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Horowitz, A. C. (2003). Do humans ape? Or do apes human? Imitation and intention in humans (Homo sapiens) and other animals. J Comp Psychol, 117(3), 325–336.
Abstract: A. Whiten, D. M. Custance, J.-C. Gomez, P. Teixidor, and K. A. Bard (1996) tested chimpanzees' (Pan troglodytes) and human children's (Homo sapiens) skills at imitation with a 2-action test on an “artificial fruit.” Chimpanzees imitated to a restricted degree; children were more thoroughly imitative. Such results prompted some to assert that the difference in imitation indicates a difference in the subjects' understanding of the intentions of the demonstrator (M. Tomasello, 1996). In this experiment, 37 adult human subjects were tested with the artificial fruit. Far from being perfect imitators, the adults were less imitative than the children. These results cast doubt on the inference from imitative performance to an ability to understand others' intentions. The results also demonstrate how any test of imitation requires a control group and attention to the level of behavioral analysis.
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Akins, C. K., & Zentall, T. R. (1996). Imitative learning in male Japanese quail (Coturnix japonica) using the two-action method. J Comp Psychol, 110(3), 316–320.
Abstract: The study of imitative learning in animals has suffered from the presence of a number of confounding motivational and attentional factors (e.g., social facilitation and stimulus enhancement). The two-action method avoids these problems by exposing observers to demonstrators performing a response (e.g., operating a treadle) using 1 of 2 distinctive topographies (e.g., by pecking or by stepping). Japanese quail (Coturnix japonica) observers exposed to conspecific demonstrators showed a high correlation between the topography of the response they observed and the response they performed. These data provide strong evidence for the existence of true imitative learning in an active, precocious bird under conditions that control for alternative accounts.
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Harlow, H. F. (1950). Learning and satiation of response in intrinsically motivated complex puzzle performance by monkeys. J Comp Physiol Psychol, 43(4), 289–294.
Abstract: Two rhesus monkeys, given 60 two-hour sessions with a six-device mechanical puzzle showed clear evidence of learning, the curve showing ratio of incorrect to correct responses appearing quite comparable to similar curves obtained during externally rewarded situations. When, on the thirteenth day of tests, the subjects were presented with the puzzle 100 times at 6-minute intervals, the number of devices manipulated decreased regularly throughout the day, although there was no significant change in the number of times the problem assembly was attacked.
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Meehan, C. L., & Mench, J. A. (2007). The challenge of challenge: Can problem solving opportunities enhance animal welfare? Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 102(3-4), 246–261.
Abstract: Cognitive mechanisms are an important part of the organization of the behavior systems of animals. In the wild, animals regularly face problems that they must overcome in order to survive and thrive. Solving such problems often requires animals to process, store, retrieve, and act upon information from the environment--in other words, to use their cognitive skills. For example, animals may have to use navigational, tool-making or cooperative social skills in order to procure their food. However, many enrichment programs for captive animals do not include the integration of these types of cognitive challenges. Thus, foraging enrichments typically are designed to facilitate the physical expression of feeding behaviors such as food-searching and food consumption, but not to facilitate complex problem solving behaviors related to food acquisition. Challenging animals by presenting them with problems is almost certainly a source of frustration and stress. However, we suggest here that this is an important, and even necessary, feature of an enrichment program, as long as animals also possess the skills and resources to effectively solve the problems with which they are presented. We discuss this with reference to theories about the emotional consequences of coping with challenge, the association between lack of challenge and the development of abnormal behavior, and the benefits of stress (arousal) in facilitating learning and memory of relevant skills. Much remains to be done to provide empirical support for these theories. However, they do point the way to a practical approach to improving animal welfare--to design enrichments to facilitate the cognitive mechanisms which underlie the performance of complex behaviors that cannot be performed due to the restrictions inherent to the captive environment.
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de Waal, F. B. M., & Davis, J. M. (2003). Capuchin cognitive ecology: cooperation based on projected returns. Neuropsychologia, 41(2), 221–228.
Abstract: Stable cooperation requires that each party's pay-offs exceed those available through individual action. The present experimental study on brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) investigated if decisions about cooperation are (a) guided by the amount of competition expected to follow the cooperation, and (b) made instantaneously or only after a period of familiarization. Pairs of adult monkeys were presented with a mutualistic cooperative task with variable opportunities for resource monopolization (clumped versus dispersed rewards), and partner relationships (kin versus nonkin). After pre-training, each pair of monkeys (N=11) was subjected to six tests, consisting of 15 2 min trials each, with rewards available to both parties. Clumped reward distribution had an immediate negative effect on cooperation: this effect was visible right from the start, and remained visible even if clumped trials alternated with dispersed trials. The drop in cooperation was far more dramatic for nonkin than kin, which was explained by the tendency of dominant nonkin to claim more than half of the rewards under the clumped condition. The immediacy of responses suggests a decision-making process based on predicted outcome of cooperation. Decisions about cooperation thus take into account both the opportunity for and the likelihood of subsequent competition over the spoils.
