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Kaiser, L., Smith, K. A., Heleski, C. R., & Spence, L. J. (2006). Effects of a therapeutic riding program on at-risk and special education children. J Am Vet Med Assoc, 228(1), 46–52.
Abstract: OBJECTIVE: To determine the effects of a therapeutic riding program on psychosocial measurements among children considered at risk for poor performance or failure in school or life and among children in special education programs. DESIGN: Observational study. POPULATION: 17 at-risk children (6 boys and 11 girls) and 14 special education children (7 boys and 7 girls). PROCEDURE: For the at-risk children, anger, anxiety, perceived self-competence, and physical coordination were assessed. For the special education children, anger and cheerfulness were measured, and the children's and their mothers' perceptions of the children's behavior were assessed. Measurements were made before and after an 8-session therapeutic riding program. RESULTS: For boys enrolled in the special education program, anger was significantly decreased after completion of the riding program. The boys' mothers also perceived significant improvements in their children's behavior after completion of the program. CONCLUSIONS AND CLINICAL RELEVANCE: Results suggest that an 8-session therapeutic riding program can significantly decrease anger in adolescent boys in a special education program and positively affect their mothers' perception of the boys' behavior.
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Virányi, Z., Topál, J., Miklósi, Á., & Csányi, V. (2006). A nonverbal test of knowledge attribution: a comparative study on dogs and children. Anim. Cogn., 9(1), 13–26.
Abstract: The sensitivity of eleven pet dogs and eleven 2.5-year-old children to others' past perceptual access was tested for object-specificity in a playful, nonverbal task in which a human Helper's knowledge state regarding the whereabouts of a hidden toy and a stick (a tool necessary for getting the out-of-reach toy) was systematically manipulated. In the four experimental conditions the Helper either participated or was absent during hiding of the toy and the stick and therefore she knew the place(s) of (1) both the toy and the stick, (2) only the toy, (3) only the stick or (4) neither of them. The subjects observed the hiding processes, but they could not reach the objects, so they had to involve the Helper to retrieve the toy. The dogs were more inclined to signal the place of the toy in each condition and indicated the location of the stick only sporadically. However the children signalled both the location of the toy and that of the stick in those situations when the Helper had similar knowledge regarding the whereabouts of them (i.e. knew or ignored both of them), and in those conditions in which the Helper was ignorant of the whereabouts of only one object the children indicated the place of this object more often than that of the known one. At the same time however, both dogs and children signalled the place of the toy more frequently if the Helper had been absent during toy-hiding compared to those conditions when she had participated in the hiding. Although this behaviour appears to correspond with the Helper's knowledge state, even the subtle distinction made by the children can be interpreted without a casual understanding of knowledge-formation in others.
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Gallup, G. G. J. (1985). Do minds exist in species other than our own? Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 9(4), 631–641.
Abstract: An answer to the question of animal awareness depends on evidence, not intuition, anecdote, or debate. This paper examines some of the problems inherent in an analysis of animal awareness, and whether animals might be aware of being aware is offered as a more meaningful distinction. A framework is presented which can be used to make a determination about the extent to which other species have experiences similar to ours based on their ability to make inferences and attributions about mental states in others. The evidence from both humans and animals is consistent with the idea that the capacity to use experience to infer the experience of others is a byproduct of self-awareness.
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