Abstract: Both white-tailed deer, Odocoileus virginianus, and mule deer, O. hemionus, females defend fawns against coyotes, Canis latrans, but only mule deer defend nonoffspring conspecific and heterospecific fawns. During a predator attack, females may have to decide whether to defend a fawn while having imperfect information on its identity obtained from hearing a few distress calls. Although imperfect recognition can influence altruistic behaviour, few empirical studies have considered this point when testing functional explanations for altruism. We designed a series of playback experiments with fawn distress calls to test alternative hypotheses (by-product of parental care, kin selection, reciprocal altruism) for the mule deer's defence of nonoffspring, specifically allowing for the possibility that females mistake these fawns for their own. White-tailed deer females approached the speaker only when distress calls of white-tailed deer fawns were played and when their own fawn was hidden, suggesting that fawn defence was strictly a matter of parental care in this species. In contrast, mule deer females responded similarly and strongly, regardless of the caller's identity, the female's reproductive state (mother or nonmother) or the presence of their own offspring. The failure of mule deer females to adjust their responses to these conditions suggests that they do not defend nonoffspring because they mistake them for their own fawns. The lack of behavioural discrimination also suggests that kin selection, reciprocal altruism and defence of the offspring's area are unlikely to explain the mule deer's defence of nonoffspring. We identify causal and functional questions that still need to be addressed to understand why mule deer defend fawns so indiscriminately.

Abstract: Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) share food even if their partner is behind a mesh restraint. Pairs of adult capuchins were moved into a test chamber in which 1 monkey received cucumber pieces for 20 min and the other received apple slices during the following 20 min. Tolerant transfers of food occurred reciprocally among females: The rate of transfer from Female B to A in the second test phase varied with the rate from Female A to B in the first test phase. Several social mechanisms may explain this reciprocity. Whereas this study does not contradict cognitively complex explanations (e.g., mental record keeping of given and received food), the results are consistent with a rather simple explanation: that food sharing reflects a combination of affiliative tendency and high tolerance. The study suggests that sharing mechanisms may be different for adult male capuchins, with males sharing food more readily and less discriminatingly than females.

Abstract: The variability of most environments taxes foraging decisions by increasing the uncertainty of the information available. One solution to the problem is to use dynamic averaging, as do some granivores and carnivores. Arguably, the same strategy could be useful for grazing herbivores, even though their food renews and is more homogeneously distributed. Horses (Equus callabus) were given choices between variable patches after short or long delays. When patch information was current, horses returned to the patch that was recently best, whereas those without current information matched choices to the long-term average values of the patches. These results demonstrate that a grazing species uses dynamic averaging and indicate that, like granivores and carnivores, they can use temporal weighting to optimize foraging decisions.

Abstract: Imitation can be defined as the copying of behavior. To a biologist, interest in imitation is focused on its adaptive value for the survival of the organism, but to a psychologist, the mechanisms responsible for imitation are the most interesting. For psychologists, the most important cases of imitation are those that involve demonstrated behavior that the imitator cannot see when it performs the behavior (e.g., scratching one's head). Such examples of imitation are sometimes referred to as opaque imitation because they are difficult to account for without positing cognitive mechanisms, such as perspective taking, that most animals have not been acknowledged to have. The present review first identifies various forms of social influence and social learning that do not qualify as opaque imitation, including species-typical mechanisms (e.g., mimicry and contagion), motivational mechanisms (e.g., social facilitation, incentive motivation, transfer of fear), attentional mechanisms (e.g., local enhancement, stimulus enhancement), imprinting, following, observational conditioning, and learning how the environment works (affordance learning). It then presents evidence for different forms of opaque imitation in animals, and identifies characteristics of human imitation that have been proposed to distinguish it from animal imitation. Finally, it examines the role played in opaque imitation by demonstrator reinforcement and observer motivation. Although accounts of imitation have been proposed that vary in their level of analysis from neural to cognitive, at present no theory of imitation appears to be adequate to account for the varied results that have been found.