Abstract: Browsing (i.e., eating woody and non-woody dicotyledonous plants) and grazing (i.e., eating grass) are distinctively different types of feeding behaviour among ungulates today. Ungulates with different diets have different morphologies (both craniodental ones and in aspects of the digestive system) and physiologies, although some of these differences are merely related to body size, as grazers are usually larger than browsers. There is also a difference in the foraging behaviour in terms of the relationship between resource abundance and intake rate, which is linear in browsers but asymptotic in grazers. The spatial distribution of the food resource is also different for the different types of herbage, browse being more patchily distributed than grass, and thus browsers and grazers are likely to have a very different perception of food resources in any given ecosystem (see Gordon 2003, for review).

Abstract: n one group each of Plains zebra (six mares, one foal, one subadult) and Asiatic wild asses (seven mares, two foals) at Nuremberg Zoo, food distribution was experimentally changed from clumped (all food in one standard hay rack) to dispersed (one heap per animal). Both groups were characterized by different social structures, which basically remained during the experiment. Plains zebras had an individually structured system of social relationships in a dominance order, wild asses a more egalitarian system without clear-cut rank differences and low frequencies of agonistic interactions. Access to food accordingly was individually (but consistently) different for zebra mares, almost equal for wild ass mares. During the dispersed feeding situation frequencies of agonistic interactions in both species decreased (however non-significantly), individual distances increased but mares also frequently ''visited'' each others' heaps. Feeding time increased for all wild ass mares. Some individuals (in both groups) behaved ''against the trend'' in agonistic behaviour. The results are discussed with regard to food distribution for ungulates in general, and equid social systems.

Abstract: The formation of collaborating pairs by individuals belonging to two different classes occurs in the contexts of reproduction and intea-specific cooperation as well as of inter-specific mutualism. There is potential for partner choice and for competition for access to preferred partners in all three contexts. These selective forces have long been recognised as important in sexual selection, but their impact is not yet appreciated in cooperative and mutualistic systems. The formation of partnerships between members of different classes has much in common with the conclusion of trade agreements in human markets with two classes of traders, like producers and consumers, or employers and employees. Similar game-theoretical models can be used to predict the behaviour of rational traders in human markets and the evolutionarily stable strategies used in biological markets. We present a formal model in which the influence of the market mechanism on selection is made explicit. We restrict ourselves to biological markets in which: (1) Individuals do not compete over access to partners in an agonistic manner, but rather by outcompeting each other in those aspects that are preferred by the choosing party. (2) The commodity the partner has to offer cannot be obtained by the use of force, but requires the consent of the partner. These two restrictions ensure a dominant role for partner choice in the formation of partnerships. In a biological market model the decision to cooperate is based on the comparison between the offers of several potential partners, rather than on the behaviour of a single potential partner, as is implicitly assumed in currently accepted models of cooperation. In our example the members of one class A offer a commodity of fixed value in exchange for a commodity of variable value supplied by the other class, B. We show that when the B-class outnumbers the A-class sufficiently and the cost for the A-class to sample the offers of the B-class are low, the choosiness of the A-class will lead to selection for the supply of high value commodities by the B-class (Fig. 3a). Under the same market conditions, but with a high sampling cost this may still be the evolutionariy stable outcome, but another pair of strategies proves to be stable too: relaxed choosiness of class A coupled with low value commodities supplied by class B (Fig. 3b). We give a number of examples of mating, cooperative and mutualistic markets that resemble the low sampling cost situation depicted in Fig. 3a.