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Author |
Dubois, F.; Giraldeau, L.-A. |
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Title |
The forager's dilemma: food sharing and food defense as risk-sensitive foraging options |
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Journal Article |
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Year |
2003 |
Publication |
The American Naturalist |
Abbreviated Journal |
Am Nat |
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Volume |
162 |
Issue |
6 |
Pages  |
768-779 |
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Keywords |
Animals; Competitive Behavior/*physiology; *Environment; Feeding Behavior/*physiology; *Game Theory; *Models, Biological; Population Density; Population Dynamics |
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Abstract |
Although many variants of the hawk-dove game predict the frequency at which group foraging animals should compete aggressively, none of them can explain why a large number of group foraging animals share food clumps without any overt aggression. One reason for this shortcoming is that hawk-dove games typically consider only a single contest, while most group foraging situations involve opponents that interact repeatedly over discovered food clumps. The present iterated hawk-dove game predicts that in situations that are analogous to a prisoner's dilemma, animals should share the resources without aggression, provided that the number of simultaneously available food clumps is sufficiently large and the number of competitors is relatively small. However, given that the expected gain of an aggressive animal is more variable than the gain expected by nonaggressive individuals, the predicted effect of the number of food items in a clump-clump richness-depends on whether only the mean or both the mean and variability associated with payoffs are considered. More precisely, the deterministic game predicts that aggression should increase with clump richness, whereas the stochastic risk-sensitive game predicts that the frequency of encounters resulting in aggression should peak at intermediate clump richnesses or decrease with increasing clump richness if animals show sensitivity to the variance or coefficient of variation, respectively. |
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Departement des Sciences Biologiques, Universite du Quebec a Montreal, Case postale 8888, Succursale Centre-Ville, Montreal, Quebec H3C 3P8, Canada. fdubois@u-bourgogne.fr |
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0003-0147 |
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PMID:14737714 |
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2132 |
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Author |
Pruett-Jones, S. |
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Title |
Independent Versus Nonindependent Mate Choice: Do Females Copy Each Other? |
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Journal Article |
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Year |
1992 |
Publication |
The American Naturalist |
Abbreviated Journal |
Am Nat |
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Volume |
140 |
Issue |
6 |
Pages |
1000-1009 |
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Abstract |
There is increasing evidence from both observational and experimental studies that females may copy each other's mating decisions. Female copying can be defined as a type of nonindependent choice in which the probability that a female chooses a given male increases if other females have chosen that male and decreases if they have not. The important characteristic of copying behavior that separates it from other similar processes is that the change in the probability of choice is strictly because of the actions of other females and not the consequences of those actions (e.g., a male's behavior changing as a result of successful matings). A gametheory model suggests that the adaptive significance of female copying may depend primarily on the ratio of the costs to the benefits of active mate choice. Copying behavior, and more generally conspecific cueing, may be important in many behavioral processes beyond mate choice. |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
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2182 |
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