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Köhler, W. (1921). Intelligenzprüfungen an Menschenaffen. Berlin: Springer.
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Bshary, R., Wickler, W., & Fricke, H. (2002). Fish cognition: a primate's eye view. Anim. Cogn., 5(1), 1–13.
Abstract: We provide selected examples from the fish literature of phenomena found in fish that are currently being examined in discussions of cognitive abilities and evolution of neocortex size in primates. In the context of social intelligence, we looked at living in individualized groups and corresponding social strategies, social learning and tradition, and co-operative hunting. Regarding environmental intelligence, we searched for examples concerning special foraging skills, tool use, cognitive maps, memory, anti-predator behaviour, and the manipulation of the environment. Most phenomena of interest for primatologists are found in fish as well. We therefore conclude that more detailed studies on decision rules and mechanisms are necessary to test for differences between the cognitive abilities of primates and other taxa. Cognitive research can benefit from future fish studies in three ways: first, as fish are highly variable in their ecology, they can be used to determine the specific ecological factors that select for the evolution of specific cognitive abilities. Second, for the same reason they can be used to investigate the link between cognitive abilities and the enlargement of specific brain areas. Third, decision rules used by fish could be used as 'null-hypotheses' for primatologists looking at how monkeys might make their decisions. Finally, we propose a variety of fish species that we think are most promising as study objects.
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Russon, A. E., & Galdikas, B. M. F. (1995). Constraints on great apes' imitation: Model and action selectivity in rehabilitant orangutan (Pongo pygmaeus) imitation. J. Comp. Psychol., 109(1), 5–17.
Abstract: We discuss selectivity in great ape imitation, on the basis of an observational study of spontaneous imitation in free-ranging rehabilitant orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus). Research on great ape imitation has neglected selectivity, although comparative evidence suggests it may be important. We observed orangutans in central Indonesian Borneo and assessed patterns in the models and actions they spontaneously imitated. The patterns we found resembled those reported in humans. Orangutans preferred models with whom they had positive affective relationships (e.g., important caregiver or older sibling) and actions that reflected their current competence, were receptively familiar, and were relevant to tasks that faced them. Both developmental and individual variability were found. We discuss the probable functions of imitation for great apes and the role of selectivity in directing it. We also make suggestions for more effective elicitation of imitation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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de Waal, F. B. M. (2003). Darwin's legacy and the study of primate visual communication. Ann N Y Acad Sci, 1000, 7–31.
Abstract: After Charles Darwin's The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, published in 1872, we had to wait 60 years before the theme of animal expressions was picked up by another astute observer. In 1935, Nadezhda Ladygina-Kohts published a detailed comparison of the expressive behavior of a juvenile chimpanzee and of her own child. After Kohts, we had to wait until the 1960s for modern ethological analyses of primate facial and gestural communication. Again, the focus was on the chimpanzee, but ethograms on other primates appeared as well. Our understanding of the range of expressions in other primates is at present far more advanced than that in Darwin's time. A strong social component has been added: instead of focusing on the expressions per se, they are now often classified according to the social situations in which they typically occur. Initially, quantitative analyses were sequential (i.e., concerned with temporal associations between behavior patterns), and they avoided the language of emotions. I will discuss some of this early work, including my own on the communicative repertoire of the bonobo, a close relative of the chimpanzee (and ourselves). I will provide concrete examples to make the point that there is a much richer matrix of contexts possible than the common behavioral categories of aggression, sex, fear, play, and so on. Primate signaling is a form of negotiation, and previous classifications have ignored the specifics of what animals try to achieve with their exchanges. There is also increasing evidence for signal conventionalization in primates, especially the apes, in both captivity and the field. This process results in group-specific or “cultural” communication patterns.
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Marino, L. (2002). Convergence of complex cognitive abilities in cetaceans and primates. Brain Behav Evol, 59(1-2), 21–32.
Abstract: What examples of convergence in higher-level complex cognitive characteristics exist in the animal kingdom? In this paper I will provide evidence that convergent intelligence has occurred in two distantly related mammalian taxa. One of these is the order Cetacea (dolphins, whales and porpoises) and the other is our own order Primates, and in particular the suborder anthropoid primates (monkeys, apes, and humans). Despite a deep evolutionary divergence, adaptation to physically dissimilar environments, and very different neuroanatomical organization, some primates and cetaceans show striking convergence in social behavior, artificial 'language' comprehension, and self-recognition ability. Taken together, these findings have important implications for understanding the generality and specificity of those processes that underlie cognition in different species and the nature of the evolution of intelligence.
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Cantlon, J. F., & Brannon, E. M. (2007). How Much Does Number Matter to a Monkey (Macaca mulatta)? Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 33(1), 32–41.
Abstract: Although many animal species can represent numerical values, little is known about how salient number is relative to other object properties for nonhuman animals. In one hypothesis, researchers propose that animals represent number only as a last resort, when no other properties differentiate stimuli. An alternative hypothesis is that animals automatically, spontaneously, and routinely represent the numerical attributes of their environments. The authors compared the influence of number versus that of shape, color, and surface area on rhesus monkeys' (Macaca mulatta) decisions by testing them on a matching task with more than one correct answer: a numerical match and a nonnumerical (color, surface area, or shape) match. The authors also tested whether previous laboratory experience with numerical discrimination influenced a monkey's propensity to represent number. Contrary to the last-resort hypothesis, all monkeys based their decisions on numerical value when the numerical ratio was favorable.
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Swartz, K. B. (1997). What is mirror self-recognition in nonhuman primates, and what is it not? Ann N Y Acad Sci, 818, 64–71.
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Gallup, G. G. J. (1997). On the rise and fall of self-conception in primates. Ann N Y Acad Sci, 818, 72–82.
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Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1996). Why Culture is Common, but Cultural Evolution is Rare. Proc Br Acad, 88, 73–93.
Abstract: If culture is defined as variation acquired and maintained by social learning, then culture is common in nature. However, cumulative cultural evolution resulting in behaviors that no individual could invent on their own is limited to humans, song birds, and perhaps chimpanzees. Circumstantial evidence suggests that cumulative cultural evolution requires the capacity for observational learning. Here, we analyze two models the evolution of psychological capacities that allow cumulative cultural evolution. Both models suggest that the conditions which allow the evolution of such capacities when rare are much more stringent than the conditions which allow the maintenance of the capacities when common. This result follows from the fact that the assumed benefit of the capacities, cumulative cultural adaptation, cannot occur when the capacities are rare. These results suggest why such capacities may be rare in nature.
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de Waal, F. B., Aureli, F., & Judge, P. G. (2000). Coping with crowding. Sci Am, 282(5), 76–81.
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