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Whiten, A., Custance, D. M., Gomez, J. C., Teixidor, P., & Bard, K. A. (1996). Imitative learning of artificial fruit processing in children (Homo sapiens) and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). J Comp Psychol, 110(1), 3–14.
Abstract: Observational learning in chimpanzees and young children was investigated using an artificial fruit designed as an analog of natural foraging problems faced by primates. Each of 3 principal components could be removed in 2 alternative ways, demonstration of only one of which was watched by each subject. This permitted subsequent imitation by subjects to be distinguished from stimulus enhancement. Children aged 2-4 years evidenced imitation for 2 components, but also achieved demonstrated outcomes through their own techniques. Chimpanzees relied even more on their own techniques, but they did imitate elements of 1 component of the task. To our knowledge, this is the first experimental evidence of chimpanzee imitation in a functional task designed to simulate foraging behavior hypothesized to be transmitted culturally in the wild.
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Gomez, J. - C. (2005). Species comparative studies and cognitive development. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 9(3), 118–125.
Abstract: The comparative study of infant development and animal cognition brings to cognitive science the promise of insights into the nature and origins of cognitive skills. In this article, I review a recent wave of comparative studies conducted with similar methodologies and similar theoretical frameworks on how two core components of human cognition--object permanence and gaze following--develop in different species. These comparative findings call for an integration of current competing accounts of developmental change. They further suggest that evolution has produced developmental devices capable at the same time of preserving core adaptive components, and opening themselves up to further adaptive change, not only in interaction with the external environment, but also in interaction with other co-developing cognitive systems.
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Pepperberg, I. M., & Brezinsky, M. V. (1991). Acquisition of a relative class concept by an African gray parrot (Psittacus erithacus): discriminations based on relative size. J Comp Psychol, 105(3), 286–294.
Abstract: We report that an African gray parrot (Psittacus erithacus), Alex, responds to stimuli on a relative basis. Previous laboratory studies with artificial stimuli (such as pure tones) suggest that birds make relational responses as a secondary strategy, only after they have acquired information about the absolute values of the stimuli. Alex, however, after learning to respond to a small set of exemplars on the basis of relative size, transferred this behavior to novel situations that did not provide specific information about the absolute values of the stimuli. He responded to vocal questions about which was the larger or smaller exemplar by vocally labeling its color or material, and he responded “none” if the exemplars did not differ in size. His overall accuracy was 78.7%.
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Parr, L. A., Winslow, J. T., Hopkins, W. D., & de Waal, F. B. (2000). Recognizing facial cues: individual discrimination by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). J Comp Psychol, 114(1), 47–60.
Abstract: Faces are one of the most salient classes of stimuli involved in social communication. Three experiments compared face-recognition abilities in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). In the face-matching task, the chimpanzees matched identical photographs of conspecifics' faces on Trial 1, and the rhesus monkeys did the same after 4 generalization trials. In the individual-recognition task, the chimpanzees matched 2 different photographs of the same individual after 2 trials, and the rhesus monkeys generalized in fewer than 6 trials. The feature-masking task showed that the eyes were the most important cue for individual recognition. Thus, chimpanzees and rhesus monkeys are able to use facial cues to discriminate unfamiliar conspecifics. Although the rhesus monkeys required many trials to learn the tasks, this is not evidence that faces are not as important social stimuli for them as for the chimpanzees.
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Zentall, T. R. (2006). Mental time travel in animals: a challenging question. Behav. Process., 72(2), 173–183.
Abstract: Humans have the ability to mentally recreate past events (using episodic memory) and imagine future events (by planning). The best evidence for such mental time travel is personal and thus subjective. For this reason, it is particularly difficult to study such behavior in animals. There is some indirect evidence, however, that animals have both episodic memory and the ability to plan for the future. When unexpectedly asked to do so, animals can report about their recent past experiences (episodic memory) and they also appear to be able to use the anticipation of a future event as the basis for a present action (planning). Thus, the ability to imagine past and future events may not be uniquely human.
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Kaiser, D. H., Zentall, T. R., & Neiman, E. (2002). Timing in pigeons: effects of the similarity between intertrial interval and gap in a timing signal. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 28(4), 416–422.
