Schnall, S., & Gattis, M. (1998). Transitive Inference by Visual Reasoning.
Abstract: Two experiments are reported that investigated the influence
of linear spatial organization on transitive inference
performance. Reward/no-reward relations between
overlapping pairs of elements were presented in a context of
linear spatial order or random spatial order. Participants in
the linear arrangement condition showed evidence for visual
reasoning: They systematically mapped spatial relations to
conceptual relation and used the spatial relations to make
inferences on a reasoning task in a new spatial context. We
suggest that linear ordering may be a “good figure”, by
constituting a parsimonious representation for the integration
of premises, as well as for the inferencing process. The late
emergence of transitive inference in children may be the
result of limited cognitive capacity, which --unless an
external spatial array is available --constrains the
construction of an internal spatial array.
|
Rosati, A. G. (2017). Foraging Cognition: Reviving the Ecological Intelligence Hypothesis. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 21(9), 691–702.
Abstract: What are the origins of intelligent behavior? The demands associated with living in complex social groups have been the favored explanation for the evolution of primate cognition in general and human cognition in particular. However, recent comparative research indicates that ecological variation can also shape cognitive abilities. I synthesize the emerging evidence that ?foraging cognition? ? skills used to exploit food resources, including spatial memory, decision-making, and inhibitory control ? varies adaptively across primates. These findings provide a new framework for the evolution of human cognition, given our species? dependence on costly, high-value food resources. Understanding the origins of the human mind will require an integrative theory accounting for how humans are unique in both our sociality and our ecology.
|
Legare, C. H., & Nielsen, M. (). Imitation and Innovation: The Dual Engines of Cultural Learning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 19(11), 688–699.
Abstract: Imitation and innovation work in tandem to support cultural learning in children and facilitate our capacity for cumulative culture. Here we propose an integrated theoretical account of how the unique demands of acquiring instrumental skills and cultural conventions provide insight into when children imitate, when they innovate, and to what degree. For instrumental learning, with an increase in experience, high fidelity imitation decreases and innovation increases. By contrast, for conventional learning, imitative fidelity stays high, regardless of experience, and innovation stays low. We synthesize cutting edge research on the development of imitative flexibility and innovation to provide insight into the social learning mechanisms underpinning the uniquely human mind.
|
Worden, R. P. (1996). Primate social intelligence. Cognit. Sci., 20(4), 579–616.
Abstract: A computational theory of primate social intelligence is proposed in which primates represent social situations internally by discrete symbol structures, called scripts. Three well-defined computational operations on scripts are sufficient to support social learning, planning, and prediction. This gives a formal, predictive model with which to analyse how primate social knowledge is acquired, as well as how it is used. The theory is compared with primate data, such as Cheney and Seyfarth's observations of vervet monkeys. It gives simple, understandable script-based analyses of many observed phenomena--such as the recognition and use of kin relations, learning of alarm calls, habituation to calls, knowledge of rank, tactical deception, and attachment behaviour. I argue that a tight, concise theory of social cognition, such as script theory, is needed to explain the rapid learning and social guile seen in primates. It also has the benefits of simplicity and testability. The extension of scripts to incorporate a primate theory of mind is described in a subsequent paper.
|
Barrett, L., Henzi, P., & Dunbar, R. (2003). Primate cognition: from 'what now?' to 'what if?'. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 7(11), 494–497.
Abstract: The 'social brain' hypothesis has had a major impact on the study of comparative cognition. However, despite a strong sense, gained from both experimental and observational work, that monkeys and apes differ from each other, we are still no closer to understanding exactly how they differ. We hypothesize that the dispersed social systems characteristic of ape societies explains why monkeys and apes should differ cognitively. The increased cognitive control and analogical reasoning ability needed to cope with life in dispersed societies also suggests a possible route for human cognitive evolution. This hypothesis is supported by behavioural and neurobiological data, but we need more of both if we are to fully understand how our primate cousins see the world.
|
Markman, E. M., & Abelev, M. (2004). Word learning in dogs? Trends. Cognit. Sci., 8(11), 479–81; discussion 481.
Abstract: In a recent paper, Kaminski, Call and Fischer report pioneering research on word-learning in a dog. In this commentary we suggest ways of distinguishing referential word use from mere association. We question whether the dog is reasoning by exclusion and, if so, compare three explanations – learned heuristics, default assumptions, and pragmatic reasoning – as they apply to children and might apply to dogs. Kaminski et al.'s work clearly raises important questions about the origins and basis of word learning and social cognition.
|
Hare, B., & Tomasello, M. (2005). Human-like social skills in dogs? Trends. Cognit. Sci., 9(9), 439–444.
Abstract: Domestic dogs are unusually skilled at reading human social and communicative behavior--even more so than our nearest primate relatives. For example, they use human social and communicative behavior (e.g. a pointing gesture) to find hidden food, and they know what the human can and cannot see in various situations. Recent comparisons between canid species suggest that these unusual social skills have a heritable component and initially evolved during domestication as a result of selection on systems mediating fear and aggression towards humans. Differences in chimpanzee and human temperament suggest that a similar process may have been an important catalyst leading to the evolution of unusual social skills in our own species. The study of convergent evolution provides an exciting opportunity to gain further insights into the evolutionary processes leading to human-like forms of cooperation and communication.
|
Bolhuis, J. J., & Macphail, E. M. (2001). A critique of the neuroecology of learning and memory. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 5(10), 426–433.
Abstract: Recent years have seen the emergence of neuroecology, the study of the neural mechanisms of behaviour guided by functional and evolutionary principles. This research has been of enormous value for our understanding of the evolution of brain- and species-specific behaviour. However, we question the validity of the neuroecological approach when applied to the analysis of learning and memory, given its arbitrary assumption that different [`]problems' engage different memory mechanisms. Differences in memory-based performance in [`]natural' tasks do not prove differences in memory capacity; similarly, differences in the use of memory in the natural environment do not provide a sound basis for expecting differences in anatomical structures that subserve learning and memory. This critique is illustrated with examples taken from the study of the neurobiology of food storing and song learning in birds.
|
Warneken, F., & Tomasello, M. (2009). Varieties of altruism in children and chimpanzees. In Trends in cognitive sciences (Vol. 13, pp. 397–402). Elsevier Science,.
Abstract: Recent empirical research has shed new light on the perennial question of human altruism. A number of recent studies suggest that from very early in ontogeny young children have a biological predisposition to help others achieve their goals, to share resources with others and to inform others of things helpfully. Humans nearest primate relatives, such as chimpanzees, engage in some but not all of these behaviors: they help others instrumentally, but they are not so inclined to share resources altruistically and they do not inform others of things helpfully. The evolutionary roots of human altruism thus appear to be much more complex than previously supposed.
|
Seyfarth, R. M., Cheney, D. L., & Bergman, T. J. (2005). Primate social cognition and the origins of language. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 9(6), 264–266.
Abstract: Are the cognitive mechanisms underlying language unique, or can similar mechanisms be found in other domains? Recent field experiments demonstrate that baboons' knowledge of their companions' social relationships is based on discrete-valued traits (identity, rank, kinship) that are combined to create a representation of social relations that is hierarchically structured, open-ended, rule-governed, and independent of sensory modality. The mechanisms underlying language might have evolved from the social knowledge of our pre-linguistic primate ancestors.
|
