Home | << 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 >> [11–20] |
Benard, J., Stach, S., & Giurfa, M. (2006). Categorization of visual stimuli in the honeybee Apis mellifera. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 257–270.
Abstract: Categorization refers to the classification of perceptual input into defined functional groups. We present and discuss evidence suggesting that stimulus categorization can also be found in an invertebrate, the honeybee Apis mellifera, thus underlining the generality across species of this cognitive process. Honeybees show positive transfer of appropriate responding from a trained to a novel set of visual stimuli. Such a transfer was demonstrated for specific isolated features such as symmetry or orientation, but also for assemblies (layouts) of features. Although transfer from training to novel stimuli can be achieved by stimulus generalization of the training stimuli, most of these transfer tests involved clearly distinguishable stimuli for which generalization would be reduced. Though in most cases specific experimental controls such as stimulus balance and discriminability are still required, it seems appropriate to characterize the performance of honeybees as reflecting categorization. Further experiments should address the issue of which categorization theory accounts better for the visual performances of honeybees.
|
Bennett, A. T. (1996). Do animals have cognitive maps? J Exp Biol, 199(Pt 1), 219–224.
Abstract: Drawing on studies of humans, rodents, birds and arthropods, I show that 'cognitive maps' have been used to describe a wide variety of spatial concepts. There are, however, two main definitions. One, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, is that a cognitive map is a powerful memory of landmarks which allows novel short-cutting to occur. The other, sensu Gallistel, is that a cognitive map is any representation of space held by an animal. Other definitions with quite different meanings are also summarised. I argue that no animal has been conclusively shown to have a cognitive map, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, because simpler explanations of the crucial novel short-cutting results are invariably possible. Owing to the repeated inability of experimenters to eliminate these simpler explanations over at least 15 years, and the confusion caused by the numerous contradictory definitions of a cognitive map, I argue that the cognitive map is no longer a useful hypothesis for elucidating the spatial behaviour of animals and that use of the term should be avoided.
|
Bentley-Condit, V., & Smith, E. O. (2010). Animal tool use: current definitions and an updated comprehensive catalog. Behaviour, 147(2), 185–32.
Abstract: Despite numerous attempts to define animal tool use over the past four decades, the definition remains elusive and the behaviour classification somewhat subjective. Here, we provide a brief review of the definitions of animal tool use and show how those definitions have been modified over time. While some aspects have remained constant (i.e., the distinction between 'true' and 'borderline' tool use), others have been added (i.e., the distinction between 'dynamic' and 'static' behaviours). We present an updated, comprehensive catalog of documented animal tool use that indicates whether the behaviours observed included any 'true' tool use, whether the observations were limited to captive animals, whether tool manufacture has been observed, and whether the observed tool use was limited to only one individual and, thus, 'anecdotal' (i.e., N = 1). Such a catalog has not been attempted since Beck (1980). In addition to being a useful reference for behaviourists, this catalog demonstrates broad tool use and manufacture trends that may be of interest to phylogenists, evolutionary ecologists, and cognitive evolutionists. Tool use and tool manufacture are shown to be widespread across three phyla and seven classes of the animal kingdom. Moreover, there is complete overlap between the Aves and Mammalia orders in terms of the tool use categories (e.g., food extraction, food capture, agonism) arguing against any special abilities of mammals. The majority of tool users, almost 85% of the entries, use tools in only one of the tool use categories. Only members of the Passeriformes and Primates orders have been observed to use tools in four or more of the ten categories. Thus, observed tool use by some members of these two orders (e.g., Corvus, Papio) is qualitatively different from that of all other animal taxa. Finally, although there are similarities between Aves and Mammalia, and Primates and Passeriformes, primate tool use is qualitatively different. Approximately 35% of the entries for this order demonstrate a breadth of tool use (i.e., three or more categories by any one species) compared to other mammals (0%), Aves (2.4%), and the Passeriformes (3.1%). This greater breadth in tool use by some organisms may involve phylogenetic or cognitive differences � or may simply reflect differences in length and intensity of observations. The impact that tool usage may have had on groups' respective ecological niches and, through niche-construction, on their respective evolutionary trajectories remains a subject for future study.
|
Beran, M. J. (2004). Long-term retention of the differential values of Arabic numerals by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Anim. Cogn., 7(2), 86–92.
Abstract: As previously reported (Beran and Rumbaugh, 2001), two chimpanzees used a joystick to collect dots, one-at-a-time, on a computer monitor, and then ended a trial when the number of dots collected was equal to the Arabic numeral presented for the trial. Here, the chimpanzees were presented with the task again after an interval of 6 months and then again after an additional interval of 3.25 years. During each interval, the chimpanzees were not presented with the task, and this allowed an assessment of the extent to which both animals retained the values of each Arabic numeral. Despite lower performance at each retention interval compared to the original study, both chimpanzees performed above chance levels in collecting a quantity of dots equal to the target numeral, one chimpanzee for the numerals 1-7, and the second chimpanzee for the numerals 1-6. For the 3.25-year retention, errors were more dispersed around each target numeral than in the original study, but the chimpanzees' performances again appeared to be based on a continuous representation of magnitude rather than a discrete representation of number. These data provide an experimental demonstration of long-term retention of the differential values of Arabic numerals by chimpanzees.
|
Beran, M. J. (2007). Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) succeed on a computerized test designed to assess conservation of discrete quantity. Anim. Cogn., 10(1), 37–45.
