Abstract: Considerable interspeci®c variation in female social relationships occurs in gregarious primates, particularly with regard to agonism and cooperation between females and to the quality of female relationships with males. This variation exists alongside variation in female philopatry and dispersal. Socioecological theories have tried to explain variation in female-female social relationships from an evolutionary perspective focused on ecological factors, notably predation and food distribution. According to the current ``ecological model'', predation risk forces females of most diurnal primate species to live in groups; the strength of the contest component of competition for resources within and between groups then largely determines social relationships between females. Social elationships among gregarious females are here characterized as DispersalEgalitarian, Resident-Nepotistic, Resident-Nepotistic-Tolerant, or Resident-Egalitarian. This ecological model has successfully explained i€erences in the occurrence of formal submission signals, decided dominance relation ships, coalitions and female philopatry. Group size and female rank generally a€ect female reproduction success as the model predicts, and studies of closely related species in di€erent ecological circumstances underscore the importance of the model. Some cases, however, can only be explained when we extend the model to incorporate the e€ects of infanticide risk and habitat saturation. We review evidence in support of the ecological model and test the power of alternative models that invoke between-group competition, forced female philopatry, demographic female recruitment, male interventions into female aggression, and male harassment.
Not one of these models can replace the ecological model, which already encompasses the between-group competition. Currently the best model, which explains
several phenomena that the ecological model does not, is a ``socioecological model'' based on the combined importance of ecological factors, habitat saturation and infanticide avoidance. We note some points of similarity and divergence with other mammalian taxa; these remain to be explored in detail.

Abstract: Abstract
Several comparative research programs have focusedon the cognitive, life history and ecological traits thataccount for variation in brain size. We review one ofthese programs, a program that uses the reported frequencyof behavioral innovation as an operational measureof cognition. In both birds and primates, innovationrate is positively correlated with the relative size of associationareas in the brain, the hyperstriatum ventrale andneostriatum in birds and the isocortex and striatum inprimates. Innovation rate is also positively correlatedwith the taxonomic distribution of tool use, as well asinterspecific differences in learning. Some features ofcognition have thus evolved in a remarkably similar wayin primates and at least six phyletically-independent avianlineages. In birds, innovation rate is associated withthe ability of species to deal with seasonal changes in theenvironment and to establish themselves in new regions,and it also appears to be related to the rate atwhich lineages diversify. Innovation rate provides a usefultool to quantify inter-taxon differences in cognitionand to test classic hypotheses regarding the evolution ofthe brain.

Abstract: When we talk of the 'nature of intelligence', or any other attribute, we may be referring to its essential structure, or to its place in nature, particularly the function it has evolved to serve. Here I examine both, from the perspective of the evolution of intelligence in primates. Over the last 20 years, the Social (or 'Machiavellian') Intelligence Hypothesis has gained empirical support. Its core claim is that the intelligence of primates is primarily an adaptation to the special complexities of primate social life. In addition to this hypothesis about the function of intellect, a secondary claim is that the very structure of intelligence has been moulded to be 'social' in character, an idea that presents a challenge to orthodox views of intelligence as a general-purpose capacity. I shall outline the principal components of social intelligence and the environment of social complexity it engages with. This raises the question of whether domain specificity is an appropriate characterization of social intelligence and its subcomponents, like theory of mind. As a counter-argument to such specificity I consider the hypothesis that great apes exhibit a cluster of advanced cognitive abilities that rest on a shared capacity for second-order mental representation.