Dunbar, R. I. M., McAdam, M. R., & O'connell, S. (2005). Mental rehearsal in great apes (Pan troglodytes and Pongo pygmaeus) and children. Behav. Process., 69(3), 323–330.
Abstract: The ability to rehearse possible future courses of action in the mind is an important feature of advanced social cognition in humans, and the “social brain” hypothesis implies that it might also be a feature of primate social cognition. We tested two chimpanzees, six orangutans and 63 children aged 3-7 years on a set of four puzzle boxes, half of which were presented with an opportunity to observe the box before being allowed to open it (“prior view”), the others being given without an opportunity to examine the boxes before handling them (“no prior view”). When learning effects are partialled out, puzzle boxes in the “prior view” condition were opened significantly faster than boxes given in the “no prior view” condition by the children, but not by either of the great apes. The three species differ significantly in the speed with which they opened boxes in the “no prior view” condition. The three species' performance on this task was a function of relative frontal lobe volume, suggesting that it may be possible to identify quantitative neuropsychological differences between species.
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Horowitz, A. C. (2003). Do humans ape? Or do apes human? Imitation and intention in humans (Homo sapiens) and other animals. J Comp Psychol, 117(3), 325–336.
Abstract: A. Whiten, D. M. Custance, J.-C. Gomez, P. Teixidor, and K. A. Bard (1996) tested chimpanzees' (Pan troglodytes) and human children's (Homo sapiens) skills at imitation with a 2-action test on an “artificial fruit.” Chimpanzees imitated to a restricted degree; children were more thoroughly imitative. Such results prompted some to assert that the difference in imitation indicates a difference in the subjects' understanding of the intentions of the demonstrator (M. Tomasello, 1996). In this experiment, 37 adult human subjects were tested with the artificial fruit. Far from being perfect imitators, the adults were less imitative than the children. These results cast doubt on the inference from imitative performance to an ability to understand others' intentions. The results also demonstrate how any test of imitation requires a control group and attention to the level of behavioral analysis.
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Ayres, C. M., Davey, L. M., & German, W. J. (1963). Cerebral Hydatidosis. Clinical Case Report With A Review Of Pathogenesis. J Neurosurg, 20, 371–377.
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Zentall, S. S., & Zentall, T. R. (1986). Hyperactivity ratings: statistical regression provides an insufficient explanation of practice effects. J Pediatr Psychol, 11(3), 393–396.
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Zentall, S. S., & Zentall, T. R. (1983). Optimal stimulation: a model of disordered activity and performance in normal and deviant children. Psychol Bull, 94(3), 446–471.
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Cochet, H., & Byrne, R. W. (2013). Evolutionary origins of human handedness: evaluating contrasting hypotheses. Animal Cognition, 16(4), 531–542.
Abstract: Variation in methods and measures, resulting in past dispute over the existence of population handedness in nonhuman great apes, has impeded progress into the origins of human right-handedness and how it relates to the human hallmark of language. Pooling evidence from behavioral studies, neuroimaging and neuroanatomy, we evaluate data on manual and cerebral laterality in humans and other apes engaged in a range of manipulative tasks and in gestural communication. A simplistic human/animal partition is no longer tenable, and we review four (nonexclusive) possible drivers for the origin of population-level right-handedness: skilled manipulative activity, as in tool use; communicative gestures; organizational complexity of action, in particular hierarchical structure; and the role of intentionality in goal-directed action. Fully testing these hypotheses will require developmental and evolutionary evidence as well as modern neuroimaging data.
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Zentall, S. S., Zentall, T. R., & Barack, R. C. (1978). Distraction as a function of within-task stimulation for hyperactive and normal children. J Learn Disabil, 11(9), 540–548.
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Manning, G. S., & Ratanarat, C. (1970). Fasciolopsis buski (Lankester, 1857) in Thailand. Am J Trop Med Hyg, 19(4), 613–619.
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Thomas, K. E., Annest, J. L., Gilchrist, J., & Bixby-Hammett, D. M. (2006). Non-fatal horse related injuries treated in emergency departments in the United States, 2001-2003 (Vol. 40).
Abstract: OBJECTIVE: To characterise and provide nationally representative estimates of persons with non-fatal horse related injuries treated in American emergency departments. METHODS: The National Electronic Injury Surveillance System All Injury Program (NEISS-AIP) is a stratified probability sample comprising 66 hospitals. Data on injuries treated in these emergency departments are collected and reported. NEISS-AIP data on all types (horseback riding and otherwise) of non-fatal horse related injuries from 2001 to 2003 were analysed. RESULTS: An estimated 102,904 persons with non-fatal horse related injuries (35.7 per 100,000 population) were treated in American emergency departments each year from 2001 to 2003 inclusive. Non-fatal injury rates were higher for females (41.5 per 100,000) than for males (29.8 per 100,000). Most patients were injured while mounted on a horse (66.1%), commonly from falling or being thrown by the horse; while not mounted, injuries most often resulted from being kicked by the horse. The body parts most often injured were the head/neck region (23.2%), lower extremity (22.2%), and upper extremity (21.5%). The most common principal diagnoses were contusions/abrasions (31.4%) and fractures (25.2%). For each year that was studied, an estimated 11 502 people sustained traumatic brain injuries from horse related incidents. Overall, more than 11% of those injured were admitted to hospital. CONCLUSIONS: Horse related injuries are a public health concern not just for riders but for anyone in close contact with horses. Prevention programmes should target horseback riders and horse caregivers to promote helmet use and educate participants about horse behaviour, proper handling of horses, and safe riding practices.
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Gallup, G. G. J. (1985). Do minds exist in species other than our own? Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 9(4), 631–641.
Abstract: An answer to the question of animal awareness depends on evidence, not intuition, anecdote, or debate. This paper examines some of the problems inherent in an analysis of animal awareness, and whether animals might be aware of being aware is offered as a more meaningful distinction. A framework is presented which can be used to make a determination about the extent to which other species have experiences similar to ours based on their ability to make inferences and attributions about mental states in others. The evidence from both humans and animals is consistent with the idea that the capacity to use experience to infer the experience of others is a byproduct of self-awareness.
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