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Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (1992). Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations. Nature, 355, 250–253.
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Ewart Jc,. (1903). The wild horse. Nature, 68, 271–274.
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Clayton, N. S., & Dickinson, A. (1998). Episodic-like memory during cache recovery by scrub jays. Nature, 395(6699), 272–274.
Abstract: The recollection of past experiences allows us to recall what a particular event was, and where and when it occurred1,2, a form of memory that is thought to be unique to humans3. It is known, however, that food-storing birds remember the spatial location4, 5, 6 and contents6, 7, 8, 9 of their caches. Furthermore, food-storing animals adapt their caching and recovery strategies to the perishability of food stores10, 11, 12, 13, which suggests that they are sensitive to temporal factors. Here we show that scrub jays (Aphelocoma coerulescens) remember 'when' food items are stored by allowing them to recover perishable 'wax worms' (wax-moth larvae) and non-perishable peanuts which they had previously cached in visuospatially distinct sites. Jays searched preferentially for fresh wax worms, their favoured food, when allowed to recover them shortly after caching. However, they rapidly learned to avoid searching for worms after a longer interval during which the worms had decayed. The recovery preference of jays demonstrates memory of where and when particular food items were cached, thereby fulfilling the behavioural criteria for episodic-like memory in non-human animals.
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Weissing, F. J. (2011). Animal behaviour: Born leaders. Nature, 474(7351), 288–289.
Abstract: Social animals face a dilemma. To reap the benefits of group living, they have to stay together. However, individuals differ in their preferences as to where to go and what to do next. If all individuals follow their own preferences, group coherence is undermined, resulting in an outcome that is unfavourable for everyone. Neglecting one's own preferences and following a leader is one way to resolve this coordination problem. But what attributes make an individual a 'leader'? A modelling study by Johnstone and Manica1 illuminates this question.
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Brosnan, S. F., & De Waal, F. B. M. (2003). Monkeys reject unequal pay. Nature, 425(6955), 297–299.
Abstract: During the evolution of cooperation it may have become critical for individuals to compare their own efforts and pay-offs with those of others. Negative reactions may occur when expectations are violated. One theory proposes that aversion to inequity can explain human cooperation within the bounds of the rational choice model, and may in fact be more inclusive than previous explanations. Although there exists substantial cultural variation in its particulars, this 'sense of fairness' is probably a human universal that has been shown to prevail in a wide variety of circumstances. However, we are not the only cooperative animals, hence inequity aversion may not be uniquely human. Many highly cooperative nonhuman species seem guided by a set of expectations about the outcome of cooperation and the division of resources. Here we demonstrate that a nonhuman primate, the brown capuchin monkey (Cebus apella), responds negatively to unequal reward distribution in exchanges with a human experimenter. Monkeys refused to participate if they witnessed a conspecific obtain a more attractive reward for equal effort, an effect amplified if the partner received such a reward without any effort at all. These reactions support an early evolutionary origin of inequity aversion.
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Milinski, M., & Rockenbach, B. (2008). Human behaviour: Punisher pays. Nature, 452(7185), 297–298.
Abstract: The tendency of humans to punish perceived free-loaders, even at a cost to themselves, is an evolutionary puzzle: punishers perish, and those who benefit the most are those who have never punished at all.
Humans are champions of cooperation. Reciprocity – the idea that, if I help you this time, you'll help me next time1 – is a secret of our success.
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Arnold, K., & Zuberbuhler, K. (2006). Language evolution: semantic combinations in primate calls. Nature, 441(7091), 303.
Abstract: Syntax sets human language apart from other natural communication systems, although its evolutionary origins are obscure. Here we show that free-ranging putty-nosed monkeys combine two vocalizations into different call sequences that are linked to specific external events, such as the presence of a predator and the imminent movement of the group. Our findings indicate that non-human primates can combine calls into higher-order sequences that have a particular meaning.
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Prather, J. F., Peters, S., Nowicki, S., & Mooney, R. (2008). Precise auditory-vocal mirroring in neurons for learned vocal communication. Nature, 451(7176), 305–310.
Abstract: Brain mechanisms for communication must establish a correspondence between sensory and motor codes used to represent
the signal. One idea is that this correspondence is established at the level of single neurons that are active when the
individual performs a particular gesture or observes a similar gesture performed by another individual. Although neurons
that display a precise auditory–vocal correspondence could facilitate vocal communication, they have yet to be identified.
Here we report that a certain class of neurons in the swamp sparrow forebrain displays a precise auditory–vocal
correspondence. We show that these neurons respond in a temporally precise fashion to auditory presentation of certain
note sequences in this songbird’s repertoire and to similar note sequences in other birds’ songs. These neurons display
nearly identical patterns of activity when the bird sings the same sequence, and disrupting auditory feedback does not alter
this singing-related activity, indicating it is motor in nature. Furthermore, these neurons innervate striatal structures
important for song learning, raising the possibility that singing-related activity in these cells is compared to auditory
feedback to guide vocal learning.
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Sugiyama Y. (1994). Tool use by wild chimpanzees. Nature, 376, 327.
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Dreber, A., Rand, D. G., Fudenberg, D., & Nowak, M. A. (2008). Winners don/'t punish. Nature, 452(7185), 348–351.
Abstract: A key aspect of human behaviour is cooperation1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. We tend to help others even if costs are involved. We are more likely to help when the costs are small and the benefits for the other person significant. Cooperation leads to a tension between what is best for the individual and what is best for the group. A group does better if everyone cooperates, but each individual is tempted to defect. Recently there has been much interest in exploring the effect of costly punishment on human cooperation8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23. Costly punishment means paying a cost for another individual to incur a cost. It has been suggested that costly punishment promotes cooperation even in non-repeated games and without any possibility of reputation effects10. But most of our interactions are repeated and reputation is always at stake. Thus, if costly punishment is important in promoting cooperation, it must do so in a repeated setting. We have performed experiments in which, in each round of a repeated game, people choose between cooperation, defection and costly punishment. In control experiments, people could only cooperate or defect. Here we show that the option of costly punishment increases the amount of cooperation but not the average payoff of the group. Furthermore, there is a strong negative correlation between total payoff and use of costly punishment. Those people who gain the highest total payoff tend not to use costly punishment: winners don't punish. This suggests that costly punishment behaviour is maladaptive in cooperation games and might have evolved for other reasons.
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