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Lee, P. C. (2003). Innovation as a behavioural response to environmental challenges. In S. M. Reader and K. N. Laland (Ed.), Animal Innovation (pp. 261–279). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Laland, K. N., & van Bergen, Y. (2003). Experimental studies of innovation in the guppy. Animal Innovation, , 155–174.
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Greenberg, R. (2003). The role of neophobia and neophilia in the development of innovative behavour in birds. In S. M. Reader and K. N. Laland (Ed.), Animal Innovation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Virányi, Z., Range, F., & Huber, L. (2008). Attentiveness toward others and social learning in domestic dogs. In L. S. Röska-hardy, & E. Neumann-held (Eds.), Learning from Animals?: Examining the Nature of Human Uniqueness (pp. 141–154). New York, NY: Psychology Press.
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de Waal, F. B. M., & Aureli, F. (1996). Consolation, reconciliation, and a possible cognitive difference between macaque and chimpanzee. In A. E. Russon, K. A. Bard, & S. T. Parker (Eds.), Reaching into Thought: The Minds of the Great Apes (pp. 80–110.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Abstract: Russon,A.E.; Bard, K.A.; Parker, S.T.
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Dyer, F. C. (1998). Spatial Cognition: Lessons from Central-place Foraging Insects. In Russell P. Balda, Irene M. Pepperberg, & Alan C. Kamil (Eds.), Animal Cognition in Nature (pp. 119–154). London: Academic Press.
Abstract: Summary Spatial orientation has played an extremely important role in the development of ideas about the behavioral capacities of animals. Indeed, as the modern scientific study of animal behavior emerged from its roots in zoology and experimental psychology, studies of spatial orientation figured in the work of many of the pioneering researchers, including Tinbergen (), von ), Watson () and .
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Smith, W. J. (1998). Cognitive Implications of an Information-sharing Model of Animal Communication. In Russell P. Balda, Irene M. Pepperberg, & Alan C. Kamil (Eds.), Animal Cognition in Nature (pp. 227–243). London: Academic Press.
Abstract: Summary In social communication, one animal signals and another responds. Several cognitive steps are involved as the second animal selects its responses; these steps can be described as follows in terms of an informational model. First, the responding individual must evaluate the information made available by the signaling on the basis of other information, available from sources contextual to the signal. Second, the respondent must fit all of the relevant information into patterns generated from recall of past events (conscious recall is not generally required; pattern fitting is a fundamental skill). Third, conditional predictions must be made; and fourth, the individual must test and modify any of these predictions for which significant consequences exist. Many vertebrate animals appear to respond to signaling with considerable flexibility. Communicative events are thus complex but are by no means intractable. Indeed, communication provides us with excellent opportunities to investigate animal cognition.
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Beer, C. G. (1998). Varying Views of Animal and Human Cognition. In Russell P. Balda, Irene M. Pepperberg, & Alan C. Kamil (Eds.), Animal Cognition in Nature (pp. 435–456). London: Academic Press.
Abstract: Summary In this chapter I want to stand back from the splendid empirical work on animal cognitive capacities that is the focus of this book, and look at the broader context of cognitive concerns within which the work can be viewed. Indeed even the term `cognitive ethology' currently connotes and denotes more than is represented here, as other collections of articles, such as and , exemplify. I include the current descendants of behavioristic learning theory, evolutionary epistemology, evolutionary psychology and the recent comparative turn that has been taken in cognitive science. These several approaches, despite their considerable overlap, often appear independent and even ignorant of one another. Like the proverbial blind men feeling the hide of an elephant, they touch hands from time to time, yet collectively have only a piecemeal and distributed understanding of the shape of the whole. Although each approach may indeed need the space to work out its own conceptual and methodological preoccupations without confounding interference from other views, a utopian spirit envisages an ultimate coming together, a more comprehensive realization of the synthetic approach to animal cognition that is this book's theme.
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Kamil, A. C. (1998). On the Proper Definition of Cognitive Ethology. In Russell P. Balda, Irene M. Pepperberg, & Alan C. Kamil (Eds.), Animal Cognition in Nature (pp. 1–28). London: Academic Press.
Abstract: Summary The last 20-30 years have seen two `scientific revolutions' in the study of animal behavior: the cognitive revolution that originated in psychology, and the Darwinian, behavioral ecology revolution that originated in biology. Among psychologists, the cognitive revolution has had enormous impact. Similarly, among biologists, the Darwinian revolution has had enormous impact. The major theme of this chapter is that these two scientific research programs need to be combined into a single approach, simultaneously cognitive and Darwinian, and that this single approach is most appropriately called cognitive ethology.
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Rubenstein, D. I.,. (1986). Ecology and sociality in horses and zebras. In D. I. Rubenstein, & R. W. Wrangham (Eds.), Ecological Aspects of Social Evolution (pp. 282–302). Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press.
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