Abstract: Domestic fowl were deprived of the opportunity to perform litter-related behaviour for three or four days and were tested in a Y-maze (which they had previously been trained to run) for their ability to associate a coloured cue with gaining access to peat. When the goal boxes were within sight of the choice point, most birds chose peat. However, when the birds had to rely solely on the coloured cue only one bird from 12 showed learning. However, the birds seemed to have some expectation of a reward, as they ran faster if, on the previous trial, they had chosen peat. The inability of the birds to learn the association may have been an artefact of the schedule of deprivation and testing, for when they were hungry and tested in the same way they were again unable to learn an association between the same coloured cue and food reward. The experiment with peat was repeated using “massed” trials (several trials in immediate succession) during training and testing and six from 15 birds showed learning. These results suggest that the initial failure to learn was probably due to the training and testing schedule, that access to peat appears to be rewarding and that hens can learn an association between an abstract cue and a rewarding consequence. This is consistent with the possibility that domestic fowls may have some cognitive representation of peat when it is out of sight.

Abstract: Recent interest has focused on the advantage of intensively handling young foals as a means of producing more tractable horses, accustomed to humans and receptive to training. To date, the effect of this intensive handling, dubbed “imprint training” in the popular literature, has not been tested. The present study compares seven foals handled intensively as neonates with eight untreated controls. The handling protocol started from 2-8 h after birth and continued daily for a total of 5 days. The protocol consisted of a series of stimuli and experiences that were each repeated until the foal no longer resisted or reacted negatively. Subsequently, foals were tested before weaning, at 4 months of age. Results indicated that handled foals (HF) ranked higher than control foals (CF) in subjective ratings of calmness (*P<0.0117) and friendliness (*P<0.0001) and in several specific handling tasks (venipuncture *P<0.0220; placing in stock *P<0.0128). Although, in approach tests all foals but one allowed approach of a person to 4 m, significantly more HF approached the person than CF (P<0.0080). In stimulus tests, foals were presented specific stimuli to which they had been tested as neonates. Two of eight CF were too unruly and dangerous to test. Of foals that could be tested, CF required significantly more time to hook-up a heart rate monitor (**P<0.0055). Split-plot analysis indicated that HF had lower heart rates to initial left-sided stimuli, presented first, than CF (*P<0.0421). In response to right-sided stimuli, heart rate scores of CF were not significantly different from HF (P<0.2259), suggesting reduced reactivity over time due to a learning effect. Behavioral responses to specific stimuli did not differ between CF and HF, suggesting that neonatal handling has a general rather than specific effect on subsequent behavior. Cortisol concentrations were measured before and after testing and the difference calculated. All foals had higher post-testing levels than pre-testing levels. There was a significant difference between HF and CF, indicating greater reactivity among the CF (*P<0.050). In general, the results indicated that foals handled as neonates were more tractable and less reactive. Specific neonatal handling tasks, such as sticking a finger up the foal's nose or patting the bottom of the foot, seemed to have no beneficial effect on related tasks such as passing a nasogastric tube or tapping with a farrier's hammer at 4 months of age. Mechanisms for the observed effect of neonatal handling require further investigation.

Abstract: In the current study two groups of young chimpanzees (4–6 and 8–9 years old) were given a T-bar and a food item that could only be reached by using the T-bar. Experimental subjects were given the opportunity to observe an adult using the stick as a tool to obtain the food; control subjects were exposed to the adult but were given no demonstration. Subjects in the older group did not learn to use the tool. Subjects in the younger group who were exposed to the demonstrator learned to use the stick as a tool much more readily than those who were not. None of the subjects demonstrated an ability to imitatively copy the demonstrator's precise behavioral strategies. More than simple stimulus enhancement was involved, however, since both groups manipulated the T-bar, but only experimental subjects used it in its function as a tool. Our findings complement naturalistic observations in suggesting that chimpanzee tool-use is in some sense «culturally transmitted» — though perhaps not in the same sense as social-conventional behaviors for which precise copying of conspecifics is crucial.

Abstract: It is often argued that culture is adaptive because it allows people to acquire useful information without costly learning. In a recent paper Rogers (1989) analyzed a simple mathematical model that showed that this argument is wrong. Here we show that Rogers' result is robust. As long as the only benefit of social learning is that imitators avoid learning costs, social learning does not increase average fitness. However, we also show that social learning can be adaptive if it makes individual learning more accurate or less costly.

Abstract: Most social scientists would agree that the capacity for human culture was probably fashioned by natural selection, but they disagree about the implications of this supposition. Some believe that natural selection imposes important constraints on the ways in which culture can vary, while others believe that any such constraints must be negligible. This article employs a “thought experiment” to demonstrate that neither of these positions can be justified by appeal to general properties of culture or of evolution. Natural selection can produce mechanisms of cultural transmission that are neither adaptive nor consistent with the predictions of acultural evolutionary models (those ignoring cultural evolution). On the other hand, natural selection can also produce mechanisms of cultural transmission that are highly consistent with acultural models. Thus, neither side of the sociobiology debate is justified in dismissing the arguments of the other. Natural selection may impose significant constraints on some human behaviors, but negligible constraints on others. Models of simultaneous genetic/cultural evolution will be useful in identifying domains in which acultural evolutionary models are, and are not, likely to be useful.