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Chapelain, A., & Blois-Heulin, C. (2009). Lateralization for visual processes: eye preference in Campbell"s monkeys ( Cercopithecus c. campbelli ). Anim. Cogn., 12(1), 11–19.
Abstract: Abstract: Brain lateralization has been the matter of extensive research over the last centuries, but it remains an unsolved issue. While hand preferences have been extensively studied, very few studies have investigated laterality of eye use in non-human primates. We examined eye preference in 14 Campbell"s monkeys (Cercopithecus c. campbelli). We assessed eye preference to look at a seed placed inside a tube using monocular vision. Eye use was recorded for 100 independent and non-rewarded trials per individual. All of the 14 monkeys showed very strong preferences in the choice of the eye used to look inside the tube (mean preference: 97.6%). Eight subjects preferred the right eye and six subjects preferred the left eye. The results are discussed in light of previous data on eye preference in primates, and compared to data on hand preference from these subjects. Our findings would support the hypothesis for an early emergence of lateralization for perceptual processes compared to manual motor functions.
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Virányi, Z., Topál, J., Miklósi, Á., & Csányi, V. (2006). A nonverbal test of knowledge attribution: a comparative study on dogs and children. Anim. Cogn., 9(1), 13–26.
Abstract: The sensitivity of eleven pet dogs and eleven 2.5-year-old children to others' past perceptual access was tested for object-specificity in a playful, nonverbal task in which a human Helper's knowledge state regarding the whereabouts of a hidden toy and a stick (a tool necessary for getting the out-of-reach toy) was systematically manipulated. In the four experimental conditions the Helper either participated or was absent during hiding of the toy and the stick and therefore she knew the place(s) of (1) both the toy and the stick, (2) only the toy, (3) only the stick or (4) neither of them. The subjects observed the hiding processes, but they could not reach the objects, so they had to involve the Helper to retrieve the toy. The dogs were more inclined to signal the place of the toy in each condition and indicated the location of the stick only sporadically. However the children signalled both the location of the toy and that of the stick in those situations when the Helper had similar knowledge regarding the whereabouts of them (i.e. knew or ignored both of them), and in those conditions in which the Helper was ignorant of the whereabouts of only one object the children indicated the place of this object more often than that of the known one. At the same time however, both dogs and children signalled the place of the toy more frequently if the Helper had been absent during toy-hiding compared to those conditions when she had participated in the hiding. Although this behaviour appears to correspond with the Helper's knowledge state, even the subtle distinction made by the children can be interpreted without a casual understanding of knowledge-formation in others.
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McKinley, J., & Sambrook, T. D. (2000). Use of human-given cues by domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) and horses (Equus caballus). Anim. Cogn., 3(1), 13–22.
Abstract: Sixteen domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) and four horses (Equus caballus) were tested for their ability to use human-given manual and facial cues in an object-choice task. Two of the four horses used touch as a cue and one horse successfully used pointing. The performance of the dogs was considerably better, with 12 subjects able to use pointing as a cue, 4 able to use head orientation and 2 able to use eye gaze alone. Group analysis showed that the dogs performed significantly better in all experimental conditions than during control trials. Dogs were able to use pointing cues even when the cuer's body was closer to the incorrect object. Working gundogs with specialised training used pointing more successfully than pet dogs and gundog breeds performed better than non-gundog breeds. The results of this experiment suggest that animals' use of human given communicative signals depends on cognitive ability, the evolutionary consequences of domestication and enculturation by humans within the individual's lifetime.
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Call, J. (2002). A fish-eye lens for comparative studies: broadening the scope of animal cognition. Anim. Cogn., 5(1), 15–16.
Abstract: ? is the article no longer available?
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Fripp, D., Owen, C., Quintana-Rizzo, E., Shapiro, A., Buckstaff, K., Jankowski, K., et al. (2005). Bottlenose dolphin (Tursiops truncatus) calves appear to model their signature whistles on the signature whistles of community members. Anim. Cogn., 8(1), 17–26.
Abstract: Bottlenose dolphins are unusual among non-human mammals in their ability to learn new sounds. This study investigates the importance of vocal learning in the development of dolphin signature whistles and the influence of social interactions on that process. We used focal animal behavioral follows to observe six calves in Sarasota Bay, Fla., recording their social associations during their first summer, and their signature whistles during their second. The signature whistles of five calves were determined. Using dynamic time warping (DTW) of frequency contours, the calves' signature whistles were compared to the signature whistles of several sets of dolphins: their own associates, the other calves' associates, Tampa Bay dolphins, and captive dolphins. Whistles were considered similar if their DTW similarity score was greater than those of 95% of the whistle comparisons. Association was defined primarily in terms of time within 50 m of the mother/calf pair. On average, there were six dolphins with signature whistles similar to the signature whistles of each of the calves. These were significantly more likely to be Sarasota Bay resident dolphins than non-Sarasota dolphins, and (though not significantly) more likely to be dolphins that were within 50 m of the mother and calf less than 5% of the time. These results suggest that calves may model their signature whistles on the signature whistles of members of their community, possibly community members with whom they associate only rarely.
