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Detto, T., Jennions, M. D., & Backwell, P. R. Y. (2010). When and Why Do Territorial Coalitions Occur? Experimental Evidence from a Fiddler Crab. Am Nat, 175(5), E119–E125.
Abstract: Neighboring territory owners are often less aggressive toward each other than to strangers (“dear enemy” effect). There is, however, little evidence for territorial defense coalitions whereby a neighbor will temporarily leave his/her own territory, enter that of a neighbor, and cooperate in repelling a conspecific intruder. This is surprising, as theoreticians have long posited the existence of such coalitions and the circumstances under which they should evolve. Here we document territorial defense coalitions in the African fiddler crab Uca annulipes, which lives in large colonies wherein each male defends a burrow and its surrounding area against neighbors and “floaters” (burrowless males). Fights between a resident and a floater sometimes involve another male who has left his territory to fight the floater challenging his neighbor. Using simple experiments, we provide the first evidence of the rules determining when territorial coalitions form. Our results support recent models that suggest that these coalitions arise from by‐product mutualism.
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Dubois, F., Giraldeau, L. - A., Hamilton, I. M., Grant, J. W. A., & Lefebvre, L. (2004). Distraction sneakers decrease the expected level of aggression within groups: a game-theoretic model. Am Nat, 164(2), E32–45.
Abstract: Hawk-dove games have been extensively used to predict the conditions under which group-living animals should defend their resources against potential usurpers. Typically, game-theoretic models on aggression consider that resource defense may entail energetic and injury costs. However, intruders may also take advantage of owners who are busy fighting to sneak access to unguarded resources, imposing thereby an additional cost on the use of the escalated hawk strategy. In this article we modify the two-strategy hawk-dove game into a three-strategy hawk-dove-sneaker game that incorporates a distraction-sneaking tactic, allowing us to explore its consequences on the expected level of aggression within groups. Our model predicts a lower proportion of hawks and hence lower frequencies of aggressive interactions within groups than do previous two-strategy hawk-dove games. The extent to which distraction sneakers decrease the frequency of aggression within groups, however, depends on whether they search only for opportunities to join resources uncovered by other group members or for both unchallenged resources and opportunities to usurp.
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