|
|
Bergman, T. J., Beehner, J. C., Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (2003). Hierarchical classification by rank and kinship in baboons. Science, 302(5648), 1234–1236.
Abstract: Humans routinely classify others according to both their individual attributes, such as social status or wealth, and membership in higher order groups, such as families or castes. They also recognize that people's individual attributes may be influenced and regulated by their group affiliations. It is not known whether such rule-governed, hierarchical classifications are specific to humans or might also occur in nonlinguistic species. Here we show that baboons recognize that a dominance hierarchy can be subdivided into family groups. In playback experiments, baboons respond more strongly to call sequences mimicking dominance rank reversals between families than within families, indicating that they classify others simultaneously according to both individual rank and kinship. The selective pressures imposed by complex societies may therefore have favored cognitive skills that constitute an evolutionary precursor to some components of human cognition.
|
|
|
|
Gentner, T. Q., Fenn, K. M., Margoliash, D., & Nusbaum, H. C. (2006). Recursive syntactic pattern learning by songbirds. Nature, 440(7088), 1204–1207.
Abstract: Humans regularly produce new utterances that are understood by other members of the same language community. Linguistic theories account for this ability through the use of syntactic rules (or generative grammars) that describe the acceptable structure of utterances. The recursive, hierarchical embedding of language units (for example, words or phrases within shorter sentences) that is part of the ability to construct new utterances minimally requires a 'context-free' grammar that is more complex than the 'finite-state' grammars thought sufficient to specify the structure of all non-human communication signals. Recent hypotheses make the central claim that the capacity for syntactic recursion forms the computational core of a uniquely human language faculty. Here we show that European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) accurately recognize acoustic patterns defined by a recursive, self-embedding, context-free grammar. They are also able to classify new patterns defined by the grammar and reliably exclude agrammatical patterns. Thus, the capacity to classify sequences from recursive, centre-embedded grammars is not uniquely human. This finding opens a new range of complex syntactic processing mechanisms to physiological investigation.
|
|
|
|
Dunbar, R. (2003). Evolution of the social brain. Science, 302(5648), 1160–1161.
|
|
|
|
Gallup, G. G. J. (1985). Do minds exist in species other than our own? Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 9(4), 631–641.
Abstract: An answer to the question of animal awareness depends on evidence, not intuition, anecdote, or debate. This paper examines some of the problems inherent in an analysis of animal awareness, and whether animals might be aware of being aware is offered as a more meaningful distinction. A framework is presented which can be used to make a determination about the extent to which other species have experiences similar to ours based on their ability to make inferences and attributions about mental states in others. The evidence from both humans and animals is consistent with the idea that the capacity to use experience to infer the experience of others is a byproduct of self-awareness.
|
|
|
|
Cochet, H., & Byrne, R. W. (2013). Evolutionary origins of human handedness: evaluating contrasting hypotheses. Animal Cognition, 16(4), 531–542.
Abstract: Variation in methods and measures, resulting in past dispute over the existence of population handedness in nonhuman great apes, has impeded progress into the origins of human right-handedness and how it relates to the human hallmark of language. Pooling evidence from behavioral studies, neuroimaging and neuroanatomy, we evaluate data on manual and cerebral laterality in humans and other apes engaged in a range of manipulative tasks and in gestural communication. A simplistic human/animal partition is no longer tenable, and we review four (nonexclusive) possible drivers for the origin of population-level right-handedness: skilled manipulative activity, as in tool use; communicative gestures; organizational complexity of action, in particular hierarchical structure; and the role of intentionality in goal-directed action. Fully testing these hypotheses will require developmental and evolutionary evidence as well as modern neuroimaging data.
|
|
|
|
Linton, M. L. (1970). Washoe the chimpanzee. Science, 169(943), 328.
|
|
|
|
Seyfarth, R. M., Cheney, D. L., & Bergman, T. J. (2005). Primate social cognition and the origins of language. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 9(6), 264–266.
Abstract: Are the cognitive mechanisms underlying language unique, or can similar mechanisms be found in other domains? Recent field experiments demonstrate that baboons' knowledge of their companions' social relationships is based on discrete-valued traits (identity, rank, kinship) that are combined to create a representation of social relations that is hierarchically structured, open-ended, rule-governed, and independent of sensory modality. The mechanisms underlying language might have evolved from the social knowledge of our pre-linguistic primate ancestors.
|
|
|
|
Lyn, H., & Savage-Rumbaugh, E. S. (2000). Observational word learning in two bonobos (Pan paniscus): ostensive and non-ostensive contexts. Language & Communication, 20(3), 255–273.
Abstract: Word learning has been extensively studied in humans. Children seem to be able to map new words onto objects with only one exposure to the referent. This ability has been called “fast mapping”(Carey, 1978 and Carey). Using a modified human paradigm, this paper explores two language-competent bonobos' (Pan paniscus) abilities to map new words to objects in realistic surroundings with few exposures to the referents. This paper also investigates the necessity of the apes maintaining visual contact (ostensive context) with the item to map the novel name onto the novel object. The bonobos tested in this experiment were able to map new words onto objects and could do so without visual contact with the items.
|
|
|
|
Zentall, T. R., Galizio, M., & Critchfied, T. S. (2002). Categorization, concept learning, and behavior analysis: an introduction. J Exp Anal Behav, 78(3), 237–248.
Abstract: Categorization and concept learning encompass some of the most important aspects of behavior, but historically they have not been central topics in the experimental analysis of behavior. To introduce this special issue of the Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior (JEAB), we define key terms; distinguish between the study of concepts and the study of concept learning; describe three types of concept learning characterized by the stimulus classes they yield; and briefly identify several other themes (e.g., quantitative modeling and ties to language) that appear in the literature. As the special issue demonstrates, a surprising amount and diversity of work is being conducted that either represents a behavior-analytic perspective or can inform or constructively challenge this perspective.
|
|
|
|
Watanabe, S., & Huber, L. (2006). Animal logics: decisions in the absence of human language. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 235–245.
Abstract: Without Abstract
|
|
