abstract: The capacity to construct a cognitive map is hypothesized to rest on two foundations: (1) dead reckoning (path integration); (2) the perception of the direction and distance of terrain features relative to the animal. A map may be constructed by combining these two sources of positional information, with the result that the positions of all terrain features are represented in the coordinate framework used for dead reckoning. When animals need to become reoriented in a mapped space, results from rats and human toddlers indicate that they focus exclusively on the shape of the perceived environment, ignoring non-geometric features such as surface colors. As a result, in a rectangular space, they are misoriented half the time even when the two ends of the space differ strikingly in their appearance. In searching for a hidden object after becoming reoriented, both kinds of subjects search on the basis of the object's mapped position in the space rather than on the basis of its relationship to a goal sign (e.g. a distinctive container or nearby marker), even though they have demonstrably noted the relationship between the goal and the goal sign. When choosing a multidestination foraging route, vervet monkeys look at least three destinations ahead, even though they are only capable of keeping a maximum of six destinations in mind at once.