Abstract: The types of social organisation displayed by the African antelope species have been assigned in this paper to five classes, distinguished largely by the strategies used by the reproductively active males in securing mating rights, and the effects of those strategies on other social castes. The paper attempts to show that these strategies are appropriate to each class because of the effects of other, ecological, aspects of their ways of life. The paper describes different feeding styles among antelope, in terms of selection of food items and coverage of home ranges. It argues that these feeding styles bear a relationship to maximum group size of feeding animals through the influence of dispersion of food items upon group cohesion. The feeding styles also bear a relationship to body size and to habitat choice, both of which influence the antelope species' antipredator behaviour. Thus feeding style is related to anti-predator behaviour which, in many species, influences minimum group size. Group size and the pattern of movement over the annual home range affect the likelihood of females being found in a given place at a given time, and it is this likelihood which, to a large extent, determines the kind of strategy a male must employ to achieve mating rights. The effects of the different strategies employed by males can be seen in such aspects of each species' biology as sexual dimorphism, adult sex ratio, and differential distribution of the sexes.

Abstract: The view is examined that the adaptive value of conventional aspects of fighting behaviour is for assessment of relative RHP (resource holding power) of the combatants. Outcomes of aggressive disputes should be decided by each individual's fitness budget available for expenditure during a fight (determined by the fitness difference between adoption of alternative strategies, escalation or withdrawal without escalation) and on the rate of expenditure of the fitness budget if escalation occurs (determined by the RHPs of the combatants). Thus response thresholds for alternative strategies (“assessments”) will be determined by natural selection on a basis of which opponent is likely to expend its fitness budget first, should escalation occur. This “loser” should retreat (before escalation) and the winner should stay in possession of the resource. Many aggressive decisions depend on whether one is a resource holder, or an attacker. Assuming the RHP of the combatants to be equal, there are many instances of fitness pay-off imbalances between holder and attacker which should weight the dispute outcome in favour of one or other opponent by allowing it a greater expendable fitness budget. Usually the weighting favours the holder; the attacker therefore needs a correspondingly higher RHP before it may be expected to win. This is not invariably the case, and much observed data fits the predictions of this sort of model. If assessments are perfect and budget expenditure rates exactly predictable, then there would never seem to be any case for escalation. Escalation can be explained in terms of injury inflictions (expenditures) occurring as discrete events; i.e. as “bouts” won or lost during fighting. Assessment can give only a probabilistic prediction of the outcome of a bout. A simple model is developed to investigate escalation situations. Each combatant assesses relative RHP; this correlates with an absolute probability of winning the next bout (cabs). The stake played for is infliction of loss of RHP and is determined by the fitness budgets of the opponents. (Each individual plays for the withdrawal of its opponent.) This defines a critical probability of winning (ccrit) for each combatant, above which escalation is the favourable strategy (cabs > ccrit) and below which withdrawal is favourable (cabs < ccrit). Escalation should occur only where cabs-ccrit is positive for both combatants. This model gives predictions compatible with the observations, indicating that RHP loss alone can be adequate to explain withdrawal: escalation behaviour. Withdrawal tendency will be increased by low searching costs. Escalations should be restricted to closely matched RHP opponents if RHP disparity is the major imbalance. Outside the “escalation range” of a given individual, the higher RHP individual wins and the lower one loses (i.e. it should withdraw after conventional display). RHP disparity and holder: attacker imbalance should both interact to shape the observed pattern, though their relative importances will depend on species and situation. In some instances selection may favour immediate withdrawal from an occupied territory even without assessment of RHP.