Abstract: Previous research suggests that when a fixed interval is interrupted (known as the gap procedure), pigeons tend to reset memory and start timing from 0 after the gap. However, because the ambient conditions of the gap typically have been the same as during the intertrial interval (ITI), ambiguity may have resulted. In the present experiment, the authors found that when ambient conditions during the gap were similar to the ITI, pigeons tended to reset memory, but when ambient conditions during the gap were different from the ITI, pigeons tended to stop timing, retain the duration of the stimulus in memory, and add to that time when the stimulus reappeared. Thus, when the gap was unambiguous, pigeons timed accurately.
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Zentall, T. R., Roper, K. L., & Sherburne, L. M. (1995). Most directed forgetting in pigeons can be attributed to the absence of reinforcement on forget trials during training or to other procedural artifacts. J Exp Anal Behav, 63(2), 127–137.
Abstract: In research on directed forgetting in pigeons using delayed matching procedures, remember cues, presented in the delay interval between sample and comparisons, have been followed by comparisons (i.e., a memory test), whereas forget cues have been followed by one of a number of different sample-independent events. The source of directed forgetting in delayed matching to sample in pigeons was examined in a 2 x 2 design by independently manipulating whether or not forget-cue trials in training ended with reinforcement and whether or not forget-cue trials in training included a simultaneous discrimination (involving stimuli other than those used in the matching task). Results were consistent with the hypothesis that reinforced responding following forget cues is sufficient to eliminate performance deficits on forget-cue probe trials. Only when reinforcement was omitted on forget-cue trials in training (whether a discrimination was required or not) was there a decrement in accuracy on forget-cue probe trials. When reinforcement is present, however, the pattern of responding established during and following a forget cue in training may also play a role in the directed forgetting effect. These findings support the view that much of the evidence for directed forgetting using matching procedures may result from motivational and behavioral artifacts rather than the loss of memory.
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Urcuioli, P. J., & Zentall, T. R. (1992). Transfer across delayed discriminations: evidence regarding the nature of prospective working memory. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 18(2), 154–173.
Abstract: Pigeons were trained successively either on 2 delayed simple discriminations or on a delayed simple discrimination followed by delayed matching-to-sample. During subsequent transfer tests, the initial stimuli from the 1st task were substituted for those in the 2nd. Performances transferred immediately if both sets of initial stimuli had been associated with the presence versus absence of food on their respective retention tests, and the direction of transfer (positive or negative) depended on whether the substitution involved stimuli with identical or different outcome associates. No transfer was found, however, when the initial stimuli were associated with different patterns of responding but food occurred at the end of every trial. These results are consistent with outcome expectancy mediation but are incompatible with response intention and retrospective coding accounts.
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Urcuioli, P. J., & Zentall, T. R. (1986). Retrospective coding in pigeons' delayed matching-to-sample. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 12(1), 69–77.
Abstract: In this study we examined how coding processes in pigeons' delayed matching-to-sample were affected by the stimuli to be remembered. In Experiment 1, two groups of pigeons initially learned 0-delay matching-to-sample with identical comparison stimuli (vertical and horizontal lines) but with different sample stimuli (red and green hues or vertical and horizontal lines). Longer delays were then introduced between sample offset and comparison onset to assess whether pigeons were prospectively coding the same events (viz., the correct line comparisons) or retrospectively coding different events (viz., their respective sample stimuli). The hue-sample group matched more accurately and showed a slower rate of forgetting than the line-sample group. In Experiment 2, pigeons were trained with either hues or lines as both sample and comparison stimuli, or with hue samples and line comparisons or vice versa. Subsequent delay tests revealed that the hue-sample groups remembered more accurately and generally showed slower rates of forgetting than the line-sample groups. Comparison dimension had little or no effect on performance. Together, these data suggest that pigeons retrospectively code the samples in delayed matching-to-sample.
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Hampton, R. R., & Shettleworth, S. J. (1996). Hippocampus and memory in a food-storing and in a nonstoring bird species. Behav Neurosci, 110(5), 946–964.
Abstract: Food-storing birds maintain in memory a large and constantly changing catalog of the locations of stored food. The hippocampus of food-storing black-capped chickadees (Parus atricapillus) is proportionally larger than that of nonstoring dark-eyed juncos (Junco hyemalis). Chickadees perform better than do juncos in an operant test of spatial non-matching-to-sample (SNMTS), and chickadees are more resistant to interference in this paradigm. Hippocampal lesions attenuate performance in SNMTS and increase interference. In tests of continuous spatial alternation (CSA), juncos perform better than chickadees. CSA performance also declines following hippocampal lesions. By itself, sensitivity of a given task to hippocampal damage does not predict the direction of memory differences between storing and nonstoring species.
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