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Holekamp, K. E., Sakai, S. T., & Lundrigan, B. L. (2007). Social intelligence in the spotted hyena (Crocuta crocuta). Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci, 362(1480), 523–538.
Abstract: If the large brains and great intelligence characteristic of primates were favoured by selection pressures associated with life in complex societies, then cognitive abilities and nervous systems with primate-like attributes should have evolved convergently in non-primate mammals living in large, elaborate societies in which social dexterity enhances individual fitness. The societies of spotted hyenas are remarkably like those of cercopithecine primates with respect to size, structure and patterns of competition and cooperation. These similarities set an ideal stage for comparative analysis of social intelligence and nervous system organization. As in cercopithecine primates, spotted hyenas use multiple sensory modalities to recognize their kin and other conspecifics as individuals, they recognize third-party kin and rank relationships among their clan mates, and they use this knowledge adaptively during social decision making. However, hyenas appear to rely more intensively than primates on social facilitation and simple rules of thumb in social decision making. No evidence to date suggests that hyenas are capable of true imitation. Finally, it appears that the gross anatomy of the brain in spotted hyenas might resemble that in primates with respect to expansion of frontal cortex, presumed to be involved in the mediation of social behaviour.
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Morley, K. I., & Montgomery, G. W. (2001). The genetics of cognitive processes: candidate genes in humans and animals. Behav Genet, 31(6), 511–531.
Abstract: It has been hypothesized that numerous genes contribute to individual variation in human cognition. An extensive search of the scientific literature was undertaken to identify candidate genes which might contribute to this complex trait. A list of over 150 candidate genes that may influence some aspect of cognition was compiled. Some genes are particularly strong candidates based on evidence for involvement in cognitive processes in humans, mice, and Drosophila melanogaster. This survey confirms that many genes are associated with cognitive variation and highlights the potential importance of animal models in the study of human cognition.
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Cowley, J. J., & Griesel, R. D. (1966). The effect on growth and behaviour of rehabilitating first and second generation low protein rats. Anim. Behav., 14(4), 506–517.
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Previc, F. H. (2002). Thyroid hormone production in chimpanzees and humans: implications for the origins of human intelligence. Am J Phys Anthropol, 118(4), 402–3; discussion 404–5.
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Gould, J. L. (2004). Animal cognition. Curr Biol, 14(10), R372–5.
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Hunt, G. R., Rutledge, R. B., & Gray, R. D. (2006). The right tool for the job: what strategies do wild New Caledonian crows use? Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 307–316.
Abstract: New Caledonian crows Corvus moneduloides (NC crows) display sophisticated tool manufacture in the wild, but the cognitive strategy underlying these skills is poorly understood. Here, we investigate what strategy two free-living NC crows used in response to a tool-length task. The crows manufactured tools to extract food from vertical holes of different depths. The first tools they made in visits were of a similar length regardless of the hole depth. The typical length was usually too short to extract food from the deep holes, which ruled out a strategy of immediate causal inference on the first attempt in a trial. When the first tool failed, the crows made second tools significantly longer than the unsuccessful first tools. There was no evidence that the crows made the lengths of first tools to directly match hole depth. We argue that NC crows may generally use a two-stage heuristic strategy to solve tool problems and that performance on the first attempt in a trial is not necessarily the 'gold standard' for assessing folk physics.
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Huber, L., & Gajdon, G. K. (2006). Technical intelligence in animals: the kea model. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 295–305.
Abstract: The ability to act on information flexibly is one of the cornerstones of intelligent behavior. As particularly informative example, tool-oriented behavior has been investigated to determine to which extent nonhuman animals understand means-end relations, object affordances, and have specific motor skills. Even planning with foresight, goal-directed problem solving and immediate causal inference have been a focus of research. However, these cognitive abilities may not be restricted to tool-using animals but may be found also in animals that show high levels of curiosity, object exploration and manipulation, and extractive foraging behavior. The kea, a New Zealand parrot, is a particularly good example. We here review findings from laboratory experiments and field observations of keas revealing surprising cognitive capacities in the physical domain. In an experiment with captive keas, the success rate of individuals that were allowed to observe a trained conspecific was significantly higher than that of naive control subjects due to their acquisition of some functional understanding of the task through observation. In a further experiment using the string-pulling task, a well-probed test for means-end comprehension, we found the keas finding an immediate solution that could not be improved upon in nine further trials. We interpreted their performance as insightful in the sense of being sensitive of the relevant functional properties of the task and thereby producing a new adaptive response without trial-and-error learning. Together, these findings contribute to the ongoing debate on the distribution of higher cognitive skills in the animal kingdom by showing high levels of sensorimotor intelligence in animals that do not use tools. In conclusion, we suggest that the 'Technical intelligence hypothesis' (Byrne, Machiavellian intelligence II: extensions and evaluations, pp 289-211, 1997), which has been proposed to explain the origin of the ape/monkey grade-shift in intelligence by a selection pressure upon an increased efficiency in foraging behavior, should be extended, that is, applied to some birds as well.
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Levy, J. (1977). The mammalian brain and the adaptive advantage of cerebral asymmetry. Ann N Y Acad Sci, 299, 264–272.
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McLean, A. N. (2001). Cognitive abilities -- the result of selective pressures on food acquisition? Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 71(3), 241–258.
Abstract: Locating and capturing food are suggested as significant selection pressures for the evolution of various cognitive abilities in mammals and birds. The hypothesis is proposed that aspects of food procuring behaviour should be strongly indicative of particular cognitive abilities. Experimental data concerning higher mental abilities in mammals and birds are reviewed. These data deal with self-recognition studies, rule-learning experiments, number concept, deceptive abilities, tool-use and observational learning. A Darwinian approach reveals: (1) the adaptiveness of particular abilities for particular niches, (2) that in complex foraging environments, increases in foraging efficiencies in animals should result from the evolution of particular cognitive abilities, (3) that phenomena such as convergent mental evolution should be expected to have taken place across taxonomic groups for species exploiting similar niches, (4) that divergence in mental ability should also have taken place where related species have exploited dissimilar niches. Experimental data of higher mental abilities in animals concur with a Darwinian explanation for the distribution of these cognitive abilities and no anomalies have been found. There are, as a consequence, significant implications for the welfare of animals subject to training when training methodology gives little or no consideration to the various mental abilities of species.
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Mulcahy, N. J., & Call, J. (2006). How great apes perform on a modified trap-tube task. Anim. Cogn., 9(3), 193–199.
Abstract: To date, neither primates nor birds have shown clear evidence of causal knowledge when attempting to solve the trap tube task. One factor that may have contributed to mask the knowledge that subjects may have about the task is that subjects were only allowed to push the reward away from them, which is a particularly difficult action for primates in certain problem solving situations. We presented five orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), two chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), two bonobos (Pan paniscus), and one gorilla (Gorilla gorilla) with a modified trap tube that allowed subjects to push or rake the reward with the tool. In two additional follow-up tests, we inverted the tube 180 degrees rendering the trap nonfunctional and also presented subjects with the original task in which they were required to push the reward out of the tube. Results showed that all but one of the subjects preferred to rake the reward. Two orangutans and one chimpanzee (all of whom preferred to rake the reward), consistently avoided the trap only when it was functional but failed the original task. These findings suggest that some great apes may have some causal knowledge about the trap-tube task. Their success, however, depended on whether they were allowed to choose certain tool-using actions.
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