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Weatherly, J. N., Arthur, E. I. L., & Tischart, L. M. (2003). Altering “motivational” variables alters induction produced by upcoming food-pellet reinforcement. Anim. Cogn., 6(1), 17–26.
Abstract: Previous research has demonstrated that rats will increase their rates of lever pressing for sucrose rewards in the first half of an experimental session when food pellets, rather than the same sucrose, continually serve as the reward in the second half of the session. This effect has been coined induction, and the present study investigated whether it could be altered by altering “motivational” variables. Experiment 1 manipulated subjects' motivation by altering, across conditions, their level of food deprivation. Predictably, the size of induction varied directly with level of deprivation. Experiments 2 and 3 manipulated subjects' motivation by feeding them food pellets and sucrose, respectively, prior to their responding in the experimental session. These pre-session feedings decreased the size of the observed induction in both experiments. The results from the present study indicate that the size of induction is correlated with subjects' motivation to respond for the available reinforcers. They are also consistent with the idea that operant processes underlie the effect. The notion that induction might encompass the concept of “anticipation” is also discussed.
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Mercado, E. I. I. I., Uyeyama, R. U., Pack, A. A., & Herman, L. M. (1999). Memory for action events in the bottlenosed dolphin. Anim. Cogn., 2(1), 17–25.
Abstract: We investigated whether a bottlenosed dolphin’s ability to recall and repeat actions on command would immediately generalize to actions performed with specified objects. The dolphin was tested on her ability to repeat 18 novel behaviors performed with potentially interchangeable objects specified using an artificial gestural language. Such “action events” were correctly repeated at above chance levels, indicating that the dolphin had access to memories of those events. Performance levels were, however, lower than in previous tests. The dolphin appeared to have difficulty recalling which object an action was performed with. Previous research has demonstrated that animals can recall features of their environment and features of their actions independently of one another. The results of this study demonstrate (1) that the dolphin’s concept of repeating extends beyond simply accessing memories of movement patterns, and (2) that dolphins’ memories of past events incorporate representations of both self-performed acts and objects, locations, or gestural instructions.
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Miklósi, Á. (2002). On the usefulness and limits of functional analogies. Anim. Cogn., 5(1), 17–18.
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Vallortigara, G., Regolin, L., Rigoni, M., & Zanforlin, M. (1998). Delayed search for a concealed imprinted object in the domestic chick. Anim. Cogn., 1(1), 17–24.
Abstract: Five-day-old chicks were accustomed to follow an imprinted object (a small red ball with which they had been reared) that was moving slowly in a large arena, until it disappeared behind an opaque screen. In experiments, each chick was initially confined in a transparent cage, from where it could see and track the ball while it moved towards, and then beyond, one of two screens. The screens could be either identical or differ in colour and pattern. Either immediately after the disappearance of the ball, or with a certain delay, the chick was released and allowed to search for its imprinted object behind either screen. The results showed that chicks took into account the directional cue provided by the ball movement and its concealment, up to a delay period of about 180 s, independently of the perceptual characteristics of the two screens. If an opaque partition was positioned in front of the transparent cage immediately after the ball had disappeared, so that, throughout the delay, neither the goal-object nor the two screens were visible, chicks were still capable of remembering and choosing the correct screen, though over a much shorter period of about 60 s. The results suggest that, at least in this precocial bird species, very young chicks can maintain some form of representation of the location where a social partner was last seen, and are also capable of continuously updating this representation so as to take into account successive displacements of the goal-object.
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Adachi, I., Kuwahata, H., & Fujita, K. (2007). Dogs recall their owner's face upon hearing the owner's voice. Anim. Cogn., 10(1), 17–21.
Abstract: Abstract We tested whether dogs have a cross-modal representation of human individuals. We presented domestic dogs with a photo of either the owner's or a stranger's face on the LCD monitor after playing back a voice of one of those persons. A voice and a face matched in half of the trials (Congruent condition) and mismatched in the other half (Incongruent condition). If our subjects activate visual images of the voice, their expectation would be contradicted in Incongruent condition. It would result in the subjects` longer looking times in Incongruent condition than in Congruent condition. Our subject dogs looked longer at the visual stimulus in Incongruent condition than in Congruent condition. This suggests that dogs actively generate their internal representation of the owner's face when they hear the owner calling them. This is the first demonstration that nonhuman animals do not merely associate auditory and visual stimuli but also actively generate a visual image from auditory information. Furthermore, our subject also looked at the visual stimulus longer in Incongruent condition in which the owner's face followed an unfamiliar person's voice than in Congruent condition in which the owner's face followed the owner's voice. Generating a particular visual image in response to an unfamiliar voice should be difficult, and any expected images from the voice ought to be more obscure or less well defined than that of the owners. However, our subjects looked longer at the owner's face in Incongruent condition than in Congruent condition. This may indicate that dogs may have predicted that it should not be the owner when they heard the unfamiliar person's voice.
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