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Shettleworth, S. J., & Plowright, C. M. (1992). How pigeons estimate rates of prey encounter. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 18(3), 219–235.
Abstract: Pigeons were trained on operant schedules simulating successive encounters with prey items. When items were encountered on variable-interval schedules, birds were more likely to accept a poor item (long delay to food) the longer they had just searched, as if they were averaging prey density over a short memory window (Experiment 1). Responding as if the immediate future would be like the immediate past was reversed when a short search predicted a long search next time (Experiment 2). Experience with different degrees of environmental predictability appeared to change the length of the memory window (Experiment 3). The results may reflect linear waiting (Higa, Wynne, & Staddon, 1991), but they differ in some respects. The findings have implications for possible mechanisms of adjusting behavior to current reinforcement conditions.
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Shettleworth, S. J. (1985). Foraging, memory, and constraints on learning. Ann N Y Acad Sci, 443, 216–226.
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Waite, T. A. (2002). Interruptions improve choice performance in gray jays: prolonged information processing versus minimization of costly errors. Anim. Cogn., 5(4), 209–214.
Abstract: Under the assumption that selection favors minimization of costly errors, erroneous choice may be common when its fitness cost is low. According to an adaptive-choice model, this cost depends on the rate at which an animal encounters the choice: the higher this rate, the smaller the cost of choosing a less valuable option. Errors should thus be more common when interruptions to foraging are shorter. A previous experiment supported this prediction: gray jays, Perisoreus canadensis, were more error prone when subjected to shorter delays to access to food rewards. This pattern, though, is also predicted by an attentional-constraints model. Because the subjects were able to inspect the rewards during delays, their improved performance when subjected to longer delays could have been a byproduct of the experimentally prolonged opportunity for information processing. To evaluate this possibility, a follow-up experiment manipulated both delay to access and whether rewards could be inspected during delays. Depriving jays of the opportunity to inspect rewards (using opaque lids) induced only a small, nonsignificant increase in error rate. This effect was independent of length of delay and so the jays' improved performance when subjected to longer delays was not simply a byproduct of prolonged information processing. More definitively, even when the jays were prevented from inspecting rewards during delays, their performance improved when subjected to longer delays. The findings are thus consistent with the adaptive-choice model.
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Petherick, J. C., Seawright, E., & Waddington, D. (1993). Influence of motivational state on choice of food or a dustbathing/foraging substrate by domestic hens. Behav. Process., 28(3), 209–220.
Abstract: Domestic hens were trained to run a Y-maze and make an association between differently coloured doorways and access to food pellets or sand. The hens were tested for their choice of doorway when the goals were not visible from the choice point and when they were food or sand deprived. Hens made the choice appropriate to their deprivation state (correct choice) significantly more often for food than sand and were faster at choosing and entering the goal box when food deprived. In a follow up experiment, the goals were visible from the choice point. Again the hens chose correctly significantly more often when food than sand deprived and made the choice and entered the goal box faster when food deprived. Thus, failure to choose sand in the first experiment was not due to an inability to learn the association, but appears to result from a strong motivation to feed in the Y-maze, even when not food deprived, and a weak motivation to dustbathe or forage, even when sand deprived.
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Zentall, T. R., & Sherburne, L. M. (1994). Transfer of value from S+ to S- in a simultaneous discrimination. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 20(2), 176–183.
Abstract: Value transfer theory has been proposed to account for transitive inference effects (L. V. Fersen, C. D. L. Wynne, J. D. Delius, & J. E. R. Staddon, 1991), in which following training on 4 simultaneous discriminations (A+B-, B+C-, C+D-, D+E-) pigeons show a preference for B over D. According to this theory, some of the value of reinforcement acquired by each S+ transfers to the S-. In the transitive inference experiment, C (associated with both reward and nonreward) can transfer less value to D than A (associated only with reward) can transfer to B. Support for value transfer theory was demonstrated in 2 experiments in which an S- presented in the context of a stimulus to which responses were always reinforced (S+) was preferred over an S- presented in the context of a stimulus to which responses were sometimes reinforced (S +/-).
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