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Cheney, D. L., Seyfarth, R. M., & Silk, J. B. (1995). The responses of female baboons (Papio cynocephalus ursinus) to anomalous social interactions: evidence for causal reasoning? J Comp Psychol, 109(2), 134–141.
Abstract: Baboons' (Papio cynocephalus ursinus) understanding of cause-effect relations in the context of social interactions was examined through use of a playback experiment. Under natural conditions, dominant female baboons often grunt to more subordinate mothers when interacting with their infants. Mothers occasionally respond to these grunts by uttering submissive fear barks. Subjects were played causally inconsistent call sequences in which a lower ranking female apparently grunted to a higher ranking female, and the higher ranking female apparently responded with fear barks. As a control, subjects heard a sequence made causally consistent by the inclusion of grunts from a 3rd female that was dominant to both of the others. Subjects responded significantly more strongly to the causally inconsistent sequences, suggesting that they recognized the factors that cause 1 individual to give submissive vocalizations to another.
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Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (2001). Cognitive strategies and the representation of social relations by monkeys. Nebr Symp Motiv, 47, 145–177.
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Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (2003). Signalers and receivers in animal communication. Annu Rev Psychol, 54, 145–173.
Abstract: In animal communication natural selection favors callers who vocalize to affect the behavior of listeners and listeners who acquire information from vocalizations, using this information to represent their environment. The acquisition of information in the wild is similar to the learning that occurs in laboratory conditioning experiments. It also has some parallels with language. The dichotomous view that animal signals must be either referential or emotional is false, because they can easily be both: The mechanisms that cause a signaler to vocalize do not limit a listener's ability to extract information from the call. The inability of most animals to recognize the mental states of others distinguishes animal communication most clearly from human language. Whereas signalers may vocalize to change a listener's behavior, they do not call to inform others. Listeners acquire information from signalers who do not, in the human sense, intend to provide it.
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Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1990). The representation of social relations by monkeys. Cognition, 37(1-2), 167–196.
Abstract: Monkeys recognize the social relations that exist among others in their group. They know who associates with whom, for example, and other animals' relative dominance ranks. In addition, monkeys appear to compare types of social relations and make same/different judgments about them. In captivity, longtailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis) trained to recognize the relation between one adult female and her offspring can identify the same relation among other mother-offspring pairs, and distinguish this relation from bonds between individuals who are related in a different way. In the wild, if a vervet monkey (Cercopithecus aethiops) has seen a fight between a member of its own family and a member of Family X, this increases the likelihood that it will act aggressively toward another member of Family X. Vervets act as if they recognize some similarity between their own close associates and the close associates of others. To make such comparisons the monkeys must have some way of representing the properties of social relationships. We discuss the adaptive value of such representations, the information they contain, their structure, and their limitations.
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Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (2015). Social cognition. Animal Behaviour, 103, 191–202.
Abstract: The social intelligence hypothesis argues that competition and cooperation among individuals have shaped the evolution of cognition in animals. What do we mean by social cognition? Here we suggest that the building blocks of social cognition are a suite of skills, ordered roughly according to the cognitive demands they place upon individuals. These skills allow an animal to recognize others by various means; to recognize and remember other animals' relationships; and, perhaps, to attribute mental states to them. Some skills are elementary and virtually ubiquitous in the animal kingdom; others are more limited in their taxonomic distribution. We treat these skills as the targets of selection, and assume that more complex levels of social cognition evolve only when simpler methods are inadequate. As a result, more complex levels of social cognition indicate greater selective pressures in the past. The presence of each skill can be tested directly through field observations and experiments. In addition, the same methods that have been used to compare social cognition across species can also be used to measure individual differences within species and to test the hypothesis that individual differences in social cognition are linked to differences in reproductive success.
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Silk, J., Cheney, D., & Seyfarth, R. (2013). A practical guide to the study of social relationships. Evol. Anthropol., 22(5), 213–225.
Abstract: Behavioral ecologists have devoted considerable effort to identifying the sources of variation in individual reproductive success. Much of this work has focused on the characteristics of individuals, such as their sex and rank. However, many animals live in stable social groups and the fitness of individuals depends at least in part on the outcome of their interactions with other group members. For example, in many primate species, high dominance rank enhances access to resources and reproductive success. The ability to acquire and maintain high rank often depends on the availability and effectiveness of coalitionary support. Allies may be cultivated and coalitions may be reinforced by affiliative interactions such as grooming, food sharing, and tolerance. These findings suggest that if we want to understand the selective pressures that shape the social behavior of primates, it will be profitable to broaden our focus from the characteristics of individuals to the properties of the relationships that they form with others. The goal of this paper is to discuss a set of methods that can be used to quantify the properties of social relationships.
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Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1988). Social and non.social knowledge in vervet monkeys. In Machiavellian Intelligence (pp. 255–270). Oxford: Oxford Univ Press.
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Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1989). Reconciliation and redirected aggression in vervet monkeys, Behaviour. Behaviour, 110, 258–275.
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Seyfarth, R. M., Cheney, D. L., & Bergman, T. J. (2005). Primate social cognition and the origins of language. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 9(6), 264–266.
Abstract: Are the cognitive mechanisms underlying language unique, or can similar mechanisms be found in other domains? Recent field experiments demonstrate that baboons' knowledge of their companions' social relationships is based on discrete-valued traits (identity, rank, kinship) that are combined to create a representation of social relations that is hierarchically structured, open-ended, rule-governed, and independent of sensory modality. The mechanisms underlying language might have evolved from the social knowledge of our pre-linguistic primate ancestors.
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Owren, M. J., Dieter, J. A., Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (1993). Vocalizations of rhesus (Macaca mulatta) and Japanese (M. fuscata) macaques cross-fostered between species show evidence of only limited modification. Dev Psychobiol, 26(7), 389–406.
Abstract: Two rhesus and two Japanese macaque infants were cross-fostered between species in order to study the effects of auditory experience on vocal development. Both the cross-fostered and normally raised control subjects were observed over the first 2 years of life and their vocalizations were tape-recorded. We classified 8053 calls by ear, placed each call in one of six acoustic categories, and calculated the rates at which different call-types were used in different social contexts. Species differences were found in the use of “coo” and “gruff” vocalizations among control subjects. Japanese macaques invariably produced coos almost exclusively. In contrast, rhesus macaques produced a mixture of coos and gruffs and showed considerable interindividual variation in the relative use of one call type or the other. Cross-fostered Japanese macaques adhered to their species-typical behavior, rarely using gruffs. Cross-fostered rhesus subjects also exhibited species-typical behavior in many contexts, but in some situations produced coos and gruffs at rates that were intermediate between those shown by normally raised animals of the two species. This outcome suggests that environmentally mediated modification of vocal behavior may have occurred, but that the resulting changes were quite limited.
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