Abstract: A previous study demonstrated that horses can learn socially from observing humans, but could not draw any conclusions about the social learning mechanisms. Here we develop this by showing horses four different human action sequences as demonstrations of how to press a button to open a feed box. We tested 68 horses aged between 3 and 12 years. 63 horses passed the habituation phase and were assigned either to the group Hand Demo (N = 13) for which a kneeling person used a hand to press the button, Head Demo (N = 13) for which a kneeling person used the head, Mixed Demo (N = 12) for which a squatting person used both head and hand, Foot Demo (N = 12) in which a standing person used a foot, or No Demo (N = 13) in which horses did not receive a demonstration. 44 horses reached the learning criterion of opening the feeder twenty times consecutively, 40 of these were 75% of the Demo group horses and four horses were 31% of the No Demo group horses. Horses not reaching the learning criterion approached the human experimenters more often than those who did. Significantly more horses used their head to press the button no matter which demonstration they received. However, in the Foot Demo group four horses consistently preferred to use a hoof and two switched between hoof and head use. After the Mixed Demo the horses' actions were more diverse. The results indicate that only a few horses copy behaviours when learning socially from humans. A few may learn through observational conditioning, as some appeared to adapt to demonstrated actions in the course of reaching the learning criterion. Most horses learn socially through enhancement, using humans to learn where, and which aspect of a mechanism has to be manipulated, and by applying individual trial and error learning to reach their goal.

Abstract: This paper reviews evidence that increases the probability that many animals experience at least simple levels of consciousness. First, the search for neural correlates of consciousness has not found any consciousness-producing structure or process that is limited to human brains. Second, appropriate responses to novel challenges for which the animal has not been prepared by genetic programming or previous experience provide suggestive evidence of animal consciousness because such versatility is most effectively organized by conscious thinking. For example, certain types of classical conditioning require awareness of the learned contingency in human subjects, suggesting comparable awareness in similarly conditioned animals. Other significant examples of versatile behavior suggestive of conscious thinking are scrub jays that exhibit all the objective attributes of episodic memory, evidence that monkeys sometimes know what they know, creative tool-making by crows, and recent interpretation of goal-directed behavior of rats as requiring simple nonreflexive consciousness. Third, animal communication often reports subjective experiences. Apes have demonstrated increased ability to use gestures or keyboard symbols to make requests and answer questions; and parrots have refined their ability to use the imitation of human words to ask for things they want and answer moderately complex questions. New data have demonstrated increased flexibility in the gestural communication of swarming honey bees that leads to vitally important group decisions as to which cavity a swarm should select as its new home. Although no single piece of evidence provides absolute proof of consciousness, this accumulation of strongly suggestive evidence increases significantly the likelihood that some animals experience at least simple conscious thoughts and feelings. The next challenge for cognitive ethologists is to investigate for particular animals the content of their awareness and what life is actually like, for them.

Abstract: In this study we examined how social learning of feeding preferences by zebra finches was affected by the identity of different demonstrators. We presented adult zebra finches with two demonstrators, one male and one female, that exhibited different food choices, and we recorded their subsequent preference when given a choice between the two food types. Previously it was found that young zebra finches' patterns of social learning are affected by the sex of the individual demonstrating a feeding behaviour. This result could be explained by the lack of exposure these animals had to the opposite sex, or by their mating status. Therefore, we investigated the social learning preferences of adult mated zebra finches. We found the same pattern of directed social learning of a different type of feeding behaviour (food colour): female zebra finches preferred the colour of food eaten by male demonstrators, whereas male zebra finches showed little evidence of any preference for the colour of food eaten by female demonstrators. Furthermore, we found that female observers' preferences were biased by demonstrators' relative feeding activity: the female demonstrator was only ever preferred if it ate less than its male counterpart.

Abstract: Abstract: Brain lateralization has been the matter of extensive research over the last centuries, but it remains an unsolved issue. While hand preferences have been extensively studied, very few studies have investigated laterality of eye use in non-human primates. We examined eye preference in 14 Campbell"s monkeys (Cercopithecus c. campbelli). We assessed eye preference to look at a seed placed inside a tube using monocular vision. Eye use was recorded for 100 independent and non-rewarded trials per individual. All of the 14 monkeys showed very strong preferences in the choice of the eye used to look inside the tube (mean preference: 97.6%). Eight subjects preferred the right eye and six subjects preferred the left eye. The results are discussed in light of previous data on eye preference in primates, and compared to data on hand preference from these subjects. Our findings would support the hypothesis for an early emergence of lateralization for perceptual processes compared to manual motor functions.

Abstract: Sixteen domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) and four horses (Equus caballus) were tested for their ability to use human-given manual and facial cues in an object-choice task. Two of the four horses used touch as a cue and one horse successfully used pointing. The performance of the dogs was considerably better, with 12 subjects able to use pointing as a cue, 4 able to use head orientation and 2 able to use eye gaze alone. Group analysis showed that the dogs performed significantly better in all experimental conditions than during control trials. Dogs were able to use pointing cues even when the cuer's body was closer to the incorrect object. Working gundogs with specialised training used pointing more successfully than pet dogs and gundog breeds performed better than non-gundog breeds. The results of this experiment suggest that animals' use of human given communicative signals depends on cognitive ability, the evolutionary consequences of domestication and enculturation by humans within the individual's lifetime.