Abstract: The formation of collaborating pairs by individuals belonging to two different classes occurs in the contexts of reproduction and intea-specific cooperation as well as of inter-specific mutualism. There is potential for partner choice and for competition for access to preferred partners in all three contexts. These selective forces have long been recognised as important in sexual selection, but their impact is not yet appreciated in cooperative and mutualistic systems. The formation of partnerships between members of different classes has much in common with the conclusion of trade agreements in human markets with two classes of traders, like producers and consumers, or employers and employees. Similar game-theoretical models can be used to predict the behaviour of rational traders in human markets and the evolutionarily stable strategies used in biological markets. We present a formal model in which the influence of the market mechanism on selection is made explicit. We restrict ourselves to biological markets in which: (1) Individuals do not compete over access to partners in an agonistic manner, but rather by outcompeting each other in those aspects that are preferred by the choosing party. (2) The commodity the partner has to offer cannot be obtained by the use of force, but requires the consent of the partner. These two restrictions ensure a dominant role for partner choice in the formation of partnerships. In a biological market model the decision to cooperate is based on the comparison between the offers of several potential partners, rather than on the behaviour of a single potential partner, as is implicitly assumed in currently accepted models of cooperation. In our example the members of one class A offer a commodity of fixed value in exchange for a commodity of variable value supplied by the other class, B. We show that when the B-class outnumbers the A-class sufficiently and the cost for the A-class to sample the offers of the B-class are low, the choosiness of the A-class will lead to selection for the supply of high value commodities by the B-class (Fig. 3a). Under the same market conditions, but with a high sampling cost this may still be the evolutionariy stable outcome, but another pair of strategies proves to be stable too: relaxed choosiness of class A coupled with low value commodities supplied by class B (Fig. 3b). We give a number of examples of mating, cooperative and mutualistic markets that resemble the low sampling cost situation depicted in Fig. 3a.

Abstract: Mobbing signals advertise the location of a stalking predator to all prey in an area and recruit them into the inspection aggregation. Such behavior usually causes the predator to move to another area. However, mobbing calls could be eavesdropped by other predators. Because the predation cost of mobbing calls is poorly known, we investigated whether the vocalizations of the mobbing pied flycatcher, Ficedula hypoleuca, a small hole nesting passerine, increase the risk of nest predation. We used mobbing calls of pied flycatchers to examine if they could lure predators such as the marten, Martes martes. This predator usually hunts by night and may locate its mobbing prey while resting nearby during the day. Within each of 56 experimental plots, from the top of one nest-box we played back mobbing sounds of pied flycatchers, whereas blank tapes were played from the top of another nest-box. The trials with mobbing calls were carried out before sunset. We put pieces of recently abandoned nests of pied flycatchers and a quail, Coturnix coturnix, egg into each of the nest-boxes. Nest-boxes with playbacks of mobbing calls were depredated by martens significantly more than were nest-boxes with blank tapes. The results of the present study indicate that repeated conspicuous mobbing calls may carry a significant cost for birds during the breeding season.

Abstract: Abstract   We present here an attempt to understand behaviors of dominant individuals and of subordinate individuals as behavior strategies in an asymmetric “hawk-dove” game. We assume that contestants have perfect information about relative fighting ability and the value of the resource. Any type of asymmetry, both relevant to and irrelevant to the fighting ability, can be considered. It is concluded that evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) depend on the resource value (V), the cost of injury (D), and the probability that the individual in one role will win (x). Different ESSs can exist even when values of V, D, and x are the same. The characteristics of dominance relations detected by observers may result from the ESSs that the individuals are adopting. The model explains some characteristics of dominance relations, for example, the consistent outcome of contests, the rare occurrence of escalated fights, and the discrepancy between resource holding potential (RHP) and dominance relations, from the viewpoint of individual selection.

Abstract: There are both benefits (e.g., social information) and costs (e.g., intraspecific competition) for individuals foraging in groups. To ascertain how group-foraging goats (Capra hircus) deal with these trade-offs, we asked 1) do goats use social information to make foraging decisions and 2) how do they adjust their intake rate in light of having attracted by other group members? To establish whether goats use social information, we recorded their initial choice of different quality food patches when they were ignorant of patch quality and when they could observe others foraging. After determining that goats use social information, we recorded intake rates while they fed alone and in the presence of potential competitors. Intake rate increased as the number of competitors increased. Interestingly, lone goats achieved an intake rate that was higher than when one competitor was present but similar to when two or more competitors were present. Faster intake rates may allow herbivores to ingest a larger portion of the available food before competing group members arrive at the patch. This however, does not explain the high intake rates achieved when the goats were alone. We provide 2 potential explanations: 1) faster intake rates are a response to greater risk incurred by lone individuals, the loss of social information, and the fear of being left behind by the group and 2) when foraging alone, intake rate is no longer a trade-off between reducing competition and acquiring social information. Thus, individuals are able to feed close to their maximum rate.

Abstract: Conflicts of interest within and between the sexes are important processes leading to variability in mating systems. The behavioral interactions mediating conflict are little documented. We studied pairs and harems of the snail-shell inhabiting cichlid fish Lamprologus ocellatus in the laboratory. Due to their larger size, males controlled the resource that limited breeding: snail shells. Males were able to choose among females ready to spawn. Females were only accepted if they produced a clutch within a few days of settling. When several females attempted to settle simultaneously the larger female settled first. Females were least aggressive when guarding eggs. Secondary females were more likely to settle when the primary female was guarding eggs. In established harems females continued to be aggressive against each other. The male intervened in about 80% of female aggressive interactions. Male intervention activity correlated with the frequency of aggression among the females in his harem. The male usually attacked the aggressor and chased her back to her own snail shell. When a male was removed from his harem, aggression between females increased immediately and usually the secondary female was expelled by the primary female within a few days. Time to harem break-up was shorter the more mobile the primary females' young were and did not correlate with the size difference between harem females. Male L. ocellatus interfere actively in female conflict and keep the harem together against female interests. Female conflict presumably relates to the cost of sharing male parental investment and to the potential of predation by another female's large juveniles on a female's own small juveniles.