Abstract: Humans are consciously aware of some memories and can make verbal reports about these memories. Other memories cannot be brought to consciousness, even though they influence behavior. This conspicuous difference in access to memories is central in taxonomies of human memory systems but has been difficult to document in animal studies, suggesting that some forms of memory may be unique to humans. Here I show that rhesus macaque monkeys can report the presence or absence of memory. Although it is probably impossible to document subjective, conscious properties of memory in nonverbal animals, this result objectively demonstrates an important functional parallel with human conscious memory. Animals able to discern the presence and absence of memory should improve accuracy if allowed to decline memory tests when they have forgotten, and should decline tests most frequently when memory is attenuated experimentally. One of two monkeys examined unequivocally met these criteria under all test conditions, whereas the second monkey met them in all but one case. Probe tests were used to rule out “cueing” by a wide variety of environmental and behavioral stimuli, leaving detection of the absence of memory per se as the most likely mechanism underlying the monkeys' abilities to selectively decline memory tests when they had forgotten.

Abstract: Domestic dogs, Canis familiaris, have been shown capable of finding hidden food by following pointing gestures made with different parts of the human body. However, previous studies have reported that hand-reared wolves, C. lupus, fail to locate hidden food in response to similar points in the absence of extensive training. The failure of wolves to perform this task has led to the proposal that the ability to understand others' intentions is a derived character in dogs, not present in the ancestral population (wolves). Here we show that wolves, given the right rearing environment and daily interaction with humans, can use momentary distal human pointing cues to find food without training, whereas dogs tested outdoors and dogs at an animal shelter do not follow the same human points. In line with past studies, pet dogs tested indoors were successful in following these points. We also show that the reported failure of wolves in some past studies may be due to differences in the testing environment. Our findings indicate that domestication is not a prerequisite for human-like social cognition in canids, and show the need for additional research on the role of rearing conditions and environmental factors in the development of higher-level cognitive abilities.

Abstract: Animals process sensory information according to specific computational rules and, subsequently, form representations of their environments that form the basis for decisions and choices. The specific computational rules used by organisms will often be evolutionarily adaptive by generating higher probabilities of survival, reproduction, and resource acquisition. Experiments with enclosed colonies of bumblebees constrained to foraging on artificial flowers suggest that the bumblebee's cognitive architecture is designed to efficiently exploit floral resources from spatially structured environments given limits on memory and the neuronal processing of information. A non-linear relationship between the biomechanics of nectar extraction and rates of net energetic gain by individual bees may account for sensitivities to both the arithmetic mean and variance in reward distributions in flowers. Heuristic rules that lead to efficient resource exploitation may also lead to subjective misperception of likelihoods. Subjective probability formation may then be viewed as a problem in pattern recognition subject to specific sampling schemes and memory constraints.

Abstract: Although reinforcement often leads to repetitive, even stereotyped responding, that is not a necessary outcome. When it depends on variations, reinforcement results in responding that is diverse, novel, indeed unpredictable, with distributions sometimes approaching those of a random process. This article reviews evidence for the powerful and precise control by reinforcement over behavioral variability, evidence obtained from human and animal-model studies, and implications of such control. For example, reinforcement of variability facilitates learning of complex new responses, aids problem solving, and may contribute to creativity. Depression and autism are characterized by abnormally repetitive behaviors, but individuals afflicted with such psychopathologies can learn to vary their behaviors when reinforced for so doing. And reinforced variability may help to solve a basic puzzle concerning the nature of voluntary action.

Abstract: A group of animals can only move cohesively, if group members “somehow” reach a consensus about the timing (e.g., start) and the spatial direction/destination of the collective movement. Timing and spatial decisions usually differ with respect to the continuity of their cost/benefit distribution in such a way that, in principle, compromises are much more feasible in timing decision (e.g. median preferred time) than they are in spatial decisions. The consequence is that consensus costs connected to collective timing decisions are usually less skewed amongst group members than are consensus costs connected to spatial decisions. This, in turn, influences the evolution of decision sharing: sharing in timing decisions is most likely to evolve when conflicts are high relative to group cohesion benefits, while sharing in spatial decisions is most likely to evolve in the opposite situation. We discuss the implications of these differences for the study of collective movement decisions.