Abstract: Abstract  Transitive performance (TP) is a learning-based behaviour exhibited by a wide range of species, where if a subject has been taught to prefer A when presented with the pair AB but to prefer B when presented with the pair BC, then the subject will also prefer A when presented with the novel pair AC. Most explanations of TP assume that subjects recognize and learn an underlying sequence from observing the training pairs. However, data from squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) and young children contradict this, showing that when three different items (a triad) are drawn from the sequence, subjects`` performance degrades systematically (McGonigle and Chalmers, Nature 267:694-696, 1977; Chalmers and McGonigle, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 37:355-377, 1984; Harris and McGonigle, The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 47B:319-348, 1994). We present here the two-tier model, the first learning model of TP which accounts for this systematic performance degradation. Our model assumes primate TP is based on a general-purpose task learning system rather than a special-purpose sequence-learning system. It supports the hypothesis of Heckers et al. (Hippocampus 14:153-162, 2004) that TP is an expression of two separate general learning elements: one for associating actions and contexts, another for prioritising associations when more than one context is present. The two-tier model also provides explanations for why phased training is important for helping subjects learn the initial training pairs and why some subjects fail to do so. It also supports the Harris and McGonigle (The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 47B:319-348, 1994) explanation of why, once the training pairs have been acquired, subjects perform transitive choice automatically on two-item diads, but not when exposed to triads from the same sequence.

Abstract: Some animals give specific calls when they discover food or detect a particular type of predator. Companions respond with food-searching behaviour or by adopting appropriate escape responses. These signals thus seem to denote objects in the environment, but this specific mechanism has only been demonstrated for monkey alarm calls. We manipulated whether fowl (Gallus gallus) had recently found a small quantity of preferred food and then tested for a specific interaction between this event and their subsequent response to playback of food calls. In one treatment, food calls thus potentially provided information about the immediate environment, while in the other the putative message was redundant with individual experience. Food calls evoked substrate searching, but only if the hens had not recently discovered food. An identical manipulation had no effect on responses to an acoustically matched control call. These results show that chicken food calls are representational signals: they stimulate retrieval of information about a class of external events. This is the first such demonstration for any non-primate species. Representational signalling is hence more taxonomically widespread than has previously been thought, suggesting that it may be the product of common social factors, rather than an attribute of a particular phylogenetic lineage.

Abstract: A trap-tube task was used to determine whether chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and children (Homo sapiens) who observed a model's errors and successes could master the task in fewer trials than those who saw only successes. Two- to 7-year-old chimpanzees and 3- to 4-year-old children did not benefit from observing errors and found the task difficult. Two of the 6 chimpanzees developed a successful anticipatory strategy but showed no evidence of representing the core causal relations involved in trapping. Three- to 4-year-old children showed a similar limitation and tended to copy the actions of the demonstrator, irrespective of their causal relevance. Five- to 6-year-old children were able to master the task but did not appear to be influenced by social learning or benefit from observing errors.

Abstract: In non-human animals, creative behaviour occurs spontaneously only at low frequencies, so is typically missed by standardised observational methods. Experimental approaches have tended to rely overly on paradigms from child development or adult human cognition, which may be inappropriate for species that inhabit very different perceptual worlds and possess quite different motor capacities than humans. The analysis of anecdotes offers a solution to this impasse, provided certain conditions are met. To be reliable, anecdotes must be recorded immediately after observation, and only the records of scientists experienced with the species and the individuals concerned should be used. Even then, interpretation of a single record is always ambiguous, and analysis is feasible only when collation of multiple records shows that a behaviour pattern occurs repeatedly under similar circumstances. This approach has been used successfully to study a number of creative capacities of animals: the distribution, nature and neural correlates of deception across the primate order; the occurrence of teaching in animals; and the neural correlates of several aptitudes--in birds, foraging innovation, and in primates, innovation, social learning and tool-use. Drawing on these approaches, we describe the use of this method to investigate a new problem, the cognition of the African elephant, a species whose sheer size and evolutionary distance from humans renders the conventional methods of comparative psychology of little use. The aim is both to chart the creative cognitive capacities of this species, and to devise appropriate experimental methods to confirm and extend previous findings.