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Nathan J. Emery. (2005). The Evolution of Social Cognition. In The Cognitive Neuroscience of Social BehaviourGarten. Psychology Press.
Abstract: Although this bookis focusedon the cognitive neuroscience ofhuman social behaviour, an
understandingofsocial cognition in non-human animals is critical for unravellingthe neural basis of
social cognition in humans as well as the selective pressures that have shapedthe evolution ofcomplex
social cognition. Thanks to methodological limitations, we know little about the relationships between
certain biochemical andelectrophysiological properties ofthe human brain andhow theycompute the
behaviour andmental states ofother individuals. Traditional techniques for examiningneural function
in humans, such as event-relatedpotentials (ERP),positron emission tomography(PET),and
functional magnetic resonance imaging(fMRI),are constrainedbythe fact that subjects are placed
either into an immoveable scanner with a lot ofbackgroundnoise or wiredup with dozens of
electrodes that are sensitive to slight movements. The possibilityofscanningor recordingbrain waves
from two individuals that are physicallyinteractingsociallyis technicallyimpossible at present
(however, see Montague et al, 2002 for a new methodfor simultaneouslyscanningtwo individuals
interactingvia a computer).
The onlywayto understandthe neurocognitive architecture ofhuman social behaviour is to examine
similar social processes in both human andnon-human animal minds andmake comparisons at the
species level. An additional argument is that traditional human socio-cognitive tasks are dependent on
the use ofstories, cartoons andverbal cues andinstructions (Heberlein & Adolphs, this volume)which
themselves will elicit specific neural responses that have to be eliminatedfrom neural responses
specificallyrelatedto mindreading. Therefore, the development ofnon-verbal tasks wouldprovide a
breakthrough for studies in non-linguistic animals, pre-verbal human infants andhuman cognitive
neuroimaging.
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Hare, B., & Tomasello, M. (2005). Human-like social skills in dogs? Trends. Cognit. Sci., 9(9), 439–444.
Abstract: Domestic dogs are unusually skilled at reading human social and communicative behavior--even more so than our nearest primate relatives. For example, they use human social and communicative behavior (e.g. a pointing gesture) to find hidden food, and they know what the human can and cannot see in various situations. Recent comparisons between canid species suggest that these unusual social skills have a heritable component and initially evolved during domestication as a result of selection on systems mediating fear and aggression towards humans. Differences in chimpanzee and human temperament suggest that a similar process may have been an important catalyst leading to the evolution of unusual social skills in our own species. The study of convergent evolution provides an exciting opportunity to gain further insights into the evolutionary processes leading to human-like forms of cooperation and communication.
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Dunbar, R. (2003). Evolution of the social brain. Science, 302(5648), 1160–1161.
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Zhou, W. - X., Sornette, D., Hill, R. A., & Dunbar, R. I. M. (2005). Discrete hierarchical organization of social group sizes. Proc Biol Sci, 272(1561), 439–444.
Abstract: The 'social brain hypothesis' for the evolution of large brains in primates has led to evidence for the coevolution of neocortical size and social group sizes, suggesting that there is a cognitive constraint on group size that depends, in some way, on the volume of neural material available for processing and synthesizing information on social relationships. More recently, work on both human and non-human primates has suggested that social groups are often hierarchically structured. We combine data on human grouping patterns in a comprehensive and systematic study. Using fractal analysis, we identify, with high statistical confidence, a discrete hierarchy of group sizes with a preferred scaling ratio close to three: rather than a single or a continuous spectrum of group sizes, humans spontaneously form groups of preferred sizes organized in a geometrical series approximating 3-5, 9-15, 30-45, etc. Such discrete scale invariance could be related to that identified in signatures of herding behaviour in financial markets and might reflect a hierarchical processing of social nearness by human brains.
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Janik, V. M. (2000). Whistle matching in wild bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus). Science, 289(5483), 1355–1357.
Abstract: Dolphin communication is suspected to be complex, on the basis of their call repertoires, cognitive abilities, and ability to modify signals through vocal learning. Because of the difficulties involved in observing and recording individual cetaceans, very little is known about how they use their calls. This report shows that wild, unrestrained bottlenose dolphins use their learned whistles in matching interactions, in which an individual responds to a whistle of a conspecific by emitting the same whistle type. Vocal matching occurred over distances of up to 580 meters and is indicative of animals addressing each other individually.
