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Skov-Rackette, S. I., & Shettleworth, S. J. (2005). What do rats learn about the geometry of object arrays? Tests with exploratory behavior. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 31(2), 142–154.
Abstract: Six experiments using habituation of exploratory behavior tested whether disoriented rats foraging in a large arena encode the shapes of arrays of objects. Rats did not respond to changes in position of a single object, but they responded to a change in object color and to a change in position of 1 object in a square array, as in previous research (e.g., C. Thinus-Blanc et al., 1987). Rats also responded to an expansion of a square array, suggesting that they encoded sets of interobject distances rather than overall shape. In Experiments 4-6, rats did not respond to changes in sense of a triangular array that maintained interobject distances and angles. Shapes of object arrays are encoded differently from shapes of enclosures.
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Goto, K., Wills, A. J., & Lea, S. E. G. (2004). Global-feature classification can be acquired more rapidly than local-feature classification in both humans and pigeons. Anim. Cogn., 7(2), 109–113.
Abstract: When humans process visual stimuli, global information often takes precedence over local information. In contrast, some recent studies have pointed to a local precedence effect in both pigeons and nonhuman primates. In the experiment reported here, we compared the speed of acquisition of two different categorizations of the same four geometric figures. One categorization was on the basis of a local feature, the other on the basis of a readily apparent global feature. For both humans and pigeons, the global-feature categorization was acquired more rapidly. This result reinforces the conclusion that local information does not always take precedence over global information in nonhuman animals.
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Fortes, A. F., Merchant, H., & Georgopoulos, A. P. (2004). Comparative and categorical spatial judgments in the monkey: “high” and “low”. Anim. Cogn., 7(2), 101–108.
Abstract: Adult human subjects can classify the height of an object as belonging to either of the “high” or “low” categories by utilizing an abstract concept of midline that divides the vertical dimension into two halves. Children lack this abstract concept of midline, do not have a sense that these categories are directional opposites, and their categorical and comparative usages of high(er) or low(er) are restricted to the corresponding poles. We investigated the abilities of a rhesus monkey to perform categorical judgments in space. We were also interested in the presence of the congruity effect (a decrease in response time when the objects compared are closer to the category pole) in the monkey. The presence of this phenomenon in the monkey would allow us to relate the behavior of the animal to the two major competing hypotheses that have been suggested to explain the congruity effect in humans: the analog and semantic models. The monkey was trained in delayed match-to-sample tasks in which it had to categorize objects as belonging to either a high or low category. The monkey was able to generate an abstract notion of midline in a fashion similar to that of adult human subjects. The congruity effect was also present in the monkey. These findings, taken together with the notion that monkeys are not considered to think in propositional terms, may favor an analog comparison model in the monkey.
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Urcuioli, P. J., & Zentall, T. R. (1986). Retrospective coding in pigeons' delayed matching-to-sample. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 12(1), 69–77.
Abstract: In this study we examined how coding processes in pigeons' delayed matching-to-sample were affected by the stimuli to be remembered. In Experiment 1, two groups of pigeons initially learned 0-delay matching-to-sample with identical comparison stimuli (vertical and horizontal lines) but with different sample stimuli (red and green hues or vertical and horizontal lines). Longer delays were then introduced between sample offset and comparison onset to assess whether pigeons were prospectively coding the same events (viz., the correct line comparisons) or retrospectively coding different events (viz., their respective sample stimuli). The hue-sample group matched more accurately and showed a slower rate of forgetting than the line-sample group. In Experiment 2, pigeons were trained with either hues or lines as both sample and comparison stimuli, or with hue samples and line comparisons or vice versa. Subsequent delay tests revealed that the hue-sample groups remembered more accurately and generally showed slower rates of forgetting than the line-sample groups. Comparison dimension had little or no effect on performance. Together, these data suggest that pigeons retrospectively code the samples in delayed matching-to-sample.
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Pepperberg, I. M. (2002). In search of king Solomon's ring: cognitive and communicative studies of Grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus). Brain Behav Evol, 59(1-2), 54–67.
Abstract: During the past 24 years, I have used a modeling technique (M/R procedure) to train Grey parrots to use an allospecific code (English speech) referentially; I then use the code to test their cognitive abilities. The oldest bird, Alex, labels more than 50 different objects, 7 colors, 5 shapes, quantities to 6, 3 categories (color, shape, material) and uses 'no', 'come here', wanna go X' and 'want Y' (X and Y are appropriate location or item labels). He combines labels to identify, request, comment upon or refuse more than 100 items and to alter his environment. He processes queries to judge category, relative size, quantity, presence or absence of similarity/difference in attributes, and show label comprehension. He semantically separates labeling from requesting. He thus exhibits capacities once presumed limited to humans or nonhuman primates. Studies on this and other Greys show that parrots given training that lacks some aspect of input present in M/R protocols (reference, functionality, social interaction) fail to acquire referential English speech. Examining how input affects the extent to which parrots acquire an allospecific code may elucidate mechanisms of other forms of exceptional learning: learning unlikely in the normal course of development but that can occur under certain conditions.
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Bovet, D., Vauclair, J., & Blaye, A. (2005). Categorization and abstraction abilities in 3-year-old children: a comparison with monkey data. Anim. Cogn., 8(1), 53–59.
Abstract: Three-year-old children were tested on three categorization tasks of increasing levels of abstraction (used with adult baboons in an earlier study): the first was a conceptual categorization task (food vs toys), the second a perceptual matching task (same vs different objects), and the third a relational matching task in which the children had to sort pairs according to whether or not the two items belonged to the same or different categories. The children were tested using two different procedures, the first a replication of the procedure used with the baboons (pulling one rope for a category or a relationship between two objects, and another rope for the other category or relationship), the second a task based upon children's prior experiences with sorting objects (putting in the same box objects belonging to the same category or a pair of objects exemplifying the same relation). The children were able to solve the first task (conceptual categorization) when tested with the sorting into boxes procedure, and the second task (perceptual matching) when tested with both procedures. The children were able to master the third task (relational matching) only when the rules were clearly explained to them, but not when they could only watch sorting examples. In fact, the relational matching task without explanation requires analogy abilities that do not seem to be fully developed at 3 years of age. The discrepancies in performances between children tested with the two procedures, with the task explained or not, and the discrepancies observed between children and baboons are discussed in relation to differences between species and/or problem-solving strategies.
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Fiset, S., Landry, F., & Ouellette, M. (2006). Egocentric search for disappearing objects in domestic dogs: evidence for a geometric hypothesis of direction. Anim. Cogn., 9(1), 1–12.
Abstract: In several species, the ability to locate a disappearing object is an adaptive component of predatory and social behaviour. In domestic dogs, spatial memory for hidden objects is primarily based on an egocentric frame of reference. We investigated the geometric components of egocentric spatial information used by domestic dogs to locate an object they saw move and disappear. In experiment 1, the distance and the direction between the position of the animal and the hiding location were put in conflict. Results showed that the dogs primarily used the directional information between their own spatial coordinates and the target position. In experiment 2, the accuracy of the dogs in finding a hidden object by using directional information was estimated by manipulating the angular deviation between adjacent hiding locations and the position of the animal. Four angular deviations were tested: 5, 7.5, 10 and 15 degrees . Results showed that the performance of the dogs decreased as a function of the angular deviations but it clearly remained well above chance, revealing that the representation of the dogs for direction is precise. In the discussion, we examine how and why domestic dogs determine the direction in which they saw an object disappear.
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