Abstract: Conservation of quantity occurs through recognition that changes in the physical arrangement of a set of items do not change the quantity of items in that set. Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were presented with a computerized quantity judgment task. Monkeys were rewarded for selecting the greater quantity of items in one of two horizontal arrays of items on the screen. On some trials, after a correct selection, no reward was given but one of the arrays was manipulated. In some cases, this manipulation involved moving items closer together or farther apart to change the physical arrangement of the array without changing the quantity of items in the array. In other cases, additional items were added to the initially smaller array so that it became quantitatively larger. Monkeys then made another selection from the two rows of items. Monkeys were sensitive to these manipulations, changing their selections when the number of items in the rows changed but not when the arrangement only was changed. Therefore, monkeys responded on the basis of the quantity of items, and they were not distracted by non-quantitative manipulations of the sets.
|
Beran, M. J., Beran, M. M., Harris, E. H., & Washburn, D. A. (2005). Ordinal judgments and summation of nonvisible sets of food items by two chimpanzees and a rhesus macaque. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 31(3), 351–362.
Abstract: Two chimpanzees and a rhesus macaque rapidly learned the ordinal relations between 5 colors of containers (plastic eggs) when all containers of a given color contained a specific number of identical food items. All 3 animals also performed at high levels when comparing sets of containers with sets of visible food items. This indicates that the animals learned the approximate quantity of food items in containers of a given color. However, all animals failed in a summation task, in which a single container was compared with a set of 2 containers of a lesser individual quantity but a greater combined quantity. This difficulty was not overcome by sequential presentation of containers into opaque receptacles, but performance improved if the quantitative difference between sizes was very large.
|
Beran, M. J., Pate, J. L., Washburn, D. A., & Rumbaugh, D. M. (2004). Sequential responding and planning in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta). J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 30(3), 203–212.
Abstract: Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) selected either Arabic numerals or colored squares on a computer monitor in a learned sequence. On shift trials, the locations of 2 stimuli were interchanged at some point. More errors were made when this interchange occurred for the next 2 stimuli to be selected than when the interchange was for stimuli later in the sequence. On mask trials, all remaining stimuli were occluded after the 1st selection. Performance exceeded chance levels for only 1 selection after these masks were applied. There was no difference in performance for either stimulus type (numerals or colors). The data indicated that the animals planned only the next selection during these computerized tasks as opposed to planning the entire response sequence.
|
Beran, M. J., Smith, J. D., Redford, J. S., & Washburn, D. A. (2006). Rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) monitor uncertainty during numerosity judgments. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 32(2), 111–119.
Abstract: Two rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) judged arrays of dots on a computer screen as having more or fewer dots than a center value that was never presented in trials. After learning a center value, monkeys were given an uncertainty response that let them decline to make the numerosity judgment on that trial. Across center values (3-7), errors occurred most often for sets adjacent in numerosity to the center value. The monkeys also used the uncertainty response most frequently on these difficult trials. A 2nd experiment showed that monkeys' responses reflected numerical magnitude and not the surface-area illumination of the displays. This research shows that monkeys' uncertainty-monitoring capacity extends to the domain of numerical cognition. It also shows monkeys' use of the purest uncertainty response possible, uncontaminated by any secondary motivator.
|
Berger, J. (1983). Induced abortion and social factors in wild horses. Nature, 303(5912), 59–61.
Abstract: Much evidence now suggests that the postnatal killing of young in primates and carnivores, and induced abortions in some rodents, are evolved traits exerting strong selective pressures on adult male and female behaviour. Among ungulates it is perplexing that either no species have developed convergent tactics or that these behaviours are not reported, especially as ungulates have social systems similar to those of members of the above groups. Only in captive horses (Equus caballus) has infant killing been reported. It has been estimated that 40,000 wild horses live in remote areas of the Great Basin Desert of North America (US Department of Interior (Bureau of Land Management), unpublished report), where they occur in harems (females and young) defended by males. Here I present evidence that, rather than killing infants directly, invading males induce abortions in females unprotected by their resident stallions and these females are then inseminated by the new males.
|
Bergman, T. J., Beehner, J. C., Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (2003). Hierarchical classification by rank and kinship in baboons. Science, 302(5648), 1234–1236.
Abstract: Humans routinely classify others according to both their individual attributes, such as social status or wealth, and membership in higher order groups, such as families or castes. They also recognize that people's individual attributes may be influenced and regulated by their group affiliations. It is not known whether such rule-governed, hierarchical classifications are specific to humans or might also occur in nonlinguistic species. Here we show that baboons recognize that a dominance hierarchy can be subdivided into family groups. In playback experiments, baboons respond more strongly to call sequences mimicking dominance rank reversals between families than within families, indicating that they classify others simultaneously according to both individual rank and kinship. The selective pressures imposed by complex societies may therefore have favored cognitive skills that constitute an evolutionary precursor to some components of human cognition.
|