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| Author |
Ohtsuki, H.; Iwasa, Y.; Nowak, M.A. |
| Title |
Indirect reciprocity provides only a narrow margin of efficiency for costly punishment |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2009 |
Publication |
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Abbreviated Journal |
Nature |
| Volume |
457 |
Issue |
7225 |
Pages |
79-82 |
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| Abstract |
Indirect reciprocity1, 2, 3, 4, 5 is a key mechanism for the evolution of human cooperation. Our behaviour towards other people depends not only on what they have done to us but also on what they have done to others. Indirect reciprocity works through reputation5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17. The standard model of indirect reciprocity offers a binary choice: people can either cooperate or defect. Cooperation implies a cost for the donor and a benefit for the recipient. Defection has no cost and yields no benefit. Currently there is considerable interest in studying the effect of costly (or altruistic) punishment on human behaviour18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25. Punishment implies a cost for the punished person. Costly punishment means that the punisher also pays a cost. It has been suggested that costly punishment between individuals can promote cooperation. Here we study the role of costly punishment in an explicit model of indirect reciprocity. We analyse all social norms, which depend on the action of the donor and the reputation of the recipient. We allow errors in assigning reputation and study gossip as a mechanism for establishing coherence. We characterize all strategies that allow the evolutionary stability of cooperation. Some of those strategies use costly punishment; others do not. We find that punishment strategies typically reduce the average payoff of the population. Consequently, there is only a small parameter region where costly punishment leads to an efficient equilibrium. In most cases the population does better by not using costly punishment. The efficient strategy for indirect reciprocity is to withhold help for defectors rather than punishing them. |
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Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved |
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0028-0836 |
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| Notes |
10.1038/nature07601 |
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no |
| Call Number |
Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
4705 |
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| Author |
Clayton, N.S.; Dickinson, A. |
| Title |
Episodic-like memory during cache recovery by scrub jays |
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Journal Article |
| Year |
1998 |
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Abbreviated Journal |
Nature |
| Volume |
395 |
Issue |
6699 |
Pages |
272-274 |
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| Abstract |
The recollection of past experiences allows us to recall what a particular event was, and where and when it occurred1,2, a form of memory that is thought to be unique to humans3. It is known, however, that food-storing birds remember the spatial location4, 5, 6 and contents6, 7, 8, 9 of their caches. Furthermore, food-storing animals adapt their caching and recovery strategies to the perishability of food stores10, 11, 12, 13, which suggests that they are sensitive to temporal factors. Here we show that scrub jays (Aphelocoma coerulescens) remember 'when' food items are stored by allowing them to recover perishable 'wax worms' (wax-moth larvae) and non-perishable peanuts which they had previously cached in visuospatially distinct sites. Jays searched preferentially for fresh wax worms, their favoured food, when allowed to recover them shortly after caching. However, they rapidly learned to avoid searching for worms after a longer interval during which the worms had decayed. The recovery preference of jays demonstrates memory of where and when particular food items were cached, thereby fulfilling the behavioural criteria for episodic-like memory in non-human animals. |
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0028-0836 |
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10.1038/26216 |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
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4788 |
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| Author |
Couzin, I.D.; Krause, J.; Franks, N.R.; Levin, S.A. |
| Title |
Effective leadership and decision-making in animal groups on the move |
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Journal Article |
| Year |
2005 |
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Nature |
| Volume |
433 |
Issue |
7025 |
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513-516 |
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0028-0836 |
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10.1038/nature03236 |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
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4827 |
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| Author |
Fehr, E.; Gachter, S. |
| Title |
Altruistic punishment in humans |
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Journal Article |
| Year |
2002 |
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Abbreviated Journal |
Nature |
| Volume |
415 |
Issue |
6868 |
Pages |
137-140 |
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Human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. These patterns of cooperation cannot be explained by the nepotistic motives associated with the evolutionary theory of kin selection and the selfish motives associated with signalling theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism. Here we show experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We show that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence indicates that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment. These results suggest that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punishment. |
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0028-0836 |
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no |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
4835 |
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| Author |
Clutton-Brock, T.H.; Parker, G.A. |
| Title |
Punishment in animal societies |
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Journal Article |
| Year |
1995 |
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Nature |
| Volume |
373 |
Issue |
6511 |
Pages |
209-216 |
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Although positive reciprocity (reciprocal altruism) has been a focus of interest in evolutionary biology, negative reciprocity (retaliatory infliction of fitness reduction) has been largely ignored. In social animals, retaliatory aggression is common, individuals often punish other group members that infringe their interests, and punishment can cause subordinates to desist from behaviour likely to reduce the fitness of dominant animals. Punishing strategies are used to establish and maintain dominance relationships, to discourage parasites and cheats, to discipline offspring or prospective sexual partners and to maintain cooperative behaviour. |
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| Notes |
10.1038/373209a0 |
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no |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
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4838 |
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| Author |
Packer, C. |
| Title |
Reciprocal altruism in Papio anubis |
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Journal Article |
| Year |
1977 |
Publication |
Nature |
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Nature |
| Volume |
265 |
Issue |
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Pages |
441-445 |
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10.1038/265441a0 |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
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4840 |
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| Author |
Nowak, M.A.; Sigmund, K. |
| Title |
Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations |
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Journal Article |
| Year |
1992 |
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Nature |
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Nature |
| Volume |
355 |
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250-253 |
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10.1038/355250a0 |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
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4842 |
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| Author |
Maynard Smith, J.; Price, G.R. |
| Title |
The Logic of Animal Conflict |
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Journal Article |
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1973 |
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Nature |
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Nature |
| Volume |
246 |
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15-18 |
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10.1038/246015a0 |
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no |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
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4844 |
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| Author |
Hamilton, W.D. |
| Title |
Selfish and Spiteful Behaviour in an Evolutionary Model |
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Journal Article |
| Year |
1970 |
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Nature |
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Nature |
| Volume |
228 |
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1218-1220 |
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10.1038/2281218a0 |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
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4853 |
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| Author |
Reeve, H.K. |
| Title |
Queen activation of lazy workers in colonies of the eusocial naked mole-rat |
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Journal Article |
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1992 |
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Nature |
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Nature |
| Volume |
358 |
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147-149 |
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10.1038/358147a0 |
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no |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
4921 |
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