Morell, V. (2007). Nicola Clayton profile. Nicky and the jays (Vol. 315).
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Dunbar, R. (2003). Evolution of the social brain. Science, 302(5648), 1160–1161.
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Bergman, T. J., Beehner, J. C., Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (2003). Hierarchical classification by rank and kinship in baboons. Science, 302(5648), 1234–1236.
Abstract: Humans routinely classify others according to both their individual attributes, such as social status or wealth, and membership in higher order groups, such as families or castes. They also recognize that people's individual attributes may be influenced and regulated by their group affiliations. It is not known whether such rule-governed, hierarchical classifications are specific to humans or might also occur in nonlinguistic species. Here we show that baboons recognize that a dominance hierarchy can be subdivided into family groups. In playback experiments, baboons respond more strongly to call sequences mimicking dominance rank reversals between families than within families, indicating that they classify others simultaneously according to both individual rank and kinship. The selective pressures imposed by complex societies may therefore have favored cognitive skills that constitute an evolutionary precursor to some components of human cognition.
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Cheney, D., Seyfarth, R., & Smuts, B. (1986). Social relationships and social cognition in nonhuman primates. Science, 234(4782), 1361–1366.
Abstract: Complex social relationships among nonhuman primates appear to contribute to individual reproductive success. Experiments with and behavioral observations of natural populations suggest that sophisticated cognitive mechanisms may underlie primate social relationships. Similar capacities are usually less apparent in the nonsocial realm, supporting the view that at least some aspects of primate intelligence evolved to solve the challenges of interacting with conspecifics.
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Moses, S. N., Villate, C., & Ryan, J. D. (2006). An investigation of learning strategy supporting transitive inference performance in humans compared to other species. Neuropsychologia, 44(8), 1370–1387.
Abstract: Generalizations about neural function are often drawn from non-human animal models to human cognition, however, the assumption of cross-species conservation may sometimes be invalid. Humans may use different strategies mediated by alternative structures, or similar structures may operate differently within the context of the human brain. The transitive inference problem, considered a hallmark of logical reasoning, can be solved by non-human species via associative learning rather than logic. We tested whether humans use similar strategies to other species for transitive inference. Results are crucial for evaluating the validity of widely accepted assumptions of similar neural substrates underlying performance in humans and other animals. Here we show that successful transitive inference in humans is unrelated to use of associative learning strategies and is associated with ability to report the hierarchical relationship among stimuli. Our work stipulates that cross-species generalizations must be interpreted cautiously, since performance on the same task may be mediated by different strategies and/or neural systems.
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Hare, B., Brown, M., Williamson, C., & Tomasello, M. (2002). The domestication of social cognition in dogs. Science, 298(5598), 1634–1636.
Abstract: Dogs are more skillful than great apes at a number of tasks in which they must read human communicative signals indicating the location of hidden food. In this study, we found that wolves who were raised by humans do not show these same skills, whereas domestic dog puppies only a few weeks old, even those that have had little human contact, do show these skills. These findings suggest that during the process of domestication, dogs have been selected for a set of social-cognitive abilities that enable them to communicate with humans in unique ways.
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Pennisi, E. (2006). Animal cognition. Social animals prove their smarts (Vol. 312).
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Pennisi, E. (2006). Animal cognition. Man's best friend(s) reveal the possible roots of social intelligence (Vol. 312).
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Curtis, S. E., & Stricklin, W. R. (1991). The importance of animal cognition in agricultural animal production systems: an overview. J. Anim Sci., 69(12), 5001–5007.
Abstract: To describe and then fulfill agricultural animals' needs, we must learn more about their fundamental psychological and behavioral processes. How does this animal feel? Is that animal suffering? Will we ever be able to know these things? Scientists specializing in animal cognition say that there are numerous problems but that they can be overcome. Recognition by scientists of the notion of animal awareness has been increasing in recent years, because of the work of Griffin and others. Feeling, thinking, remembering, and imagining are cognitive processes that are factors in the economic and humane production of agricultural animals. It has been observed that the animal welfare debate depends on two controversial questions: Do animals have subjective feelings? If they do, can we find indicators that reveal them? Here, indirect behavioral analysis approaches must be taken. Moreover, the linear additivity of several stressor effects on a variety of animal traits suggests that some single phenomenon is acting as a “clearinghouse” for many or all of the stresses acting on an animal at any given time, and this phenomenon might be psychological stress. Specific situations animals may encounter in agricultural production settings are discussed with respect to the animals' subjective feelings.
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Duncan, I. J., & Petherick, J. C. (1991). The implications of cognitive processes for animal welfare. J. Anim Sci., 69(12), 5017–5022.
Abstract: In general, codes that have been designed to safeguard the welfare of animals emphasize the importance of providing an environment that will ensure good health and a normal physiological and physical state, that is, they emphasize the animals' physical needs. If mental needs are mentioned, they are always relegated to secondary importance. The argument is put forward here that animal welfare is dependent solely on the cognitive needs of the animals concerned. In general, if these cognitive needs are met, they will protect the animals' physical needs. It is contended that in the few cases in which they do not safeguard the physical needs, it does not matter from a welfare point of view. The human example is given of being ill. It is argued that welfare is only adversely affected when a person feels ill, knows that he or she is ill, or even thinks that he or she is ill, all of which processes are cognitive ones. The implications for welfare of animals possessing certain cognitive abilities are discussed. For example, the extent to which animals are aware of their internal state while performing behavior known to be indicative of so-called states of suffering, such as fear, frustration, and pain, will determine how much they are actually suffering. With careful experimentation it may be possible to determine how negative they feel these states to be. Similarly, the extent to which animals think about items or events absent from their immediate environment will determine how frustrated they are in the absence of the real item or event but in the presence of the cognitive representation.
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