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Walpole, M. J., & Leader-Williams, N. (2002). Tourism and flagship species in conservation. Biodivers Conserv, 11.
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Jedrzejewski, W., Schmidt, K., Theuerkauf, J., Jedrzejewska, B., Selva, N., & Zub, K. (2002). Kill rate and predation by wolves on ungulate populations in Bialowieza primeval forest (Poland). Ecology, 83.
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Gazzola, A., Avanzinelli, E., Mauri, L., Scandura, M., & Apollonio, M. (2002). Temporal changes of howling in south European wolf packs. Ital J Zool, 69.
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Preston, S. D., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2002). Empathy: Its ultimate and proximate bases. Behav Brain Sci, 25(1), 1–20; discussion 20–71.
Abstract: There is disagreement in the literature about the exact nature of the phenomenon of empathy. There are emotional, cognitive, and conditioning views, applying in varying degrees across species. An adequate description of the ultimate and proximate mechanism can integrate these views. Proximately, the perception of an object's state activates the subject's corresponding representations, which in turn activate somatic and autonomic responses. This mechanism supports basic behaviors (e.g., alarm, social facilitation, vicariousness of emotions, mother-infant responsiveness, and the modeling of competitors and predators) that are crucial for the reproductive success of animals living in groups. The Perception-Action Model (PAM), together with an understanding of how representations change with experience, can explain the major empirical effects in the literature (similarity, familiarity, past experience, explicit teaching, and salience). It can also predict a variety of empathy disorders. The interaction between the PAM and prefrontal functioning can also explain different levels of empathy across species and age groups. This view can advance our evolutionary understanding of empathy beyond inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism and can explain different levels of empathy across individuals, species, stages of development, and situations.
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Acuna, B. D., Sanes, J. N., & Donoghue, J. P. (2002). Cognitive mechanisms of transitive inference. Exp Brain Res, 146(1), 1–10.
Abstract: We examined how the brain organizes interrelated facts during learning and how the facts are subsequently manipulated in a transitive inference (TI) paradigm (e.g., if A<B and B<C, then A<C). This task determined features such as learned facts and behavioral goals, but the learned facts could be organized in any of several ways. For example, if one learns a list by operating on paired items, the pairs may be stored individually as separate facts and reaction time (RT) should decrease with learning. Alternatively, the pairs may be stored as a single, unified list, which may yield a different RT pattern. We characterized RT patterns that occurred as participants learned, by trial and error, the predetermined order of 11 shapes. The task goal was to choose the shape occurring closer to the end of the list, and feedback about correctness was provided during this phase. RT increased even as its variance decreased during learning, suggesting that the learnt knowledge became progressively unified into a single representation, requiring more time to manipulate as participants acquired relational knowledge. After learning, non-adjacent (NA) list items were presented to examine how participants reasoned in a TI task. The task goal also required choosing from each presented pair the item occurring closer to the list end, but without feedback. Participants could solve the TI problems by applying formal logic to the previously learnt pairs of adjacent items; alternatively, they could manipulate a single, unified representation of the list. Shorter RT occurred for NA pairs having more intervening items, supporting the hypothesis that humans employ unified mental representations during TI. The response pattern does not support mental logic solutions of applying inference rules sequentially, which would predict longer RT with more intervening items. We conclude that the brain organizes information in such a way that reflects the relations among the items, even if the facts were learned in an arbitrary order, and that this representation is subsequently used to make inferences.
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Bshary, R., Wickler, W., & Fricke, H. (2002). Fish cognition: a primate's eye view. Anim. Cogn., 5(1), 1–13.
Abstract: We provide selected examples from the fish literature of phenomena found in fish that are currently being examined in discussions of cognitive abilities and evolution of neocortex size in primates. In the context of social intelligence, we looked at living in individualized groups and corresponding social strategies, social learning and tradition, and co-operative hunting. Regarding environmental intelligence, we searched for examples concerning special foraging skills, tool use, cognitive maps, memory, anti-predator behaviour, and the manipulation of the environment. Most phenomena of interest for primatologists are found in fish as well. We therefore conclude that more detailed studies on decision rules and mechanisms are necessary to test for differences between the cognitive abilities of primates and other taxa. Cognitive research can benefit from future fish studies in three ways: first, as fish are highly variable in their ecology, they can be used to determine the specific ecological factors that select for the evolution of specific cognitive abilities. Second, for the same reason they can be used to investigate the link between cognitive abilities and the enlargement of specific brain areas. Third, decision rules used by fish could be used as 'null-hypotheses' for primatologists looking at how monkeys might make their decisions. Finally, we propose a variety of fish species that we think are most promising as study objects.
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Goodwin, D. (2002). Horse Behaviour: Evolution, Domestication and Feralisation. In The Welfare of Horses (pp. 1–18).
Abstract: The evolution of the horse began some 65 million years ago. The horse"s survival has depended on adapative behaviour patterns that enabled it to exploit a diverse range of habitats, to successfully rear its young and to avoid predation. Domestication took place relatively recently in evolutionary time and the adaptability of equine behaviour has allowed it to exploit a variety of domestic environments. Though there are benefits associated with the domestic environment, including provision of food, shelter and protection from predators, there are also costs. These include restriction of movement, social interaction, reproductive success and maternal behaviour. Many aspects of domestication conflict with the adaptive behaviour of the horse and may affect its welfare through the frustration of highly motivated behaviour patterns. Horse behaviour appears little changed by domestication, as evidenced by the reproductive success of feral horse populations around the world.
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Couzin, I. D., Krause, J., James, R., Ruxton, G. D., & Franks, N. R. (2002). Collective Memory and Spatial Sorting in Animal Groups. J. Theor. Biol., 218(1), 1–11.
Abstract: We present a self-organizing model of group formation in three-dimensional space, and use it to investigate the spatial dynamics of animal groups such as fish schools and bird flocks. We reveal the existence of major group-level behavioural transitions related to minor changes in individual-level interactions. Further, we present the first evidence for collective memory in such animal groups (where the previous history of group structure influences the collective behaviour exhibited as individual interactions change) during the transition of a group from one type of collective behaviour to another. The model is then used to show how differences among individuals influence group structure, and how individuals employing simple, local rules of thumb, can accurately change their spatial position within a group (e.g. to move to the centre, the front, or the periphery) in the absence of information on their current position within the group as a whole. These results are considered in the context of the evolution and ecological importance of animal groups.
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Rogers, L. J. (2002). Evolution of Side Biases: Motor versus Sensory Lateralization. In M. K. Mandal, M. B. Bulman-Fleming, & G. Tiwari (Eds.), Side Bias: A Neuropsychological Perspective (3-p. 40). Springer Netherlands.
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Hampton, R. R., Healy, S. D., Shettleworth, S. J., & Kamil, A. C. (2002). Neuroecologists' are not made of straw. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 6(1), 6–7.
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