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Reeve, H. K. (1997). Evolutionarily stable communication between kin: a general model. Proc. Roy. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci., 264((1384)). Retrieved May 30, 2024, from http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.1997.0143
Abstract: At present, the most general evolutionary theory of honest communication is Grafen's model of Zahavi's 'handicap' signalling system, in which honesty of signals about the signaller's quality (e.g. mate suitability or fighting ability) is maintained by the differentially high cost of signals to signallers having lower quality. The latter model is here further generalized to include any communication between signallers and receivers that are genetically related (e.g. parents and begging offspring, cooperative or competing siblings). Signalling systems involving relatives are shown to be evolutionarily stable, despite a potential pay-off for false signalling, if the Zahavian assumption of differential signal costs holds and there are diminishing reproductive returns to the signaller as the receiver's assessed value of its attribute increases, or if, regardless of whether the Zahavian assumption holds, signallers with high values of the attribute benefit more from a given receiver assessment than signallers with low values (e.g. begging chicks that are hungrier benefit more from being fed). In stable systems of signalling among kin, it is also shown to be generally true that (i) levels of signalling and thus observed signal costs will decline as relatedness increases or as the receiver's reproductive penalty for erroneous assessment increases, and (ii) receivers will consistently, altruistically overestimate the true value of the signalled attribute.
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Brilot, B. O., & Johnstone, R. A. (2003). The limits to cost-free signalling of need between relatives. Proc Biol Sci, 270(1519), 1055–1060.
Abstract: Theoretical models have demonstrated the possibility of stable cost-free signalling of need between relatives. The stability of these cost-free equilibria depends on the indirect fitness cost of cheating and deceiving a donor into giving away resources. We show that this stability is highly sensitive to the distribution of need among signallers and receivers. In particular, cost-free signalling is likely to prove stable only if there is very large variation in need (such that the least-needy individuals stand to gain much less than the most-needy individuals from additional resources). We discuss whether these conditions are likely to be found in altricial avian breeding systems--the most intensively studied instance of signalling of need between relatives. We suggest that cost-free signalling is more likely to prove stable and will provide parents with more information during the earlier phases of chick growth, when parents can more easily meet the demands of a brood (and chicks are more likely to reach satiation). Later, informative yet cost-free signalling is unlikely to persist.
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Bergstrom, C. T., & Lachmann, M. (1997). Signalling among relatives. I. Is costly signalling too costly? Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 352(1353), 609–617.
Abstract: ahavi's handicap principle,originally proposed as an explanation for sexual selection ofelaborate male traits, suggests that a sufficient cost to dishonest signals can outweigh the rewards of deception and allow individuals to communicate honestly. Maynard Smith (1991) and Johnstone and Grafen (1992) introduce the Sir Philip Sidney game in order to extend the handicap principle to interactions among related individuals, and to demonstrate that stable costly signalling systems can exist among relatives.
In this paper we demonstrate that despite the benefits associated with honest information transfer, the costs incurred in a stable costly signalling system may leave all participants worse off than they would be in a system with no signalling at all. In both the discrete and continuous forms of the Sir Philip Sidney game, there exist conditions under which costly signalling among relatives, while stable, is so costly that it is disadvantageous compared with no signalling at all. We determine the factors which dictate signal cost and signal benefit in a generalized version of this game, and explain how signal cost can exceed signal value. Such results raise concerns about theevolutionary pathways which could have led to the existence of signalling equilibria in nature. The paper stresses the importance of comparing signalling equilibria with other possible strategies, beforedrawing conclusions regarding the optimality of signalling.
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Bergstrom, C. T., & Lachmann, M. (1998). Signaling among relatives. III. Talk is cheap. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 95(9), 5100–5105.
Abstract: The Sir Philip Sidney game has been used by numerous authors to show how signal cost can facilitate honest signaling among relatives. Here, we demonstrate that, in this game, honest cost-free signals are possible as well, under very general conditions. Moreover, these cost-free signals are better for all participants than the previously explored alternatives. Recent empirical evidence suggests that begging is energetically inexpensive for nestling birds; this finding led some researchers to question the applicability of the costly signaling framework to nestling begging. Our results show that cost-free or inexpensive signals, as observed empirically, fall within the framework of signaling theory.
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Lindberg, A. C., Kelland, A., & Nicol, C. J. (1999). Effects of observational learning on acquisition of an operant response in horses. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 61(3), 187–199.
Abstract: The effect of observational learning on the acquisition of an operant response was examined in eighteen riding horses and ponies. The test horses were randomly divided into three groups of six and individually exposed to one of three treatments. An additional horse was trained as a demonstrator, to perform the operant response. The observer horses watched either the demonstrator performing the bin-opening response (Group D+B); the demonstrator standing passively (Group D); or the operant bin in the absence of the demonstrator (Group B). Observers had access to and were free to interact with an identical bin during testing. Observers in Groups D+B and D were socially familiar with the demonstrator. Each test horse was tested once a day for 10 days. An ANOVA revealed no significant differences between treatment groups in the number of responses or the time taken to reach the learning criterion. However, there were highly significant differences between breed types, with non-warmbloods performing more bouts of opening the bin and feeding (p=0.02), feeding from the bin sooner (p=0.01) and reaching the criterion for learning sooner than warmbloods (p=0.05). There was also a significant negative linear relationship between horses' ages and time spent investigating the bin, with younger horses performing more investigative behaviour (y=-3.08x+106.86; p=0.02).
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