Abstract: Most birds rely on imprinting and experience with conspecifics to learn species-specific recognition cues. Australian brush-turkeys (Alectura lathami) do not imprint and form no bonds with parents. They hatch asynchronously, disperse widely and meet juvenile conspecifics at an unpredictable age. Nevertheless, in captivity, hatchlings respond to other chicks. A recent study, which involved the use of robotic models, found that chicks prefer to approach robots that emit specific visual cues. Here, we evaluated their response to acoustic cues, which usually play an important role in avian social cognition. However, in simultaneous choice tests, neither 2-day-old nor 9-day-old chicks preferred the choice arm with playback of either chick or adult conspecific calls over the arm containing a silent loudspeaker. Chicks of both age classes, however, scanned their surroundings more during chick playback, and the response was thus consistent in younger and older chicks. We also presented the chicks with robotic models, either with or without playback of chick calls. They did not approach the calling robot more than they did the silent robot, indicating that the combination of visual and acoustic cues does not evoke a stronger response. These results will allow further comparison with species that face similar cognitive demands in the wild, such as brood parasites. Such a comparative approach, which is the focus of cognitive ecology, will enable us to further analyse the evolution and adaptive value of species recognition abilities.

Abstract: Three-year-old children were tested on three categorization tasks of increasing levels of abstraction (used with adult baboons in an earlier study): the first was a conceptual categorization task (food vs toys), the second a perceptual matching task (same vs different objects), and the third a relational matching task in which the children had to sort pairs according to whether or not the two items belonged to the same or different categories. The children were tested using two different procedures, the first a replication of the procedure used with the baboons (pulling one rope for a category or a relationship between two objects, and another rope for the other category or relationship), the second a task based upon children's prior experiences with sorting objects (putting in the same box objects belonging to the same category or a pair of objects exemplifying the same relation). The children were able to solve the first task (conceptual categorization) when tested with the sorting into boxes procedure, and the second task (perceptual matching) when tested with both procedures. The children were able to master the third task (relational matching) only when the rules were clearly explained to them, but not when they could only watch sorting examples. In fact, the relational matching task without explanation requires analogy abilities that do not seem to be fully developed at 3 years of age. The discrepancies in performances between children tested with the two procedures, with the task explained or not, and the discrepancies observed between children and baboons are discussed in relation to differences between species and/or problem-solving strategies.

Abstract: This article offers a general definition of self-knowledge that embraces all forms and levels of self-knowledge in animals and humans. It is hypothesized that various levels of self-knowledge constitute an ordinal scale such that each species in a lineage displays the forms of self-knowledge found in related species as well as new forms it and its sister species may have evolved. Likewise, it is hypothesized that these various forms of levels of self-knowledge develop in the sequence in which they evolved. Finally, a general hypothesis for the functional significance of self-knowledge is proposed along with subhypotheses regarding the adaptive significance of various levels of self-knowledge in mammals including human and nonhuman primates. The general hypothesis is that self-knowledge serves as a standard for assessing the qualities of conspecifics compared to those of the self. Such assessment is crucial to deciding among alternative reproductive and subsistence strategies. The qualities that are assessed, which vary across taxa, range from the size and strength of the self to its mathematical or musical abilities. This so-called assessment model of self-knowledge is based on evolutionary biological models for social selection and the role of assessment in animal communication.

Abstract: Non-human animals vary in their ability to make and use tools. The goal of the present study was to further explore what, if anything, differs between tool-users and non-tool-users, and whether these differences lie in the conceptual or motor domain. We tested two species that typically do not use tools-cotton top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) and vervet monkeys (Cercopithecus aethiops)-on problems that mirrored those designed for prolific tool users such as chimpanzees. We trained subjects on a task in which they could choose one of two canes to obtain an out-of-reach food reward. After training, subjects received several variations on the original task, each designed to examine a specific conceptual aspect of the pulling problem previously studied in other tool-using species. Both species recognized that effective pulling tools must be made of rigid materials. Subsequent conditions revealed significant species differences, with vervets outperforming tamarins across many conditions. Vervets, but not tamarins, had some recognition of the relationship between a tool's orientation and the position of the food reward, the relationship between a tool's trajectory and the substance that it moves on, and that tools must be connected in order to work properly. These results provide further evidence that tool-use may derive from domain-general, rather than domain-specific cognitive capacities that evolved for tool use per se.

Abstract: This study investigated chimpanzees' spontaneous spatial constructions with objects and especially their ability to repeat inter-object spatial relations, which is basic to understanding spatial relations at a higher level than perception or recognition. Subjects were six chimpanzees-four chimpanzees and two bonobos-aged 6-21 years, all raised in a human environment from an early age. Only minor species differences, but considerable individual differences were found. The effect of different object samples was assessed through a comparison with a previous study. A common overall chimpanzee pattern was also found. Chimpanzees repeated different types of inter-object spatial relations such as insertion (I), or vertical (V), or next-to (H) relations. However chimpanzees repeated I or V relations with more advanced procedures than when repeating H relations. Moreover, chimpanzees never repeated combined HV relations. Compared with children, chimpanzees showed a specific difficulty in repeating H relations. Repeating H relations is crucial for representing and understanding multiple reciprocal spatial relations between detached elements and for coordinating independent positions in space. Therefore, the chimpanzees' difficulty indicates a fundamental difference in constructive space in comparison to humans. The findings are discussed in relation to issues of spatial cognition and tool use.