Abstract: Self-organization, or decentralized control, is widespread in biological systems, including cells, organisms, and groups. It is not, however, the universal means of organization. I argue that a biological system will be self-organized when it possesses a large number of subunits, and these subunits lack either the communicational abilities or the computational abilities, or both, that are needed to implement centralized control. Such control requires a well informed and highly intelligent supervisor. I stress that the subunits in a self-organized system do not necessarily have low cognitive abilities. A lack of preadaptations for evolving a system-wide communication network can prevent the evolution of centralized control. Hence, sometimes even systems whose subunits possess high cognitive abilities will be self-organized. N1 -

Abstract: The behavior of mares at foaling and their behavior during subsequent weekly brief separations from their foals was quantified. Thirteen multiparous pony mares were observed for the first 30 min after foaling. Activities directed toward the foal and toward the fetal membranes were recorded. There were 16+/-8 contacts with the fetal membranes, most in the first 10 min post-partum. There were 81+/-12 activities directed toward the foal. There was a downward trend in foal contacts over the first 30 min. Eight of the 13 mares were observed for the 30-60 min post-partum during which licking and touching the foal continued. Only one of the foals suckled in the first 30 min, but half had suckled by 60 min. Ten mares and foals were separated for 5 min each week for 9 weeks. Although mare responses (neighs and steps) decreased with age of the foal, the foals' responses increased from weeks 1 to 2 and then decreased with foal age. This indicates that foal attachment to the mare is not complete until it is 2 weeks old.

Abstract: Summary A wonderfully lucid framework for the ways to understand animal behaviour is that represented by the four [`]whys' proposed by Tinbergen (1963). For much of the past three decades, however, these four avenues have been pursued more or less in parallel. Functional questions, for example, have been addressed by behavioural ecologists, mechanistic questions by psychologists and ethologists, ontogenetic questions by developmental biologists and neuroscientists and phylogenetic questions by evolutionary biologists. More recently, the value of integration between these differing views has become apparent. In this brief review, we concentrate especially on current attempts to integrate mechanistic and functional approaches. Most of our understanding of learning and memory in animals comes from the psychological literature, which tends to use only rats or pigeons, and more occasionally primates, as subjects. The underlying psychological assumption is of general processes that are similar across species and contexts rather than a range of specific abilities. However, this does not seem to be entirely true as several learned behaviours have been described that are specific to particular species or contexts. The first conspicuous exception to the generalist assumption was the demonstration of long delay taste aversion learning in rats (Garcia et al., 1955), in which it was shown that a stimulus need not be temporally contiguous with a response for the animal to make an association between food and illness. Subsequently, a number of other examples, such as imprinting and song learning in birds (e.g., Bolhuis and Honey, 1998; Catchpole and Slater, 1995; Horn, 1998), have been thoroughly researched. Even in these cases, however, it has been typical for only a few species to be studied (domestic chicks provide the [`]model' imprinting species and canaries and zebra finches the song learning [`]models'). As a result, a great deal is understood about the neural underpinnings and development of the behaviour, but substantially less is understood about interspecific variation and whether variation in behaviour is correlated with variation in neural processing (see review by Tramontin and Brenowitz, 2000 but see ten Cate and Vos, 1999).

Abstract: Traditional psychological approaches to animal learning and behavior have involved either the atheoretical behaviorist approach proposed by B. F. Skinner (1938), in which input-output relations are described in response to environmental manipulations, or the theoretical behaviorist approach offered by C. L Hull (1943), in which associations mediated by several hypothetical constructs and intervening variables are formed between stimuli and responses. Recently, the application of a cognitive behaviorist approach to animal learning and behavior has been found to have considerable value as a research tool. This perspective has grown out of E. C. Tolman's cognitive approach to learning in which behavior is mediated by mechanisms that are not directly observable but can be inferred from the results of critical experiments. In the present article, the author presents several examples of the successful application of the cognitive behaviorist approach. In each case, the experiments have been designed to distinguish between more traditional mechanisms and those mediated by hypothesized internal representations. These examples were selected because the evidence suggests that some form of active cognitive organization is needed to account for the behavioral results.